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ABSTRACT 
The following thesis investigates the MACR in African Legal Systems.  The MACR 
is the youngest age at which children in conflict with the law find themselves caught 
up in the harsh realities of the criminal justice system.  Up until recently, debates 
around fixing a MACR had been successfully side-stepped since the adoption of the 
UNCRC in 1989.  The UNCRC has provided for human rights for children on a 
global scale while the ACRWC provides for such rights regionally.  Contracting 
States Parties to these treaties agree that there needs to be a MACR in place and have 
adopted a children’s rights-based framework for reviewing their current child laws, 
policies and practices in accordance with the minimum standards provided.  They do 
not however, agree on what the fixed minimum age should be.   
 
At international level, the debates around what the minimum age should be were laid 
to rest with the advent of the CROC’s General Comment No.10 in 2007.  The 
international community fixed the MACR at the age of 12.  The States Parties under 
study are both signatories to both the UNCRC and ACRWC.  At regional level, the 
ACERWC has not introduced any concrete documentation concerning what the fixed 
minimum age should be.  This has posed a problem for some contracting States 
Parties who have a fixed minimum age set lower than 12.  These States Parties are 
encouraged through the system of State reporting to raise their minimums in 
accordance with international law.    
 
This thesis looks at the domestication of international law, especially General 
Comment No. 10, and how it impacts on the States Parties national legal system and 
their MACR laws.  It highlights the various legal reform processes undertaken in the 
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countries under study in determining their MACR, and some of the problems related 
to  establishing a MACR as well as the arguments in favour of both lower and higher 
MACR’s.   
 
A whole chapter of this work is devoted to South Africa’s juvenile justice reform as it 
is representative of some of the other African legal systems that used South Africa’s 
Child Justice Bill as a good practice model for their own process of legislative reform.  
It provides a critical analysis of the trenchant debates and case law that underpin the 
rationale for South Africa’s chosen MACR.  Chapter 2 of this Bill provides all the 
necessary information pertaining to the criminal capacity of children under the age of 
14 years and other matters relating to age.  The Bill has undergone considerable 
changes since its first appearance in Parliament in 2002, especially with regard to 
chapter 2.  The MACR for South Africa remains below the minimum age required at 
international law.  The drafters of the Bill, however, have seen it fit to put 
mechanisms in place that will ensure that the MACR is reviewed regularly with a 
view to increasing the MACR in the next 5 years.  
 
In conclusion I argue that countries under study have started their child law reform 
processes.  Yet, more than half fall short of the minimum age requirement set by the 
CROC in General Comment No.10.  The CROC must remain patient while these 
countries continue to review their MACR in an attempt to raise it in accordance with 
international principles.      
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
AND THE MINIMUM AGE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILTY (MACR) 
 
1. Aims and rationale of the research 
This thesis seeks to investigate a specific aspect of juvenile justice, namely the 
MACR in the African legal systems that have been selected for the purpose of this 
study.  The administration of juvenile justice has had many far reaching developments 
over the last decade, both internationally and nationally.  There has been much debate 
and development in the area concerning children in conflict with the law and the 
MACR.  In light of developing international law regarding the MACR, this 
investigation needs to be done within a children’s rights framework incorporating a 
rights-based approach.  The work started by Godfrey Odongo1 and the recent 
approach adopted by the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CROC) in General 
Comment No. 102 forms the basis of this thesis.     
 
The aims of this thesis is to assess, compare and analyse the MACR in accordance 
with the harmonisation of national and international laws, as reflected against the 
backdrop of 1) recent international standards and 2) African realities.  The writer 
proposes to carry out the aims of the research by furthering the work started by 
Godfrey Odongo in 2005 in conjunction with the groundbreaking General Comment 
No.10 and its views on the MACR.  In 2005 Godfrey Odongo submitted his LLD 
thesis on ‘The domestication if international law standards on the rights of the child 
                                               
1
 GO Odongo (2005) ‘The domestication of international law standards on the rights of the child with 
specific reference to juvenile justice in the African context’ (Unpublished LLD Thesis).   
2
 ‘Children’s rights in juvenile justice’, CRC/C/GC/10, 2 February 2007. 
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with specific reference to juvenile justice in the African context’.  His research 
concentrated on the following six African countries, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Namibia, South Africa and Uganda.  Chapter 4 of his thesis was dedicated to the issue 
of age and criminal responsibility and legal reform in this regard.  Two years later, the 
Committee on the Rights of the Child (CROC) produced General Comment No.10 
which has provided signatories with a chronological minimum age.  My thesis recaps 
on the work of Odongo, in so far as the MACR is concerned and reviewss a further 
six African countries, to illustrate the international developments that have occurred 
since 2005 and how it impacts on national legal systems and children in conflict with 
the law.  Finally, it will provide a critique of the position adopted by the CROC which 
conflicts with the position held by the South African Law Reform Commission 
(SALRC) and the many African countries who practice the doli incapax rule.  
 
The countries I selected to research are Gambia, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Sierra Leone and Zambia.  They were chosen on the following basis; firstly due to the 
availability of information and English texts3 at the time I started my research at the 
beginning of 2007, secondly because all six (as well as the six countries chosen by 
Odongo) are signatories of both the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (UNCRC) and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACRWC) and finally as they are all developing countries that share similar problems 
culturally, economically, practically and socially.  The legal reform taken by these 
countries and the implementation thereof will serve to illustrate the practical 
implications of the MACR pre and post General Comment No.10 and how the States 
Parties have attempted to implement suitable MACR’s into their respective legal 
                                               
3
 There were many other countries that I could have selected but their documents were not in English.  
Thus the language barrier prevented me from choosing possible other countries.  
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systems.  It will become clear in chapter 3 that a suitable MACR may sometimes fall 
short of international standards and that the States Parties are urged to continue to 
review their existing legislation in an attempt to raise their MACR in accordance with 
international standards.   
 
South Africa is used as a case study to detail some of the arguments for and against a 
MACR in accordance with international standards and the retention of the 
controversial doli incapax rule.  The rationale behind focusing on South Africa is 
firstly due to the writer being a South African and is thus far better acquainted with its 
legal system and secondly, as some of these African countries have relied on South 
Africa’s Child Justice Bill4 as a good practice model5 and thirdly on account of the 
MACR recently receiving much attention on the parliamentary agenda this year.        
 
2. The meaning and significance of the MACR 
The concept of an age of criminal responsibility relates to the age at which a child has 
the mental ability to distinguish between right and wrong and can understand or 
appreciate the consequences involved (cognitive mental function) and can act in 
accordance with such understanding or appreciation (conative mental function).6  It is 
the age at which children have the capacity to commit crimes and to accept 
responsibility for their actions, thus rendering them liable for prosecution and formal 
                                               
4
 B 49 of 2002 (2008 Cabinet version as approved by the National Assembly). 
5
 L Ehlers ‘Child Justice:  Comparing the South African child justice reform process and experiences of 
juvenile justice reform in the United States of America’ Occasional Paper 1 July 2006 31, 39.  The Bill 
has served as a good practice model for Gambia, Lesotho and Namibia.  
6
 Rumpff Report (1967) ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the responsibility of mentally 
deranged persons and related matters’ 72; E Burchell & P Hunt (1997) ‘South Africa Criminal Law and 
Procedure.  Vol 1 General Principles of Criminal Law’ 153; C Snyman (2002) ‘Criminal Law’ 177, 
178; J Burchell & J Milton (2005) ‘Principles of Criminal Law’ 358. 
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sanctions.7  A MACR is indicative of the lowest age at which a State or international 
community is willing to hold children liable for their alleged criminal acts in a court 
of law.8    Children who commit criminal acts but are below the MACR should not be 
exempted from being held accountable.  Their accountability should, however, be 
based on civil law measures of welfare, educational or non-punitive measures rather 
than criminal sanctions.9   
 
The significance of a MACR is based on the universal trend that children are slow in 
developing mental capacity.10  Secondly, they often find themselves amongst the 
marginalised and vulnerable groups in society which leads to all kinds of abuse.  
Research has shown that the criminal justice system is not the most appropriate place 
to deal with such children and it is imperative that legal systems have protection 
measures in place to protect these children who find themselves in this unfortunate 
position.11  Thus all children in conflict with law should be entitled to the MACR 
protections provided in the UNCRC, other UN standards and the ACRWC (discussed 
in chapter 2).    
 
                                               
7
 GO Odongo (2007) ‘A case for raising minimum age of criminal responsibility’.  Available at 
http://www.africanchildforum.org/Documents/age_of_cri_response.pdf [accessed 02 October 2008]. 
8
 DJ Cipriani (2008) ‘Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility:  A Global 
Perspective’.  Available at http://www.worldcat.org/wcpa/oclc/213330715 [Accessed 11 September 
2008].  
9
 DJ Cipriani (2005) ‘South Asia and the minimum age of criminal responsibility:  Raising the standard 
for children’s rights’.  Available at http://www.unicef .org/rosa/Criminal 
_Responsibility_08July_05(final_copy).pdf [ accessed 23 September 2008]; CRC/C/GC/10 para 31. 
10
 GO Odongo (2007) ‘A case for raising minimum age of criminal responsibility’.  Available at 
http://www.africanchildforum.org/Documents/age_of_cri_response.pdf [accessed 02 October 2008]. 
11
 DJ Cipriani (2005) ‘South Asia and the minimum age of criminal responsibility:  Raising the 
standard for children’s rights’.  Available at http://www.unicef .org/rosa/Criminal 
_Responsibility_08July_05(final_copy).pdf [ accessed 23 September 2008]. 
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3. Problem statement 
Investigating the MACR may tender difficulties in light of the fact that many African 
countries are developing countries structured upon deep rooted rural and cultural 
differences.12  The actual determination of a child’s true age is, and remains to be, a 
pressing issue in developing African legal systems.  Poor infrastructure in many of 
these countries results in birth records being inaccessible or virtually non-existent 
which in turn leads to a lack of proof of age and reliable age estimates.13  To further 
complicate matters, lenient treatment afforded to child offenders by the child justice 
system is used by many adults as a forum to misrepresent their true age and slip 
through the system.14  Another pressing problem is the absence of appropriate 
responses to children below the age of the MACR and where there are responses they 
tend to be of a punitive nature.15  Despite the CROC fixing a minimum age at 12, 
some countries still have a lower age minimum which leads to disarray and non-
uniformity amongst States Parties in the criminal justice sphere.    
 
 
 
                                               
12
 L Ehlers ‘Child Justice:  Comparing the South African child justice reform process and experiences 
of juvenile justice reform in the United States of America’ Occasional Paper 1 July 2006 11.  
13
 DJ Cipriani (2005) ‘South Asia and the minimum age of criminal responsibility:  Raising the 
standard for children’s rights’.  Available at http://www.unicef .org/rosa/Criminal 
_Responsibility_08July_05(final_copy).pdf [ accessed 23 September 2008]; DJ Cipriani (2008) 
‘Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility:  A Global Perspective’.  
Available at http://www.worldcat.org/wcpa/oclc/213330715 [Accessed 11 September 2008].  
14
 Children’s Rights Project (2007) Children Used By Adults to Commit Crimes (CUBAC):  Final 
Report on Pilot Programme Implementation. 
15
 DJ Cipriani (2008) ‘Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility:  A Global 
Perspective’.  Available at http://www.worldcat.org/wcpa/oclc/213330715 [Accessed 11 September 
2008].  
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
4. Delineation of chapters  
4.1 Chapter 1  
The introduction sets out the aims and rationale of the research, the meaning and 
significance of the MACR, identifying the problem and an overview of the chapters.  
It follows with a brief discussion on the work started by Odongo and developing 
international standards in light of the General Comment No. 10 and its views on the 
MACR.  The writer then provides a rationale for the selection of the 12 countries 
under study and the focus on South Africa.  It furthermore highlights some of the 
practical problems related to the MACR with regard to obtaining birth records, the 
consequences of deep rooted cultural differences and the African conception of age.   
 
4.2 Chapter 2 
An overview of the influences of international law:  This chapter focuses on the 
influence of UNCRC and ACRWC in upgrading international norms on child justice 
in relation to the minimum age issue and reforming national law in accordance with 
those international standards.  A large portion of this chapter is dedicated to General 
Comment No. 10 in general and specifically to the MACR and its findings.  It 
highlights the roles of the CROC, the African Committee of Experts and Welfare of 
the Child (ACERWC) and looks at other relevant international instruments such as the 
European Convention on Human Rights, the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights and the United Nations non-binding instruments.    
 
4.3 Chapter 3 
This chapter outlines the method of incorporating international provisions into the 
States Parties’ national legal systems.  It then discusses the process of law reform that 
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each country undertook in implementing a MACR.  The African legal systems already 
dealt with by Odongo are discussed in brief while the Gambia, Ethiopia, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Zambia’s law reform processes are discussed more 
extensively.  Finally these countries MACR’s are assessed and compared to each 
other.  
 
4.4 Chapter 4 
CROC holds the view that a ‘split age’ is confusing and leads to discriminatory 
practices while the SALRC advocates the doli incapax rule because it serves as a 
‘protective mantle’ for children in conflict with the law.  This chapter critically 
analyses the two views and determines which view prevails in the context of South 
Africa.  The chapter begins with an explanation of criminal capacity and the doli 
incapax presumption and whether the presumption really works in practice by looking 
at case law illustrations.  It then provides an overview of the drafting history of South 
Africa’s Child Justice Bill and an in depth discussion on the development of the 
relevant MACR provisions since 2002 and the cogent arguments in favour of raising 
the MACR and retaining the presumption.   
 
4.5 Chapter 5 
The final chapter briefly recaps the influence of and value attached to international 
law and the extent of harmonisation.  Finally it discusses the conclusions drawn from 
the research and provides recommendations.
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CHAPTER 2 
OVERVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS:  THE 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD AND 
THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON THE RIGHTS AND WELFARE OF THE 
CHILD.   
 
1.  Introduction   
On an international level, the administration of juvenile justice has been described as 
‘revolutionary’ since the adoption of the 1989 UNCRC.1  The UNCRC contains two 
fundamental articles concerning children in conflict with the law.2  Implementation of 
the UNCRC should not, however, be limited to these fundamental articles.  The 
CROC has constantly advocated that the general principles enshrined in articles 2, 3, 
6 and 12 form an integral part of the administration of juvenile justice.3  Thus, when 
implementing and interpreting its provisions, all the UNCRC articles affecting 
children in conflict with the law should be taken into account.4     
 
In addition to the UNCRC, other applicable binding sources of international law in the 
sphere of juvenile justice are the Concluding Observations of the CROC, the 1966 
                                               
1
 J Sloth-Nielsen (2000) ‘Child Justice and Law Reform’ in Davel, CJ (Ed) Introduction to Child Law 
in South Africa 385; G Van Bueren (2000) ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child:  
An Evolutionary Revolution’ in Davel, CJ (Ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa 202. 
2
 Article 37 and Article 40.  See 2.3.5 for full text and detailed discussion. 
3
 J Doek (2006) ‘Child justice trends and concerns with a reflection on South Africa’ in Gallinetti, J, 
Kassan, D & Ehlers, L (Eds) ‘Conference Report:  Child Justice in South Africa:  Children’s Rights 
under Construction’ 11.  
4
 G Lansdown (2000) ‘The Reporting Process under the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ in 
Alston, P and Crawford, J (Eds) The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring 116; M Gose 
(2002) ‘The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 17.   
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ICCPR,5 the 1950 ECHR6 and the 1990 ACRWC.7  These are further supplemented 
by three sets of non-binding rules or soft law known as the 1985 Beijing Rules for the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice,8 the 1990 Standard Minimum Rules for Juveniles 
Deprived of their Liberty (the Havana Rules) and the Riyadh Guidelines for the 
Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency.9  Finally regard should also be had for the 1997 
UN Guidelines for Action on Children in the Criminal Justice System (the Vienna 
Guidelines) which recommend important criminal justice guidelines and penal policy 
aspects for children in conflict with the law.10  
                                               
5
 The ICCPR was the first global treaty enshrining specific provisions in articles 6(5), 10(2)(b), 14(4) 
and 24 regulating the administration of juvenile justice.  It is important to note that these articles were 
aimed at necessary improvements rather than a move towards a child-centred criminal justice system.   
6
 Neither articles 3 and 6 of the ECHR make any reference to children yet they find application in the 
sphere of juvenile justice.  Article 3 prohibits torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment 
while article 6 covers a range of due process rights relevant to juveniles within the jurisdiction of the 
Council of Europe.   
7
 The ACRWC has its juvenile justice provision enshrined in article 17.  See 5.2.5 for full text and 
detailed discussion.  J Sloth-Nielsen (2000) ‘Child Justice and Law Reform’ in Davel, CJ (Ed) 
Introduction to Child Law in South Africa 386, 387; G Van Bueren (2006) ‘Article 40:  Child Criminal 
Justice’, in Alen, A et al  A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
4.  
8
 The Beijing Rules (UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice) were 
adopted by General Assembly Resolution 40/33 of 23 November 1985.   
9
 The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Protection of Juvenile Deprived of their Liberty 
(Havana Rules) and the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh 
Guidelines) were adopted by the General Assembly Resolution 45/113 and Resolution 45/112 on 14 
December 1990.   
10
 The UN Guidelines for Action on Children in the Criminal Justice System were recommended by 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) Resolution 1997/30 of 21 July 1997.  The Vienna Guidelines 
provide a framework for the implementation of international standards at national level.  They do not 
add any new content to the already existing standards; rather they were designed to facilitate effective 
implementation of the UNCRC and other related instruments.  The Guidelines emphasise the issues 
relating to age, for example, the importance around birth registrations and respect for all children’s 
rights regardless of the legal age limits.  Guideline 8 recommends that, in implementing the Guidelines, 
consideration should be given to the following: 
‘(a) Respect for human dignity, compatible with the four general principles underlying the 
 
 
 
 
 10 
The United Nations developed the non-binding Beijing Rules, Havana Rules and the 
Riyadh Guidelines to assist States in realising children’s rights and in protecting those 
rights.  Many of the basic principles reflected in the UNCRC are taken directly from 
the non-binding rules and guidelines.  These rules and guidelines provided the 
backbone for many of the UNCRC’s basic principles during its drafting and aid in the 
interpretation and understanding of its provisions.11  It suffices to say that the non-
binding principles incorporated into the UNCRC carry a much stronger weight than 
before, while the unincorporated principles remain interpretive tools.  Together these 
binding and non-binding international standards are the subject of a comprehensive 
guidance for a rights-based juvenile justice which has no equal in the field of 
children’s rights.12  A more recent development that goes hand in hand with these 
Rules and Guidelines is the CROC’s General Comments.  There are 10 Comments to 
date which have proved to be immensely helpful for States Parties when interpreting 
thematic issues.13  General Comment No.10 is of particular importance for States 
Parties’ understanding of the MACR which is the focal point of this thesis.   
 
                                                                                                                                      
Convention, namely: non-discrimination, including gender-sensitivity; upholding the best 
interests of the child; the right to life, survival and development; and respect for the views of the child; 
(b) A rights-based orientation; (c) A holistic approach to implementation through maximization of 
resources and efforts; (d) The integration of services on an interdisciplinary basis; (e) Participation of 
children and concerned sectors of society; (f) Empowerment of partners through a developmental 
process; (g) Sustainability without continuing dependency on external bodies; (h) Equitable application 
and accessibility to those in greatest need; (i) Accountability and transparency of operations; (j) 
Proactive responses based on effective preventive and remedial measures’.   
11
 G Van Bueren (2006) ‘Article 40:  Child Criminal Justice’, in Alen, A et al A Commentary on the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 4, 5.  At the same time the Beijing Rules were 
being adopted, the UNCRC was being drafted. 
12
 UNICEF (1998) Innocenti Digest:  Juvenile Justice 2. 
13
 See later discussion at 3.2. General Comment No. 10. 
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The UNCRC and the ACRWC have been the most influential international and 
regional instruments in the children’s rights arena.  The UNCRC entered into force on 
2 September 1990 after the UN General Assembly adopted it in 1989.14  It spells out 
basic human rights for children and places their plight on the global map.15  The 
ACRWC followed a decade later entering into force on 29 November 1999,16 
complementing both the UNCRC and African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
and reaffirming the provisions of the Declaration of the Rights and Welfare of the 
African Child.17  The ACRWC represents the African concept of human rights for 
children by taking into account their historical background, cultural heritage and the 
                                               
14
 CC Jinabhai (1992) ‘Situation of children in South Africa’ in International Conference on the Rights 
of the Child:  Papers and Reports of a Conference covered by the Community Law Centre ‘Putting 
Children First’ 57;  P Veerman (1992) ‘The Rights of the Child and the Changing Image of Childhood’ 
184; G Van Bueren (1995) ‘The International Law on the Rights of the Child’ 15; J Todres (2004) 
‘Emerging limitations on the rights of the child:  The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child and 
its early case law’ in The International Library of Essays on Rights:  Children’s Rights Volume II 139. 
15
 A Lloyd ‘Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the African 
Committee of Experts:  Raising the gauntlet’ (2002) 10 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 
179.  
16After being ratified by fifteen member States of the AU as required by Article 47(3).  The AU was 
previously known as the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).  See A Lloyd ‘A theoretical analysis of 
the reality of children’s rights in Africa:  An introduction to the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child’(2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 11; BD Mezmur ‘The African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child:  An update’ (2006) 6 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 550; BD Mezmur (2004) ‘The legal protection of children in Africa’ (unpublished) 
3; D Olowu ‘Protecting children’s rights in Africa:  A critique of the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 10 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 127; J Sloth-Nielsen & 
BD Mezmur ‘Surveying the research landscape to promote children’s rights in an African context’ 
(2007) 7(2) African Human Rights Law Journal 331.   
17
 Academics often refer to the 1981 African Charter on Human and People’s Rights as the parent 
charter of the ACRWC.  The Declaration recognized the need for the promotion and protection of 
children rights in Africa.  It was adopted by the Assembly Heads of State and Government of the then 
OAU in 1979 at its Sixteenth Ordinary Session in Monrovia, Liberia.     
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values of African civilization.18  It further recognizes the unique realities facing many 
African children and thus the need for special safeguards and care.   
 
By 1997, every country had ratified the UNCRC with the exception of Somalia and 
the United States of America.19  Currently, the ACRWC has been ratified by 43 of the 
53 African Union states.20  Ratification means that States Parties to the UNCRC and 
the ACRWC have committed themselves to promoting and protecting children’s 
rights.  They are therefore accountable before the international community and should 
ensure that their national laws are in accordance with the provisions of these treaties.  
 
The ability to exercise and enjoy the rights and protections afforded to children is very 
much dependant on the definition of a child.  The ideal situation would be for the 
respective juvenile systems to include all persons under the age of 18 who come into 
conflict with the law.  Juvenile systems are instead faced with the total opposite of the 
                                               
18
 A Lloyd ‘Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the African 
Committee of Experts:  Raising the gauntlet’ (2002) 10 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 
180; A Lloyd (2008) ‘The African Regional System for the Protection of Children’s Rights’ in Sloth-
Nielsen, J (Ed) Children’s Rights in Africa:  A legal perspective 35; Preamble of the ACRWC. 
19
 UNICEF (1998) Innocenti Digest:  Juvenile Justice 2; The African Child Policy Forum (2007) 
‘Realising rights for children: Harmonisation of laws on children: Eastern and Southern Africa’ 9.  
Available at http://www.africanchild.info/documents.asp?page=3 [accessed 05 October 2008]; J Sloth-
Nielsen & BD Mezmur ‘Surveying the research landscape to promote children’s rights in an African 
context’ (2007) 7(2) African Human Rights Law Journal 331.  Somalia and the USA have signed the 
UNCRC but have not yet ratified it.  The rationale behind their non-ratification is based on Somalia’s 
government not being recognized under the international radar while the US government has not 
recognized the concept of children’s rights.  
20
 To view list of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the African Union Convention on 
ACRWC, see 
http://www.africa-
union.org/roots/au/Documents/Treaties/List/African%20Charter%20on%20the%20Rights%20and%20
Welfare%20of %20the%20Child.pdf [accessed 03 June 2008].   
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‘ideal situation’.  In some jurisdictions children are excluded from juvenile justice on 
the basis of age or the particular offence committed.21  This is also evidenced by 
countries that do not have an overarching definition of a child which leads to 
inconsistencies in minimum ages.22  Both instruments in their articles have defined a 
child as ‘every human being below the age of 18’ with the UNCRC further attaching a 
caveat ‘unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier’.23  
The age of 18 has been accepted as the upper age limit for juvenile justice statutes and 
is indicative of the transition from childhood into adulthood.24    
 
Article 40(3)(a) of the UNCRC requires States Parties to establish a MACR below 
which children will not be criminally responsible.25  The Beijing Rules guide this 
principle in so far as they state that the minimum age must not be fixed too low.26  
Article 17(4) of the ACRWC provides that ‘there shall be a minimum age below 
which children shall be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law’ 
but has no guiding principles on what that age should be and how it should be 
determined.  The CROC has expressed its concern with regard to the vast 
international differences in setting a minimum age and called for a comprehensive 
                                               
21
 The African Child Policy Forum (2007) ‘Realising rights for children: Harmonisation of laws on 
children: Eastern and Southern Africa’ 25, 26.  Available at 
http://www.africanchild.info/documents.asp?page=3 [accessed 05 October 2008]. 
22
 UNODC (2006) Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit 2:  Cross-cutting Issues Juvenile Justice, 4. 
23
 UNODC (2006) Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit 2:  Cross-cutting Issues Juvenile Justice, 3; 
Article 1 of UNCRC and Article 2 of ACRWC.   
24
 This is a definite improvement of the Beijing Rules, Rule 2(2)(a) where the juvenile system could be 
diluted because young person could include persons older than 18 or the respective legal system could 
deal with children younger than 18 in the adult criminal justice system.  Such young children would 
then not be protected by the juvenile justice rules.  
25
 SALRC(1999) ‘Juvenile justice report’. Project 106. Discussion Paper 79 para 6.28.  Available at 
http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/dpapers/dp79_prj106_juvjust_1999.pdf [accessed 06 October 2008]. 
26
 See Rule 4 of the Beijing Rules. 
 
 
 
 
 14 
juvenile justice policy reflecting a more unified approach to the question of minimum 
age (amongst other things) so as to lessen the disparities amongst the States Parties 
and to raise international standards.27   
 
This chapter focuses on the influences of the UNCRC and the ACRWC in upgrading 
international norms on juvenile justice in relation to the issue of minimum age and 
reforming national law in accordance with those standards.  It examines the 
substantive principles of these two international instruments and the relevant 
provisions relating to the administration of juvenile justice.  Finally it highlights the 
role of the CROC, the ACERWC and the position of General Comment No.10 in light 
of changing minimum age standards.   
 
2. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child  
2.1 The historical development of the UNCRC 
The 1924 Declaration of Geneva, although limited in its scope, was the first step 
towards creating human rights for children.28  It consisted of five principles and 
placed a duty on ‘men and women of all nations’ to realise rights for children in 
accordance with its principles.29  The next significant development was the 
unanimous adoption by the UN General Assembly of the 1959 Declaration on the 
                                               
27
 General Comment No.10, CRC/C/GC/10, 2 February 2007. 
28
 Adopted by the General Assembly, Geneva, 26 September 1924; L Muthoga (1992) ‘Analysis of the 
international instruments for the protection of the rights of the child’ in International Conference on the 
Rights of the Child: ‘Putting Children First’ 123. 
29
 S Detrick (1992) ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child:  A guide to the Travaux 
Préparatoires’ 641, 642.  In 1948 a moderate expansion was made to the Declaration of Geneva but it 
did not contribute much to the development of children’s rights. 
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Rights of the Child.30  This Declaration was much more comprehensive than its 1924 
predecessor and made substantive contributions to the development of the rights of 
the child, hence initiating the process of refining human rights for children.  It ushered 
in a language of entitlement that children were no longer property but ‘subjects of 
international law capable of enjoying the benefits of specific rights, freedoms’ and 
special protections.31  These entitlements were to be implemented with reference to a 
newly introduced principle that ‘the best interest of the child shall be the paramount 
consideration’.32  The Declaration also contained a broad non-discrimination clause 
applying to all people and children.33  Although the Declaration was adopted 
unanimously, it was a non-binding resolution, which meant that the entitlements it 
granted served only as moral entitlements.34        
 
Twenty years later the Polish government mooted the idea that the principles of the 
1959 Declaration be articulated in a legally binding treaty.35  Their aim was to adopt 
                                               
30
 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 1386 (XIV), 20 November 1959. 
31
 G van Bueren (1995) ‘The International Law on the Rights of the Child’ 12; J Todres (2004)  
‘Emerging limitations on the rights of the child:  The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child and 
its early case law’ in The International Library of Essays on Rights:  Children’s Rights Volume II 143, 
144; D Kassan (2005) ‘How can the voice of the child be adequately heard in family law proceedings?’ 
(Unpublished LLM thesis). 
32
 The best interest of the child enshrined in Principle 2 of the 1959 Declaration; G van Bueren (1995) 
‘The International Law on the Rights of the Child’ 11.  
33
 J Todres (2004) ‘Emerging limitations on the rights of the child:  The U.N. Convention on the Rights 
of the Child and its early case law’ in The International Library of Essays on Rights:  Children’s Rights 
Volume II 143. 
34
 G van Bueren (1995) ‘The International Law on the Rights of the Child’ 12; J Sloth-Nielsen 
‘Ratification of the United Nation Convention on the Rights of the Child:  Some implications for South 
African law’ (1995) 11(3) The South African Journal of Human Rights 402.  
35
 P Veerman (1992) ‘The Rights of the Child and the Changing Image of Childhood’ 181; S Detrick 
(1992) ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child:  A guide to the Travaux 
Préparatoires’ 21. 
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the treaty in 1979 to commemorate the International Year of the Child.  Initially the 
idea met with little support from other countries.  The UN Commission on Human 
Rights appointed an open-ended Working group to manage the drafting process.  The 
group consisted of member States, international organisations, intergovernmental 
organisations and non-governmental organisations which all operated on the basis of 
consensus.36  The ten years of consulting, drafting and negotiation that followed 
ended in the adoption of the UNCRC comprising an elaborate 54 articles.37   
 
The UNCRC is the most authoritative and widely ratified international human rights 
instrument guiding the development of children’s rights.38  It covers an extensive 
range of fundamental rights which include civil, political, social, economic, cultural, 
recreational and humanitarian rights.39  Detrick, a well known authority and producer 
of extensive works on the UNCRC eloquently states in her Guide to the ‘Travaux 
Préparatoires’, ‘that despite the few disappointments and gaps, there is no doubt that 
                                               
36
 J Todres (2004) ‘Emerging limitations on the rights of the child:  The U.N. Convention on the Rights 
of the Child and its early case law’ in The International Library of Essays on Rights:  Children’s Rights 
Volume II 145. 
37
 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, Resolution 44/25, 20 November 1989; CC 
Jinabhai (1992) ‘Situation of children in South Africa’ in International Conference on the Rights of the 
Child: ‘Putting Children First’ 57, 58; P Veerman (1992) ‘The Rights of the Child and the Changing 
Image of Childhood’ 182-184;  J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Ratification of the United Nation Convention on the 
Rights of the Child:  Some implications for South African law’ (1995) 11(3) The South African Journal 
of Human Rights 402; J Todres (2004) ‘Emerging limitations on the rights of the child:  The U.N. 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and its early case law’ in The International Library of Essays on 
Rights:  Children’s Rights Volume II 144-146.   
38
 The UNCRC has 140 Signatories and 193 Parties. 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/11.htm [accessed 01 May 2008]. 
39
 M Gose (2002) ‘The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 30; BD Mezmur (2004) 
‘The legal protection of children in Africa’ (unpublished) 3.  The ACRWC and its predecessor the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights does not distinguish between civil, political, social, 
economic and cultural rights as does the UNCRC (to an extent) in article 4. 
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the content of the UNCRC constitutes a major leap forward in standard setting on 
children’s issues’.40 
 
2.2 The General Aims and Scope of Application  
The general aims of the UNCRC have been described as the four ‘P’s:  participation 
of children in their respective communities and in decisions that affect them; 
protection against discrimination, and all forms of torture and inhuman treatment; 
prevention of abduction and harm against children, the development of preventative 
health care; and the provision of assistance ensuring children’s basic needs are being 
met.41  These four P’s complement each other and need to be equally applied in the 
domain of children’s rights.  States Parties to the UNCRC must ensure that these aims 
are extended to all children in their jurisdiction when making laws, policies or 
implementing practices concerning the rights of the child.42  
 
Article 1 outlines the scope of the UNCRC when it defines the child as every human 
being under the age of 18.43  The definition is restricted by the proviso ‘unless, under 
                                               
40
 S Detrick (1992) ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child:  A guide to the Travaux 
Préparatoires’ 27, 28. 
41
 A Bainham (2005) ‘Children:  The Modern Law’ 70; G Van Bueren (2000) ‘The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child:  An Evolutionary Revolution’ in Davel, CJ (Ed) Introduction to 
Child Law in South Africa 203. 
42
 A Bainham (2005) ‘Children:  The Modern Law’ 70; J Sloth-Nielsen (2004) ‘The International 
Framework’ in Sloth-Nielsen, J and Gallinetti, J (Eds.) ‘Child Justice in Africa:  A guide to good 
practice’ 22. 
43
 S Detrick (1999) ‘A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’ 51, 
52.  Other international human rights instruments providing rights and protection for children lack a 
clearly defined scope as to whom or what qualifies as a child.  For example, the ICCPR includes five 
different references pertaining to ‘child’, ‘children’, ‘young person’, ‘juvenile’ and ‘minor’ but does 
not define any of the terms nor the age at which majority can be attained.  The Human Rights Council 
observes in article 24 of the ICCPR that the age must not be set too low and that States are not absolved 
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the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier’.44 It has been argued that 
the rationale behind the proviso is to accommodate communities who view durations 
of childhood differently.45  As a counter-argument, accommodating such communities 
where adulthood may be attained earlier than 18, excludes certain children from 
enjoying the rights under the UNCRC thus operating against them instead of for them.  
I submit that the proviso, although accommodating, could in fact weaken the scope of 
the UNCRC and act as a stumbling block for children who have attained majority 
before the age of 18.      
 
2.3 The Key Principles 
As a starting point to understanding the content of this comprehensive and elaborate 
document, the CROC has identified four key principles, enshrined in articles 2, 3, 6 
and 12.46  These articles form the four ‘pillars’ or the value system upon which the 
UNCRC is based.  In addition to these key principles that need to be applied by States 
Parties to all children in their jurisdiction and without discrimination, are the two 
                                                                                                                                      
from their duties if a person is younger than 18 even if he or she attained majority in their respective 
legal systems.  The Beijing Rules 2.2(a) uses the term ‘juvenile’ for a child or young person who, under 
their respective legal systems, are dealt with differently to adults after the commission of an offence.  
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) includes the term 
‘everyone’ in its text, thus it impliedly deals with the rights of children as children are included under 
the term ‘everyone’.   
44
 Article 1 of the UNCRC; S Detrick (1999) ‘A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child’ 52, 53; G Van Bueren (1993) ‘International Documents on Children’ 8. 
45
 DM Chirwa ‘The merits and demerits of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 
(2002) 10 The International Journal on Children’s Rights 158. 
46
 G Van Bueren (2000) ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child:  An Evolutionary 
Revolution’ in Davel, CJ (Ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa 203; UNODC (2006) 
Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit 2:  Cross-cutting Issues Juvenile Justice, 3; J Sloth-Nielsen (2008) 
‘Domestication of Children’s Rights in National Legal Systems in African Context:  Progress and 
Prospects’ in Sloth-Nielsen, J (Ed) Children’s Rights in Africa:  A legal perspective 55.   
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fundamental articles 37 and 40 which deal with the specifics for the administration of 
juvenile justice.  These articles are discussed next and their significance for the 
discussion of a MACR highlighted.  The MACR cannot be understood in a vacuum.   
Thus the practical implications for the rights of children both younger and older are 
crucial for our understanding of MACR.47    
 
2.3.1 Non-discrimination 
Article 2 deals with the principle of ‘non-discrimination’ as an effective measure to 
prevent discrimination between adults and children and between groups of children.48   
This principle is very broad and regarded as central to the other rights in the UNCRC.  
Many children in conflict with the law often fall victim to discriminatory practices 
resulting from a lack of comprehensive policy and procedures.  States Parties should 
ensure that children in conflict with the law are treated equally, regardless of the 
child’s race, gender, disability, ethnicity, religion and other status.49  In so doing 
States Parties must take necessary measures to promote comprehensive policy and 
procedures so as to reintegrate these children back into their communities and to 
assume constructive roles in society.50  
 
                                               
47
 DJ Cipriani (2008) ‘Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility:  A Global 
Perspective’.  Available at http://www.worldcat.org/wcpa/oclc/213330715 [accessed 11September 
2008]. 
48
 G Van Bueren (2000) ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child:  An Evolutionary 
Revolution’ in Davel, CJ (Ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa 203-204. 
49
 Article 2 of the UNCRC contains a wide variety of grounds; Rule 2.1of the Beijing Rules. 
50
 Article 40(1) of the UNCRC. 
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The non-discrimination principle was addressed in 1995, Day of General Discussion 
on the ‘Administration of Juvenile Justice’,51 in light of the subjective and arbitrary 
criteria in place for assessing the criminal responsibility of children and the measures 
applicable to them. Children’s criminal responsibility was often based on the child’s 
attainment of puberty, the age of discernment or the personality of the child.  In light 
of the CROC’s call for a comprehensive juvenile justice policy, States Parties are now 
obligated to have a fixed MACR in place which takes into account the child’s 
emotional, mental and intellectual maturity rather than the subjective and arbitrary 
criteria above.52     
   
2.3.2 Best interests of the child 
Article 3 is one of the core values underpinning the UNCRC.  It provides that ‘in all 
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare 
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration’.53  The wording indicates that it 
shall be ‘a primary consideration’ which implies that it is not the overriding principle 
in all matters and decisions affecting children.  Todres has suggested that such an 
implication has resulted in our earlier court decisions interpreting article 3 as a 
procedural fairness requirement.  He asserts that the effect of such an interpretation 
weakens the principle in that judges and others are only obligated to consider the ‘best 
interest of the child’ but need not reflect it in their decision.54  I agree with the 
                                               
51
 See later discussion at 3.1. General Day of Discussion. 
52
 General Comment No.10, CRC/C/GC10 par 32. 
53
 Article 3(1) of the UNCRC. 
54
 J Todres (2004) ‘Emerging limitations on the rights of the child:  The U.N. Convention on the Rights 
of the Child and its early case law’ in The International Library of Essays on Rights:  Children’s Rights 
Volume II 156.   
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assertion made by Todres.  I further submit that judges should be aware of this 
loophole and thus take due care in ensuring that the ‘best interests of the child’ 
principle is not only considered but also reflected in their final decisions in all matters 
concerning children.    
 
Attention must be drawn to the fact that article 3 is not only concerned with the ‘best 
interests of the child’ but State obligations as well.55  In addition to the primary 
responsibilities of the family there is an obligation on the State to support the primary 
role of parents.56  However, the interests of the State and parents should no longer be 
seen as the all important or only consideration and that due weight is granted to the 
interests of children in all matters and decisions affecting them.57  Where the UNCRC 
has neglected a certain category (of children) the State has the obligation to fill the 
gap by virtue of article 3(2).58  The ‘best interests’ principle has been transformed 
beyond its original concept of discretionary welfarism59 and is used as an 
                                               
55
 Article 3(2) and (3) of the UNCRC.   
56
 M Freeman (2007) ‘Article 3.  The Best Interests of the Child’, in  Alen, A et al  A Commentary on 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child  65-67.  The concept of family includes 
parents, legal guardians, members of extended families or members of the community.   
57
 T Hammarberg (1992) ‘Conceptualisation of the principle:  Best interest of the child’ in 
International Conference on the Rights of the Child:  ‘Putting Children First’ 25. 
58
 M Freeman (2007) ‘Article 3.  The Best Interests of the Child’, in  Alen, A et al  A Commentary on 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child  66. 
59
 G Van Bueren (2000) ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child:  An Evolutionary 
Revolution’ in Davel, CJ (Ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa 204; The Beijing Rules 
emphasises the well-being of the child in Rule 1.1 and 5.1 which includes the well-being of the family 
and the juvenile.  Rule 14.2 provides that proceedings must be conducive to the best interests of the 
child while Rule 17.1(d) provides that the well-being of child should always be a guiding factor in the 
case against a juvenile.  All these rules are consistent with the ‘best interests of the child’ principle and 
assist in interpreting the principle when the need arises.   
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interpretation tool.60  Thus it is incumbent upon judges and other role-players to 
consider the ‘best interest of the child’ principle in all actions concerning children.61        
 
The development and needs of children differ from those of adults physically, 
psychologically, emotionally and educationally.62  It is these differences that dictate a 
lesser culpability for children in conflict with the law, different treatment and separate 
juvenile justice systems.63  I submit that when States Parties determine an appropriate 
MACR they should apply their minds with insight to the above considerations, in 
order to ensure that such a determination is reflective of the ‘best interests’ principle.     
 
2.3.3 The right to life, survival and development 
Article 6 deals with the right to survival and development.  It encompasses the child’s 
right to life, health, wellbeing, welfare and social services, protection from violence 
and harm, to mention a few.64  Every child has this right and ‘States Parties shall 
ensure to the maximum extent possible the survival and development of the child’.65  
Both survival and development are dynamic concepts.  Survival is a precondition for 
all the other rights to be enjoyed and prolonged, while development is the right of 
                                               
60
 Article 3(1) of the UNCRC. 
61
 A Lloyd ‘Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the African 
Committee of Experts:  Raising the gauntlet’ (2002) 10 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 
183; A Lloyd ‘A theoretical analysis of the reality of children’s rights in Africa:  An introduction to the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 
17. 
62
 CRC/C/GC/10 para 10; N Ferreira ‘Putting the age of criminal and tort liability into context: A 
dialogue between law and psychology’ (2008) 16(1) The International Journal of Children’s Rights 29.   
63
 CRC/C/GC/10 para 10. 
64
 J Sloth-Nielsen (2004) ‘The International Framework’ in Sloth-Nielsen, J and Gallinetti, J (Eds.) 
‘Child Justice in Africa:  A guide to good practice’ 23.  
65
 Article 6(2) of the UNCRC. 
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individuals and groups to contribute to, and appreciate, continuous socio-economic, 
political and cultural development in an environment that realises all human rights.66  
Thus without these basic rights, the other rights would be meaningless.   
 
Juvenile delinquency hampers the development of children’s enjoyment of their full 
rights.  States Parties should set up national policies and effective programmes to 
prevent juvenile delinquency from eroding the inherent rights of children.   The rights 
provided for in article 37(a) and (b) ensure that the child’s right to life and 
development are being fully respected.67                    
     
2.3.4 Child participation  
The right entrenched in article 12 is a noteworthy inclusion in the UNCRC.  It is a 
new right which has never before been incorporated into a child-centered international 
document.68  Van Bueren argues that the UNCRC has the ability to achieve an 
evolutionary revolution as it seeks to change child and adult cultures into child-
centered and child-friendly cultures.69  It would require state and society to view 
children as ‘evolving autonomous individuals’ who are bearers of rights and not 
                                               
66
 G Van Bueren (2000) ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child:  An Evolutionary 
Revolution’ in Davel, CJ (Ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa 208. 
67
 CRC/C/GC/10 par 11. 
68
 S Detrick (1992) ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child:  A guide to the Travaux 
Préparatoires’ 28;  The African Child Policy Forum (2007) ‘Realising rights for children: 
Harmonisation of laws on children: Eastern and Southern Africa’ 4.  Available at 
http://www.africanchild.info/documents.asp?page=3 [accessed 05 October 2008]; L Ehlers & C Frank 
(2008) ‘Child Participation in Africa’ in Sloth-Nielsen, J (Ed) Children’s Rights in Africa:  A legal 
perspective 111, 112.   
69
 G Van Bueren (2000) ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child:  An Evolutionary 
Revolution’ in Davel, CJ (Ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa 205; para 3 of the Ridyadh 
Guidelines. 
 
 
 
 
 24 
recipients of welfare.70  Adults would have to be willing to give up some of their 
powers in order to start developing a culture of listening to children.71   
 
Article 12 of the UNCRC obliges States Parties to actively involve children who have 
the capacity to form their own views.72  The provision allows them the freedom to 
express such views in all matters affecting them and due weight will be given 
according to the child’s age and maturity.73  This right is not limited trial proceedings; 
rather it is extended to all matters (meaning before and after trial).74  It further 
provides children with the opportunity to be heard in judicial or administrative 
proceedings affecting them, either directly or through a representative.75  Article 12(1) 
is quite broad in that it extends to all children who are capable of formulating 
opinions but are unable to articulate those opinions either verbally or in writing.76  
The Ridyadh Guidelines highlight the importance of participation not only for 
                                               
70
 J Sloth-Nielsen (2004) ‘The International Framework’ in Sloth-Nielsen, J and Gallinetti, J (Eds.) 
‘Child Justice in Africa:  A guide to good practice’ 22; G Van Bueren (2000) ‘The United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child:  An Evolutionary Revolution’ in Davel, CJ (Ed) Introduction to 
Child Law in South Africa 205. 
71
 G Van Bueren (2000) ‘The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child:  An Evolutionary 
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 Article 12(1) of the UNCRC.  
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 L Ehlers & C Frank (2008) ‘Child Participation in Africa’ in Sloth-Nielsen, J (Ed) Children’s Rights 
in Africa:  A legal perspective 113.   
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 J Doek (2006) ‘Child justice trends and concerns with a reflection on South Africa’ in Gallinetti, J, 
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75
 Article 12(2) of the UNCRC and reiterated in Article 37 right to legal assistance, Article 40 the 
procedural guidelines and the Beijing Rules 14.2. 
76
 DM Chirwa ‘The merits and demerits of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 
(2002) 10 The International Journal on Children’s Rights 161; BD Mezmur (2007) ‘The African 
Children’s Charter Vs the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child:  A zero-sum game?’  
(Forthcoming). 
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planning and implementation but for also the prevention of juvenile delinquency.77  
States Parties should involve children in the planning and implementation of policies 
and procedures that affect them.78 
 
The relevance of participation for the MACR relates to whether children are old 
enough to participate in proceedings.  Articles 37(d) and 40(2)(b)(ii) and (iii) provide 
rights for children to participate in juvenile justice proceedings.  These rights are, 
however, meaningless if children are too young to participate in formal proceedings 
or to brief a legal representative.  If children are to be held criminally responsible such 
children must be given the full benefit of participating in the relevant proceedings.79     
 
As noted above articles 2, 3, 6 and 12 are not only the key principles in understanding 
the UNCRC, but are also relevant in the sphere of juvenile justice and, for this thesis, 
the MACR in particular.  The principle of non-discrimination strengthens or supports 
the approaches used by all the other rights enshrined in the UNCRC.  The ‘best 
interests’ principle is the overarching principle for all other rights in the UNCRC 
                                               
77
 See para 9(h), 37 and 50. 
78
 R Hodgkin & P Newell (2002) ‘Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the  
Child’ 595; D Kassan (2005) ‘How can the voice of the child be adequately heard in family law 
proceedings?’ (Unpublished LLM thesis) 8. 
79
 The cases of T v United Kingdom and V v United Kingdom  (better known as the famous James 
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post traumatic stress syndrome and it was questionable whether they able to effectively brief their 
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in contravention of article 6(1) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights; J 
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including those relevant to juvenile justice.  Application of this principle is by no 
means limited to the decisions made by courts of law.  Article 6 and 12 find obvious 
application in the field of juvenile justice where children have been deprived of their 
liberty or when children are afforded the chance to participate in judicial proceedings 
or matters affecting them.  These fundamental rights and protections are available to 
all children in conflict with the law and must be applied when invoking the juvenile 
justice provisions and discussing the MACR.     
 
2.3.5 The juvenile justice provisions:  Article 37 and Article 40 
The UNCRC contains two substantive articles on juvenile justice that are closely 
related, namely, article 37 and article 40.80  Article 37 deals with the provisions 
prohibiting torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and the deprivation of 
liberty while article 40 includes the provisions promoting the child’s sense of dignity 
and worth, the minimum age requirement, the promotion of diversion and the 
alternatives to custodial sentencing options as fundamental principles in the child 
criminal justice system.  Together with article 39,81 they provide justification for a 
comprehensive juvenile justice policy.82  
 
The ICCPR laid the foundation for the juvenile justice articles.  Articles 37 and 40 are 
far more comprehensive and child-centered than the ICCPR which provides for a 
juvenile procedure that only ‘takes into account age and desirability of promoting 
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 S Detrick (1999) ‘A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’ 620.  
81
 This article provides for the rehabilitation and reintegration of children who have been victims of 
torture, cruel and inhuman punishment.    
82
 R Hodgkin & P Newell (2002) ‘Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the  
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rehabilitation’.83  The Beijing Rules, Havana Rules and Riyadh Guidelines have had a 
noteworthy influence on the drafting of the juvenile justice provisions and provide 
invaluable assistance when interpreting them.  The Beijing Rules apply equally to 
articles 37 and 40 while the Havana Rules and the Riyadh Guidelines were adopted to 
assist articles 37 and 40 respectively.84         
 
Article 37 and 40 follow each other numerically and are discussed in that sequence.  
However, I am of the opinion that it would make more logical sense to examine 
article 40 prior to an examination of article 37.  The rationale is simple.  Article 40 
concerns children ‘alleged as, accused of, or recognised as having infringed the penal 
law’ and all the legal safeguards available to them.  Some of these safeguards are 
relevant when trying to understand the underpinnings of article 37 which deals with 
children who are already deprived of their liberty and their procedural rights.  Thus 
article 37 will follow on from the discussion of article 40.  
 
Article 40 
 
‘1. States Parties recognize the right of every child alleged as, accused of, or recognized as 
having infringed the penal law to be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the 
child's sense of dignity and worth, which reinforces the child's respect for the human rights 
and fundamental freedoms of others and which takes into account the child's age and the 
desirability of promoting the child's reintegration and the child's assuming a constructive role 
in society. 
  
2. To this end, and having regard to the relevant provisions of international instruments, 
States Parties shall, in particular, ensure that: 
  
(a) No child shall be alleged as, be accused of, or recognized as having infringed the penal 
law by reason of acts or omissions that were not prohibited by national or international law at 
the time they were committed;  
 
(b) Every child alleged as or accused of having infringed the penal law has at least the 
following guarantees:  
                                               
83
 G Van Bueren (2006) ‘Article 40:  Child Criminal Justice’, in Alen, A et al A Commentary on the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 7 para 11. 
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(i) To be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law; 
  
(ii) To be informed promptly and directly of the charges against him or her, and, 
if appropriate, through his or her parents or legal guardians, and to have legal 
or other appropriate assistance in the preparation and presentation of his or 
her defence; 
 
  
(iii) To have the matter determined without delay by a competent, independent 
and impartial authority or judicial body in a fair hearing according to law, in 
the presence of legal or other appropriate assistance and, unless it is 
considered not to be in the best interest of the child, in particular, taking into 
account his or her age or situation, his or her parents or legal guardians; 
  
(iv)  Not to be compelled to give testimony or to confess guilt; to examine or have 
examined adverse witnesses and to obtain the participation and examination 
of witnesses on his or her behalf under conditions of equality; 
  
(iv) If considered to have infringed the penal law, to have this decision and any 
measures imposed in consequence thereof reviewed by a higher competent, 
independent and impartial authority or judicial body according to law; 
  
(v) To have the free assistance of an interpreter if the child cannot understand or 
speak the language used;  
 
 
(vii)  To have his or her privacy fully respected at all stages of the proceedings. 
  
3. States Parties shall seek to promote the establishment of laws, procedures, authorities and 
institutions specifically applicable to children alleged as, accused of, or recognized as having 
infringed the penal law, and, in particular: 
  
(a) The establishment of a minimum age below which children shall be presumed not to have 
the capacity to infringe the penal law; 
  
(b) Whenever appropriate and desirable, measures for dealing with such children without 
resorting to judicial proceedings, providing that human rights and legal safeguards are fully 
respected. 
 
 4. A variety of dispositions, such as care, guidance and supervision orders; counselling; 
probation; foster care; education and vocational training programmes and other alternatives to 
institutional care shall be available to ensure that children are dealt with in a manner 
appropriate to their well-being and proportionate both to their circumstances and the offence.’  
 
Article 40 is the longest and most detailed of all the articles in the UNCRC.  It sets 
out the provisions detailing the rights and protections of the child in conflict with the 
law from the moment of the allegation right up until and including the sentence.85  It 
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is originally based on articles 14 and 15 of the ICCPR.86  Much of its interpretation is 
dependent on the Beijing Rules such as the rules relating to the MACR, the objectives 
of juvenile justice, the human rights standards to be applied and the Riyadh 
Guidelines setting out the standards for juvenile delinquency.87  The main essence of 
article 40 is to establish a child-centered criminal justice system encouraging the 
wellbeing of children.88  
 
Article 40(1) introduces the directives that States Parties should endeavour to achieve 
when dealing with children in conflict with the law.  States Parties should treat 
accused children in a manner consistent with promoting their sense of dignity and 
worth.89  This right finds application from the moment children come into contact 
with the justice system right up until a decision is made on what to do with them.  
From the moment of contact, children’s dignity must be protected and respected in 
such a manner that it reinforces their respect for human rights and the freedoms of 
others.  This indicates that children have a responsibility to respect the rights of others 
(by not infringing on their rights) while the State has a duty to cultivate their ability to 
do so.  The State should lead by example and ensure that actors within the criminal 
justice system fully protect and respect the guarantees afforded to children and, in so 
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 S Detrick (1999) ‘A commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’ 681; 
G Van Bueren (2006) ‘Article 40:  Child Criminal Justice’, in Alen, A et al A Commentary on the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 8-10 para 14-18. 
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doing, children will fulfil their responsibility of respecting the rights of others.90  The 
treatment of children, in terms of this article, must be appropriate to their age so as to 
reintegrate them into society to assume a constructive role.   
 
Subsection 2 highlights the procedural guarantees (also referred to as due process 
rights) available to child offenders who are ‘alleged as or accused of having infringed 
penal law’.91  In terms of article 40(2)(a) the offence committed by the child described 
above must be a penal offence defined by law at the time the alleged offence took 
place.  The first guarantee under subsection 2(b)(i) is the presumption of innocence 
afforded to children and adults alike.  The guarantees in subsection (2)(b)(ii), (iii) and 
(iv) reflect the due process rights decided upon in the US Supreme court decision of 
In re Gault.92  In this decision the court dealt with juvenile court procedures resulting 
in the loss of liberty.  The court held that where a juvenile has been ‘alleged as or 
accused of infringing penal law’ he or she must be given adequate and timely written 
notice of the allegation or charge.93  If the juvenile faces the prospect of losing his or 
her liberty such juvenile must be afforded the right to legal counsel, a formal hearing, 
the right against self-incrimination and the opportunity to confront and cross-examine 
opposing witnesses.94  The same guarantees stipulated in the Gault decision were 
incorporated into article 40(2)(b)(ii), (iii) and (iv).  Subsection (2)(b)(iii) is, however, 
qualified by the phrase ‘unless considered not in the best interest of the child’, taking 
into account the child’s age, situation and parents or guardians.  This additional 
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 CRC/C/GC/10 para 13. 
91
 Article 40(2)(b) of the UNCRC; Rule 7.1 of the Beijing Rules; UNICEF (1998) Innocenti Digest:  
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qualification allows for more informal procedures to be adopted and an atmosphere of 
understanding where the child can participate and freely express him or herself.95  
Subsection (2)(b)(v) consists of  a similar provision to that of article 37(d) which 
provides for appeal and review procedures and, where the child cannot understand the 
language used, he or she is entitled to an interpreter.  Finally, the child has a right to 
privacy and that right must be fully respected at all stages of the proceedings.  This 
serves as protection to prevent children from being scrutinized by the public and 
being labelled as delinquents.96  Research has indicated that such labelling has very 
traumatic and detrimental effects on children.97  
 
Article 40(3) of the UNCRC requires specialised legislation and procedures for 
children in conflict with the law.  This article has been subdivided into three 
subsections.  The first subsection details making separate laws, procedures, authorities 
and institutions applicable to juveniles within the spirit of article 40.  Rule 2.3(a) - (c) 
of the Beijing Rules affirms article 40(3).  These laws, procedures and authorities 
must meet the needs and protect the rights of the juvenile offender, meet the needs of 
society and ensure that the implementation of such rules and procedures are both fair 
and efficient.98                           
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 Rule 14.2 of the Beijing Rules; Article 12 of the UNCRC.   
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At international law, criminal responsibility relates to an age where the child is 
capable of understanding the consequences of his or her actions.99  The second 
subsection of this article seeks to promote a MACR.  In doing so, it calls upon 
ratifying States to set a minimum age for children in conflict with the law.  Such 
children below the set minimum age are deemed to lack criminal capacity.100  This 
means that they will not be held accountable for their unlawful actions under criminal 
law because of their young age.  Rule 4.1 of the Beijing Rules provides further 
guidelines for interpreting the above provisions by stating that the ‘minimum age 
must not be fixed too low bearing in mind the emotional, mental and intellectual 
maturity of the child’.101  These guidelines are somewhat problematic as children 
mature differently depending on the environment in which they live.  The language 
used in both documents is merely suggestive rather than mandatory upon states.    
 
Data collection for the determination of minimum age has not proved an easy task 
especially when the determined minimum age is not the lowest age for criminal 
responsibility because of the seriousness of the offence.102  States Parties reports show 
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 G Van Bueren (2006) ‘Article 40:  Child Criminal Justice’, in Alen, A et al A Commentary on the 
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a wide variety of MACR ranging from 7 to 16 years of age.103  The CROC has been 
very critical of States that have set their MACR’s at less than 10 years old.104  For 
example, South Africa in its original Child Justice Bill105 raised its minimum age of 
criminal capacity from 7 to 10 years old and the CROC was still concerned that the 
legal minimum age of 10 years was too low.106  Similarly, where the minimum age is 
too high, the problem that arises is the lack of due process rights because children 
under that high minimum age have no interaction with the criminal justice system.107  
They may find themselves in the social welfare system receiving social protections 
aimed at children in need of care rather than children in conflict with the law.  It is 
submitted that this results in the due process rights contained in subsection (2)(b) 
being protected and upheld in theory only.  Thus, the availability and implementation 
of the juvenile justice provisions are dependent on a clearly defined minimum age.   
 
Article 40(3)(b) is aimed at encouraging States Parties to implement diversionary 
mechanisms away from judicial proceedings for children in conflict with the law 
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 UNODC (2006) Criminal Justice Assessment Toolkit 2:  Cross-cutting Issues Juvenile Justice, 4; 
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(those below and above the MACR)108 while article 40(4) provides alternative 
measures to institutionalised care.  The availability of these measures complements 
the safeguards set out for children in article 37(a) and (b).109 
 
 
Article 37 
 
‘States Parties shall ensure that: 
  
(a) No child shall be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. Neither capital punishment nor life imprisonment without possibility of release 
shall be imposed for offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age; 
  
(b) No child shall be deprived of his or her liberty unlawfully or arbitrarily. The arrest, detention 
or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law and shall be used only as a 
measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time; 
  
(c) Every child deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent 
dignity of the human person, and in a manner which takes into account the needs of persons 
of his or her age. In particular, every child deprived of liberty shall be separated from adults 
unless it is considered in the child's best interest not to do so and shall have the right to 
maintain contact with his or her family through correspondence and visits, save in exceptional 
circumstances;  
 
(d) Every child deprived of his or her liberty shall have the right to prompt access to legal and 
other appropriate assistance, as well as the right to challenge the legality of the deprivation of 
his or her liberty before a court or other competent, independent and impartial authority, and 
to a prompt decision on any such action.’ 
 
 
The provisions of article 37110 are reflected in many other international human rights 
instruments which help interpret its provisions.111  States Parties should take 
cognizance of these instruments for the effective implementation of this article.   
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Subsection (a) instructs States Parties to protect persons under the age of 18 from 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment, the death penalty and life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole.  This is an absolute right for children 
in conflict with the law, which means that States Parties have a duty to protect them 
against such torture and punishment wherever they are.112  Article 37(a) has found 
successful application in many African countries with regard to abolition of judicially 
imposed corporal punishment and whipping.113    
 
Article 37(b) provides that the arrest, detention or imprisonment of a child should be a 
last resort and for the shortest appropriate time.  Rule 11 of the Havana Rules 
stipulates that States Parties must have a minimum age in place, below which children 
may not be deprived of their liberty and defines deprivation of liberty to mean ‘any 
form of detention or imprisonment or the placement of a person in a public or private 
custodial setting, from which this person is not permitted to leave at will, by order of 
any judicial, administrative or other public authority’.114  The result of this Rule is that 
a child below the stipulated minimum age cannot be deprived of their liberty for any 
reason.  Rule 13 and 17 of the Beijing Rules set out guiding principles to help States 
Parties to interpret what is ‘a measure of last resort’ and ‘for the shortest appropriate 
                                                                                                                                      
justice, namely, the non-binding Beijing Rules and the Havana Rules provide detailed standards for 
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time’.115  The commentary on Rule 13 warns against the dangers of ‘criminal 
contamination’ and the stresses the placement of juveniles in alternative institutions or 
alternative measures while awaiting trial.116  Guidelines in relation to adjudication and 
alternative measures are considered under Rule 17.   In accordance with Article 40(4) 
of the UNCRC, Rule 17 encourages alternative measures other than incarceration to 
be used to the ‘maximum extent possible’.117  The only time that incarceration of a 
juvenile cannot be avoided is when the public safety is at stake.118 
 
The treatment of children deprived of their liberty is the crux of article 37(c).  Great 
emphasis is placed on the fact that their treatment must be in accordance with their 
age and development.  This subsection is guided by Rule 13 of the Havana Rules 
which states that juveniles deprived of their liberty will not lose their fundamental 
rights and freedoms afforded to them at national and international law by reason of 
their status.  The CROC, however, has expressed its concern regarding the conditions 
of detention facilities and recommends that the applicable UN Rules and Guidelines 
be applied to all situations, coupled with effective monitoring, inspections and 
complaints procedure and appropriate training for all personnel as required by the 
UNCRC.119  The provision further holds that children deprived of their liberty must be 
separated from adults unless the best interests of the child suggests otherwise.  
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Allowing the child to maintain contact with adults will have to be justified in terms of 
article 3, being the ‘best interests’ standard of the UNCRC.120   
 
Finally article 37(d) allows children deprived of their liberty access to legal and other 
appropriate assistance.  Included in this subsection is their right to challenge such 
deprivation before a court or other competent or impartial authority.   
 
3.  The Committee on the Rights of the Child    
Article 43 provides for the establishment of a supervisory body known as the CROC 
which consists of ‘18 experts of high moral standing and recognised competence’ in 
the domain of children’s rights.121   These members serve in their personal capacities 
and are elected by States Parties for a term of 4 years after which they may be re-
elected if nominated.122  The supervisory body for CROC is the UN General 
Assembly.  Every two years, the CROC has a duty submit to the General Assembly, 
through the Economic and Social Council, a report on its activities as the monitoring 
body for States Parties.123  The CROC places great significance on the general 
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principles outlined above in articles 2, 3, 6 and 12 and advocates a move towards a 
rights-based approach when implementing the UNCRC.124  
 
The CROC meets for three sessions per year in Geneva during which time it considers 
reports, organises days of general discussion and publishes general comments on 
thematic debates.125    The main functions of the CROC are to monitor and review the 
progress of States Parties in implementing the provisions of the UNCRC, to examine 
reports and to produce concluding observations for better implementation.126  More 
recently, the CROC coordinates Regional Follow-up Workshops educating States 
Parties on implementation in a particular area.  The CROC also supports the work 
done by NGO’s who played a vital role in the drafting process and considers their 
independent reports.127       
 
The CROC examines each State Party report, addresses concerns and makes 
recommendations.  The examination of States Parties reports by CROC takes the form 
of a dialogue between State representatives and the CROC.128  Thereafter the CROC 
provides States Parties with its concluding observations.  These observations usually 
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consist of an introduction, the progress made by the particular States Party, the 
impediments obstructing effective implementation, main areas of concern, 
suggestions and recommendations on how to improve State efforts when 
implementing their national laws in accordance with the UNCRC.129  If no further 
information is requested by the CROC the concluding observations are made public 
and are meant to be widely publicized so as to provide for a national debate to 
improve enforcement of the UNCRC provisions.130  The CROC does not provide for 
an individual complaint mechanism, but there is an ongoing debate whether such a 
mechanism should be catered for. 
  
3.1 The Day of General Discussion          
Each year since 1992 and during its regular sessions, the CROC has set aside a special 
day to engage in active debate on a particular theme or article in the UNCRC.  This 
day is referred to as the Day of General Discussion131 which is open to any person or 
recognized body interested in the global plight of child.132  The main objective of 
these debates is to cultivate a greater appreciation of the content and meaning of a 
particular theme or article133 and to guide States Parties in implementing the UNCRC 
principles into their national legal systems.134  At the close of the session, the CROC 
adopts recommendations taking into account what was raised and discussed amongst 
the participants.   
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130
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On 13 November 1995, the topic the ‘Administration of Juvenile Justice’ received 
trenchant attention from the CROC and the participating parties.  This was the date set 
aside for general discussion and an opportunity for the CROC to evaluate its activities 
as a treaty monitoring body in relation to the topic.135  Articles 37, 39 and 40 were the 
main topics of debate.  The day, however, was reflective of a unified approach 
because the general principles (articles 2, 3, 6 and 12) are invaluable when 
considering the broader theme on the administration of juvenile justice.  The two 
areas of concern were the ‘effective implementation of existing standards and the 
value of international cooperation…emphasizing the importance of accountability for 
the protection of, and respect for, the human rights of children, while stressing the 
need to foster international solidarity for the realization of those same rights.’136        
 
The evaluation of the CROC’s experience manifested the following considerations.  
Firstly, in relation to States Parties reports, there was a serious lack of information and 
data in the field of juvenile justice.  Secondly, the reports consisted mainly of general 
legal provisions and very vague descriptions of processes in place for the effective 
realisation of children’s rights.137  
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The CROC was concerned that the general principles of the UNCRC were not being 
adequately reflected in States Parties domestic laws and practices.138  Article 2 came 
under the spotlight because of the subjective and arbitrary criteria used to assess the 
criminal responsibility of children and the measures applicable to them.  Article 3, on 
the other hand, was reaffirmed in light of article 40(1), but States Parties reports 
provided evidence that separate juvenile justice systems were virtually non-existent, 
justice personnel lacked training and information on fundamental rights and legal 
safeguards were not explained or provided for.  The right of children to participate in 
matters affecting them was often disregarded along with the protections afforded 
under articles 37(b) and 40(2)(b).139  This unfortunate situation was contrary to 
international standards and opened the door to frequent abuse of the juvenile justice 
system as there were no proper monitors in place to determine abuses and hand out 
sanctions.140  It was against this backdrop that the Day of General Discussion was 
meant to set in motion the wheels of change.      
            
The CROC stressed that the realisation and success of a child-orientated system is 
dependent on States Parties implementing the provisions of the UNCRC in 
accordance with article 4.141  Children should never be deprived of their liberty until 
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all the available alternatives have been exhausted.  If there are no suitable alternatives 
and a child is deprived of his or her liberty, as a last resort, the rights in article 37(d) 
and 40(2)(b) should apply with immediate effect.  It was further unequivocally stated 
in relation to institutional care that due regard be given to the ‘best interest of the 
child’.  States Parties were urged to seek alternatives to institutional care and adopt 
measures that ensure transparency and the effective monitoring for these institutions.  
The role of the family came up in the discussions as one of the most important tools 
for ensuring the effective enjoyment of children’s rights and their reintegration into an 
environment that promotes their self-respect and dignity.142  These measures 
contribute to the goal of realising effective children’s rights and promoting the 
adherence of States Parties domestic laws with that of international standards in the 
field of juvenile justice.   
 
State reporting and the CROC’s concluding observations are acknowledged as the 
frame of reference for programmes of technical assistance,  the basis of understanding 
the situation in any country, promoting international cooperation and strengthening 
national capacities and infrastructures.143  The effect of the Day of General Discussion 
was to highlight the issues and difficulties surrounding the administration of juvenile 
justice.  An enormous amount of importance was placed on international cooperation 
as a ‘way of rationalizing the use of resources, streamlining activities, enhancing the 
efficiency of programmes while reaffirming the link between criminal justice and 
human rights’.144   
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3.2 General Comment No. 10 
The CROC has developed several General Comments since 2001.  These comments 
serve as the CROC’s interpretation of the content of human rights provisions on 
thematic issues.145  To date there are currently 10 General Comments which cover 
issues such the aims of education,146 the role of independent human rights 
institutions,147 HIV/AIDS and the rights of the child,148 adolescent health,149 general 
measures of implementation for the Convention on the Rights of the Child,150 the 
treatment of unaccompanied and separated children outside their country of origin,151 
implementation of child rights in early childhood,152 the right to protection from 
corporal punishment and other cruel and degrading forms of punishment,153 the rights 
of children with disabilities154 and children’s rights in juvenile justice.155  These 
comments provide detailed guidelines for States Parties and other duty bearers on 
matters not necessarily covered in the UNCRC.  They raise awareness and act as a 
persuasive force in interpreting States Parties duties under domestic law, the UNCRC 
and international law generally.156       
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General Comment No. 10 is the focal point of this thesis and the most substantial 
comment to date.  It serves as an historic juncture of the present state of affairs in 
juvenile justice systems all over the world, representing the intersection between 
children’s rights and criminal justice.  Since the inception of the UNCRC, States 
Parties have come a long way in complying with its provisions, as evidenced by 
States Parties reports.  The CROC has commended these States Parties on their efforts 
in implementing the juvenile justice articles enshrined in the UNCRC into their 
national systems.  The reports not only reflect the progress being made by signatories 
but their failures as well.  Despite the progress of some States Parties there are many 
who fall short of achieving their UNCRC obligations.  Thus, there is still much to be 
desired on the juvenile justice front in the area of due process rights, the development 
and implementation of measures for dealing with children in conflict with the law 
without resorting to legal proceedings, and the use of deprivation of liberty as a last 
resort.157   
  
The CROC has gained much of its insight on the problematic areas in juvenile justice 
from reviewing the periodic reports submitted by the States Parties.  Areas of concern 
which emphasise the need for a comprehensive juvenile justice policy include the lack 
of facts and figures on preventative and treatment measures taken by States Parties in 
preventing children from coming into conflict with the law.158  The experience of lack 
of measures and poor statistical data on the treatment of children in conflict with the 
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law is shared by most States Parties.159  It is in the midst of this scarcity of necessary 
information and statistical data on children in conflict with the law that the General 
Comment attempts to alleviate these pressures by providing States Parties with 
improved guidelines and more detailed recommendations for the interpretation and 
implementation of articles 37 and 40.160 
 
At the outset, the General Comment elaborates on its vision for a comprehensive 
juvenile justice policy.  It reiterates the four key principles enshrined in articles 2, 3, 6 
and 12 of the UNCRC.161  These articles together with articles 4, 37, 39 and 40 are the 
starting point for States Parties to develop and implement a comprehensive juvenile 
justice policy.  In so doing States Parties are to seek technical advice and assistance 
from the Interagency Panel on Juvenile Justice (IPJJ) represented by representatives 
from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UNICEF, 
the UNODC and supporting NGO’s.162  The IPJJ are also tasked with promoting and 
integrating international standards through a national prevention strategy.163   
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The key principles which form the pillars of the UNCRC and upon which all the other 
provisions rest have been discussed in some detail above.164  In addition to these 
leading principles, the General Comment gives special attention to the child’s right to 
dignity discussed under article 40(1).165  The rest of the General Comment is devoted 
to delineating the core elements that are necessary for States Parties to put a 
comprehensive juvenile justice policy in place:  ‘the prevention of a juvenile 
delinquency; interventions without resorting to judicial proceedings and interventions 
in the context of judicial proceedings; the MACR and the upper age limits for juvenile 
justice; the guarantees for a fair trial; and deprivation of liberty including pre-trial 
detention and post-trial incarceration’.166      
 
3.2.1  The prevention of juvenile delinquency 
The General Comment places extensive emphasis on the prevention of juvenile 
delinquency.  The CROC warns that a juvenile justice policy without a 
comprehensive prevention strategy is in danger of suffering serious drawbacks. At the 
very least, States Parties are encouraged to incorporate the Riyadh Guidelines into 
their national prevention polices.167  According to Guideline 2 ‘the successful 
prevention of juvenile delinquency requires the efforts on the part of the entire society 
to ensure the harmonious development of adolescents, with respect for and promotion 
of their personality from early childhood’.  Parents bear the primary responsibility for 
their children but the State should be responsible for fostering a support system for 
parents and caretakers through family-based prevention programmes aimed at parent 
                                               
164
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training enhancing parent-child interaction and home visitation programmes.168  States 
Parties must access assistance and guidance from the IPJJ while effecting useful 
prevention programmes.169      
 
3.2.2  Interventions in the context of judicial proceedings and interventions without 
resorting to judicial proceedings (Diversion)  
There are two kinds of interventions available when dealing with children in the 
context of article 40, that is, ‘children alleged as, accused of, or recognised as having 
infringed penal law’.  State authorities may either resort to measures that will result in 
judicial proceedings or measures that divert children away from judicial proceedings.  
It is submitted that the latter intervention of diverting or redirecting children toward 
community-based services rather than a courtroom setting is far more desirable.170  If 
the authorities resort to judicial methods of intervention they are reminded to deal 
with the child in a manner that promotes their reintegration as a full member of 
society.171  Thus, State authorities should first make use of social and or educational 
measures as the deprivation of liberty should be only be used as ‘a last resort’ and ‘for 
the shortest possible period’ in accordance with the provisions set out in article 37(b).  
 
When redirecting children in conflict with the law away from judicial proceedings, 
States Parties must follow the safeguards discussed earlier under article 40(3)(b).  The 
                                               
168
 Article 18 and Article 27 of the UNCRC; CRC/C/GC/10 para 19. 
169
 Fact Sheet # 2:  Preventing Juvenile Delinquency.  Available at http://www.dci-
is.org/db/nl/up_files/GC_10_FactSheet2_Preventing_Juvenile_Delinquency_EN.pdf [accessed 10 May 
2008]; CRC/C/GC/10 para 21. 
170
 Fact Sheet # 3:  Promoting Diversion.  Available at http://www.dci-
is.org/db/nl/up_files/GC_10_FactSheet3_Promoting_Diversion_EN.pdf [accessed 10 May 2008]; 
CRC/C/GC/10 para 24. 
171
 Article 40(1) of the UNCRC. 
 
 
 
 
 48 
advantages of implementing diversionary methods into a juvenile justice system are 
multi-faceted in that they allow for children’s rights to be respected, the stigma 
attached to diversion is far less than that attached to judicial proceedings, diversion 
allows children to be accountable for their actions and it saves the State time, money 
and resources.  For diversion to be effective within the limits of article 40(3)(b), the 
General Comment requires that (a) children be afforded the opportunity of acquiring 
legal or other assistance prior to consenting to diversion; (b) upon consent to 
diversion the matter will be closed; (c) diversion will not count as a previous 
conviction and finally; (d) a record of the diversionary measure may only be kept for 
a period of one year.172        
 
 3.2.3  The MACR   
In chapter 1 we discussed the MACR in terms of its meaning, significance and the 
problematic factors affecting it.  The MACR denotes the lowest age at which a child 
is deemed to have the mental capacity to commit a crime and the State or international 
community is willing to prosecute or declare the child a delinquent in a juvenile or 
adult court.173  Articulated differently, the MACR is the age below which children are 
presumed not to have the mental capacity to infringe penal law.174  To create a MACR 
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means that if a child below such minimum age infringes penal law, he or she cannot 
be held criminally responsible.  Thus, juvenile justice policy should integrate suitable 
alternatives to prosecution such as social welfare procedures which avoid criminal 
responsibility for children below the MACR.175 
 
Article 40(3)(a) of the UNCRC directs States Parties to create a MACR below which 
children shall be presumed to lack the capacity to infringe penal law.  The 
determination of what this minimum age should be has been left for States to decide, 
resulting in wide disparities in the minimum age of criminal capacity.  The ages 
‘range from the very low age level of 7 or 8 to a commendable high level age 14 to 
16’.176  For example, Hong Kong has a minimum age of 10,177 Australia’s minimum 
age was set at 8 years old but upon review of its legislation the age was raised to 
10,178  Ethiopia’s minimum age is set at 9 179 and the United Kingdom and Scotland 
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have their minimum ages set at 10 and 8 respectively.180  Canada and the Netherlands 
have their minimum age at 12 while Germany, Sweden and Mozambique have their 
minimum set at the commendable ages of 14, 15 and 16 respectively.181   
 
Over the past 18 years that the CROC has been deliberating on human rights for 
children, yet, it has managed to evade the issue of establishing a firm standpoint 
around the MACR debate.   Finally, with the release of General Comment No. 10, an 
important milestone was reached which put an end to the issue as to what an 
appropriate MACR should be.182  The CROC took a concrete approach in establishing 
a fixed MACR at not lower than 12 years old and made many recommendations to 
States Parties in this regard.183  This approach forms the basis of my entire thesis as it 
affects the way in which MACR is viewed in the African countries under study.  
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At the very least, ratifying States are required to review their minimum age of 
criminal capacity and raise it if it is too low.184  In common law jurisdictions, the rules 
for criminal capacity which were derived from Roman law stated that there is an 
irrebuttable presumption that a child below the age of 7 lacked criminal capacity.185  
This meant that a child below the age 7 could not be held criminally liable even if he 
or she infringed penal law.  The rule went further and held that a rebuttable 
presumption of criminal incapacity (doli incapax) existed for children between the 
ages of 7 and 14 who infringed penal law.186  The burden of proof was on the 
prosecution to rebut the presumption that the child lacked criminal capacity, beyond a 
reasonable doubt.187  In other words, the prosecution had to prove that the child had 
the ability to distinguish between right and wrong (the cognitive function) and that the 
child was capable of controlling his or her actions by acting in accordance with such 
knowledge and appreciation (the conative function).188  From the age of 14 a child is 
treated as the equivalent of an adult and presumed to have full capacity unless there is 
evidence to the contrary.  
 
In its concluding observations of States Parties reports the CROC has increasingly 
criticised countries if their minimum age was fixed below 10.189  The CROC has 
urged states not to set their minimum age of criminal capacity at less than 12 years 
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old, although the ideal minimum age recommended by CROC would be 14 or 16 
years old.190  It has been recommended in General Comment No. 10 by the CROC 
that a MACR below 12 is directly contrary to international standards.191  Countries 
that have a MACR lower than 12 are in danger of violating international law and are 
urged to raise the age in accordance with international standards, while countries that 
enjoy a higher MACR than 12 are implored to keep it and raise it progressively.192 
  
The CROC further expressed its disapproval of countries who allow a lower MACR 
in exceptional cases and those practicing two minimum ages or a so called ‘split age’.  
An example of the former is where a child commits a serious offence or is found to be 
mature enough to be held criminally responsible.193  The latter ‘split age’ is where the 
rebuttable presumption of incapacity is applicable to children between the ages of 10 
and 14 years old.194  ‘The system of two minimum ages is often not only confusing, 
but leaves much to the discretion of the court and may result in discriminatory 
practices’.195  The problem with giving the courts too much discretion in assessing the 
child's maturity is that such an assessment often lacks the necessary psychological 
expert opinion.196  The ‘split age’ system allows the lower minimum age of criminal 
capacity to be used which means that the young child will be criminally liable because 
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he or she satisfies the maturity requirement in the opinion of the court.197  The CROC 
adopts the position that a ‘split age’ often leads to confusion and discriminatory 
practices and should be avoided by States at all cost.198   
 
Another area of concern raised by the CROC in the Comment relates to the treatment 
of children committing offences who are below the MACR, and children age 16 and 
17 who are treated and sentenced as adults.199  Children below the MACR are often 
dealt with in an informal setting without the necessary care for their due process rights 
and freedoms.200  Moreover, if juvenile justice systems cater for all children under the 
age of 18 then why is it that 16 and 17 year olds are treated as adults?  It is my 
submission that this goes against the international principles established by the 
CROC.  Children are defined as persons under the age of 18, so that adult standards 
should not apply to them simply because a court considers them to be adults.201  Thus, 
States Parties should strive to treat all children in conflict with the law who are under 
the age of 18 as children when implementing laws and procedures applicable to them.    
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Finally, the CROC highlights the importance of article 7 of the UNCRC which 
requires every child to be registered after birth so that States Parties are able to set 
suitable age minimums.202  All children should be provided with a birth certificate so 
that they are able to prove their age if need be.  Where there is doubt around proving a 
child’s age such child must be given the benefit of the doubt.  
 
3.2.4  The guarantees for a fair trial 
The right to a fair trial is a fundamental human right which was first expressed in the 
1948 UDHR and later in the ICCPR.203  Article 40(2) of the UNCRC outlines the 
fundamental rights and guarantees available to ‘children alleged as, accused of, or 
recognised as infringing penal law’.  These minimum guarantees are essential for 
ensuring that children in conflict with the law are afforded their rights and liberties 
and are not dealt with an arbitrary manner.  The CROC recommended in the General 
Comment that proper implementation of these guarantees is dependant on fostering 
quality personnel for the effective administration of such rights.  Thus, training of 
professionals in the fields is invaluable and it must take place in an organised and 
regular fashion.204       
   
A few noteworthy guarantees available to children in conflict with the law are the 
presumption of innocence,205 the right to be heard and to be afforded the opportunity 
for effective participation in the proceedings,206 to prompt and direct information of 
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the charge(s), the right to legal or other appropriate assistance,207 the right to speedy 
trial,208 the freedom from self-incrimination,209 the right to appeal210 and right to 
privacy and expungement of records.211  I submit that the MACR has become part of 
substantive law and is yet another ‘guarantee’ that must be afforded to children in 
conflict with the law which must be considered along with all the other guarantees 
listed above as it.  
 
3.2.5 The deprivation of liberty including pre-trial detention and post-trial 
incarceration  
The General Comment reiterates that deprivation of liberty may only be used as ‘a last 
resort’ and ‘for the shortest possible period’ and that no child may be unlawfully or 
arbitrarily deprived of their liberty.212  States Parties are urged not to use detention 
and institutionalisation as quick and easy solutions because it conflicts with the social 
reintegration and rehabilitation of children.213  Children who have been deprived of 
their liberty or placed in pre-trial detention are often not afforded the procedural rights 
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available to them.214  Thus, the CROC encourages States Parties to look for 
alternatives and use them wherever possible.215  
  
4. Evaluating the status of UNCRC and the General Comment  
The UNCRC brought with it a new philosophy for children rights as bearers of rights 
and active participants in matters that affect them.  It is the first and only treaty to 
have such a rapid following after its adoption.  The supervisory body strives for 
effective implementation of its provisions through a system of State reporting which 
provides necessary information and interpretations for a comprehensive treaty.  Since 
its inception, it has gained significant status at both international and national level, 
through the process of domestication, and has been cited in a number of cases around 
the globe as the legal basis for respecting the rights of the child.216  The UNCRC now 
serves as the ‘international benchmark against which legislation and policies can be 
measured’.217  
 
General Comment No. 10 is an invaluable document for understanding the 
administration of juvenile justice.  Nigel Cantwell, an expert in the field of children’s 
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rights and the founder of Defence for Children International (DCI), noted in his 
opening address on the ‘Follow-up to General Comment No.10’, that 30 years ago 
there were no international standards in the area of juvenile justice.218  However, 30 
years later, standards for children in conflict with the law have come a long way in the 
international arena.  The General Comment serves as a reference document, 
combining all the existing issues and standards on juvenile justice and making 
recommendations, for example, developing an appropriate MACR not lower than 12. 
 
One of the leading challenges in juvenile justice recognised by CROC is that of 
implementation.  The General Comment acts as a guide for States Parties when 
developing an implemention policy for a child-centered and coordinated juvenile 
justice system.  It is also a very useful tool when dealing with provisions of technical 
advice and assistance. 
   
Unsurprisingly, at present, there is still a variety of MACR’s at international law.  
Prior to the General Comment, States Parties relied on vague guidelines in 
determining and setting what they may have found to be an appropriate MACR.  With 
the advent of General Comment No. 10 advocating that the MACR should not be set 
at less than 12 years old, many States Parties have found themselves in danger of 
violating international law.  States Parties will have to review their MACR provisions 
in an attempt to meet its international obligations.  The CROC will have to be patient 
with States Parties as many of them have in the last decade reviewed their MACR 
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provisions and raised them.219  However, the raised MACR’s still fall short of the 
international standards set by the CROC.  Chapter 3 investigates how the African 
countries under study have attempted to domesticate the MACR provisions advocated 
in General Comment No. 10 into their national legal systems. 
 
5.  The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
5.1 Background and Scope of Application 
The ACRWC was created and adopted by the AU to promote and protect human 
rights for children in Africa.220  As the first regional document recognising children as 
bearers of rights and representing an African concept of human rights, the AU was of 
the opinion that its members would gain significantly in the area of children’s 
rights.221  While many of the ACRWC provisions were fashioned to complement 
those of the UNCRC, it includes certain provisions thought to be relevant more to 
children in an African context.222  Some of its provisions are also of a higher standard 
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and more advanced than those in its CRC counterpart.223  These provisions are aimed 
at addressing particular concerns relevant in Africa and at the same time fulfilling the 
objective of supplementing the UNCRC with regional specificities.224  When States 
are party to both instruments, and the national laws or the ACRWC provides for a 
higher level of protection with regard to children’s rights, then the latter supersedes 
the protection offered by the UNCRC.225  Thus the ACRWC serves as ‘a potent 
weapon for children’s rights activism at domestic levels’.226                       
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Article 2 defines a child as every human being below the age of 18 years.  The 
drafters undertook the task of drafting a strict and unambiguous definition of child.227  
In so doing, the ambit of the ACRWC has been clearly defined to include all persons 
under the age of 18, without exception.  The ACRWC has a wider scope of 
application than the UNCRC as no proviso or limitation exists under the ACRWC.  
Thus it applies to and protects any person under the age of 18 regardless of their 
majority status.228   
 
Even though the approach taken by the ACRWC is more advanced and inclusive 
when defining a child, it clashes with the traditional African culture of understanding 
childhood.229  In an African context, the rules relating to age, criminal and other 
capacities were inherited from pre-colonial traditions.  The concept of childhood with 
respect to physical age is uninvestigated in African cultural traditions.230  The 
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traditional African conception of age and criminal responsibility is understood as 
comprising the distinction between maturing children and adults which is marked by 
phases (rites of passage) such as initiation ceremonies, marriage and forming a 
separate household, rather than by a physical threshold of 18 years of age.231  To 
complicate matters further, other difficulties associated with defining children by 
chronological age relate to lack of birth registration and children assuming roles and 
responsibilities allocated to adults.232  The ACRWC has been criticized for its silence 
with regard to implementing effective birth registration in Africa.233  Articles 6(2) and 
(4) provides for children to be registered immediately after birth in order to attain a 
name and nationality but fails dismally in indicating the importance of birth 
registration for the purposes of recording chronological age.234 
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As noted above, the actual determination of a child’s true age is, and remains to be, a 
pressing issue in developing African legal systems.  Poor infrastructure in many of 
these countries results in birth records being inaccessible or virtually non-existent.235  
The child justice system is open to all sorts of abuse without effective implementation 
of birth registration offices and proper record keeping.  Offending adults could easily 
misrepresent their true age and slip through the system so that they can be afforded 
the lenient treatment available to child offenders under the age of 18.  On the other 
hand, because of the lenient treatment afforded to child offenders, adults could use 
children as pawns to commit crime on their behalf.236   In the same way adults can 
misrepresent their age, child offenders could be mistaken as adults and diverted into 
the adult criminal justice system.  If chronological age cannot be adequately 
determined, child offenders may face the very real risk of being dealt with in the adult 
criminal justice system.   
     
5.2 The Substantive Principles 
The ACRWC displays the same substantive principles as the UNCRC, namely, non-
discrimination (article 3), the best interests of the child (article 4), right to life, 
survival and development (article 5) and child participation (article 4(2)).  In addition 
to these anchoring principles that need to be extended to all children by States Parties 
are the juvenile justice provisions found in article 17.   
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5.2.1 Non-discrimination 
The principle of non-discrimination is a golden thread present in all human rights 
documents.  Under the ACRWC it is an overriding principle which entitles every 
child equal enjoyment of the guaranteed rights and freedoms, regardless of the child’s 
or his or her parents’ or legal guardians race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, 
religion, political belief or other opinions, social origins, fortune, birth and any other 
status.237  A weakness of the principle is its silence on children belonging to minority 
or indigenous groups despite mounting evidence of their oppression.238  The MACR is 
a guaranteed right that must be afforded to all children in conflict with the law.  No 
matter the status of the child or how age is determined an African setting, as an 
absolute minimum each child is entitled to enjoy every right under the ACRWC 
without discrimination.      
 
5.2.2 Best interests of the child 
The ‘best interests of the child’ is the standard by which States Parties measure all 
actions, laws and policies affecting children within their jurisdiction.  It can be located 
in article 4 of the ACRWC as ‘the primary consideration’ in all matters concerning 
the child as opposed to ‘a primary consideration’ in the UNCRC.  Using the definite 
article of ‘the’ rather than the indefinite article ‘a’ may prove overly fastidious but the 
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usage of these articles has noteworthy consequences.239  Unlike its CRC counterpart, 
the provision relating to the ‘best interests of the child’ is maximised in its influence 
in that it is supreme over all other considerations, which offers better protection for 
children.240  The UNCRC, however, has been interpreted as having a broader scope 
because it includes all matters ‘concerning children’ whereas the ACRWC only 
concerns all matters ‘concerning the child’.  Thus the wording in the UNCRC denotes 
a higher protection by including all children rather referring to a specific child.241   
 
It is common practice in African rural societies that traditional customs will 
sometimes take precedence over formal law.  The ACRWC asserts its primacy over 
cultural practices that prove harmful or contravene any of its provisions by employing 
the fundamental ‘best interests’ principle.242  A further important consideration when 
dealing with this principle is that it serves as an interpretive tool for all the other rights 
                                               
239
 A Lloyd ‘A theoretical analysis of the reality of children’s rights in Africa:  An introduction to the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 
17.  
240
 DM Chirwa ‘The merits and demerits of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 
(2002) 10 The International Journal on Children’s Rights 160; M Gose (2002) ‘The African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 25, 26; A Lloyd ‘Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child and the African Committee of Experts:  Raising the gauntlet’ (2002) 10 The 
International Journal on Children’s Rights 183; A Lloyd ‘A theoretical analysis of the reality of 
children’s rights in Africa:  An introduction to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child’(2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 17; M Freeman (2007) ‘Article 3.  The Best 
Interest of the Child’, in Alen, A et al A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child 1, 21; BD Mezmur (2007) ‘The African Children’s Charter Vs the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child:  A zero-sum game?’  (Forthcoming). 
241
 M Gose (2002) ‘The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 26. 
242
 F Viljoen (2000) ‘The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ in Davel, CJ (Ed) 
Introduction to Child Law in South Africa 220; A Lloyd ‘A theoretical analysis of the reality of 
children’s rights in Africa:  An introduction to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child’ (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 17.  
 
 
 
 
 65 
in the Charter.  It is the duty of the Member States to implement legislation that 
ensures that the principle is upheld within their domestic systems.    
 
5.2.3 Right to life, survival and development 
The right to life, survival and development are encompassed in article 5 of the 
ACRWC.  It is dealt with very similarly to the UNCRC’s survival right in article 6.  It 
protects children who have committed serious criminal acts from the death penalty in 
countries where the death penalty is still rife.243  It is unfortunate that the death 
penalty is part and parcel of criminal justice systems in 32 of the 53 African States.244  
Life imprisonment could serve as a substitute for the death penalty but it would be 
contrary to the aims of article 17(3) which will be discussed under the next section.    
 
5.2.4 Child participation  
For the first time at regional level there is a move away from the philosophy of 
children being seen and not heard.  The substantive principle of child participation 
which is one of the new rights afforded to children which allows them the opportunity 
to actively participate as a party to any proceedings.  No other human rights document 
prior to the UNCRC and the ACRWC catered for children to be heard and to 
participate in any matters affecting them.  Article 4(2) of the ACRWC allows children 
who are capable of communicating their views, to do so, in all judicial or 
administrative proceedings that affect them.  The child’s right to participate is further 
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reinforced by the guarantees provided for in articles 7, 8 and 9.245  The scope of article 
4(2) is limited in the sense that some children are not capable of effectively 
communicating their views.  A child’s capability would depend on factors such as 
age, education levels and the child’s level of articulateness.   In other words, a child 
who is capable of having an opinion but is unable to express it will not be heard.246   
 
5.2.5 The juvenile justice provision:  Article 17 
The ACRWC has its child justice provisions encompassed in article 17 and article 
30.247  Article 17 is largely based on the blueprint on the administration of juvenile 
justice in its CRC counterpart.  The scope of the rights and protection offered by this 
article, however, is more limited due to the drafters omitting some of the most 
important guarantees.248  Despite its limited scope, article 17 has nonetheless 
considerably added to the positive development in the protection of children’s rights 
in juvenile justice in Africa. 
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Article 17 states the following: 
 
‘ 1. Every child accused or found guilty of having infringed penal law shall have the right to 
special treatment in a manner consistent with the child’s sense of dignity which reinforces the 
child’s respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of others. 
 
2. States Parties to the present Charter shall in particular: 
  
(a) ensure that no child who is detained or imprisoned or otherwise deprived of his/her liberty 
is subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; 
 
(b) ensure that children are separated from adults in their place of detention or imprisonment; 
 
(c) ensure that every child accused of infringing the penal law: 
 
(i) shall be presumed innocent until duly recognized guilty; 
 
(ii) shall be informed promptly in a language that he understands and in detail of 
the charge against him, and shall be entitled to the assistance of an 
interpreter if he or she cannot understand the language used; 
 
(iii) shall be afforded legal and other appropriate assistance in the preparation 
and presentation of his presentation of his defence; 
 
(iv)  shall have the matters determined as speedily as possible by an impartial 
tribunal and if found guilty, be entitled to an appeal by a higher tribunal; 
 
(v)  shall not be compelled to give testimony or confess guilt. 
 
(d) Prohibit the press and the public from trial. 
 
3. The essential aim of treatment of every child during the trial and also if found guilty of 
infringing the penal law shall be his or her reformation, re-integration into his or her family and 
social rehabilitation. 
 
4. There shall be a minimum age below which children shall be presumed not to have 
capacity to infringe the penal law.’   
 
The first part of Article 17(1) provides for children ‘accused or found guilty of having 
infringed penal law’.  On a literal interpretation, children detained in prison without 
trial are excluded from the protection offered under this article.  To allow children 
detained in prison without trial recourse to the protection of article 17, the provision 
needs to be broadly interpreted in accordance with article 37(c) of the UNCRC.249  A 
broad interpretation means that article 17(1) applies to ‘all children deprived of their 
liberty’ not only those ‘accused of or found guilty of infringing penal law’.  Such an 
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interpretation affords the highest level of protection to all African children most in 
need of such protection.250   
 
A child deprived of his or her liberty ‘shall have the right to special treatment in a 
manner consistent with the child’s sense of dignity and worth and which reinforces 
the child’s respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of others’.251  The 
wording of this portion of article 17(1) is highly problematic and ambiguous.  Michael 
Gose points out that in past dictatorial regimes ‘special treatment’ was used as a 
euphemism for torture.252   Article 17(3), on the other hand, refers to this ‘special 
treatment’ as the achievement of the child’s reformation, reintegration and 
rehabilitation back into the family and society.253  This portion of Article 17(1) 
compared to the similarly worded articles 37(c) and 40(1)254 seems to be less 
preferable.  Article 37(c) reads ‘treatment with humanity and respect for the inherent 
dignity of the human person’, while article 40(1) uses the same wording as article 
17(1) but the words ‘special treatment’ are absent in its provision.  The UNCRC 
articles255 indicate a more neutral approach as opposed to article 17(1)’s very narrow 
approach to the African child’s sense of dignity and worth.  It assumes that the child 
has the ability to know what his or her sense of dignity and self worth is.256  One of 
the problems arising from this portion of Article 17(1) is that many children are 
oblivious to their sense of dignity and worth as it is still to be developed and nurtured.  
                                               
250
 M Gose (2002) ‘The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 69. 
251
 Article 17(1) of ACRWC. 
252
 M Gose (2002) ‘The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 69. 
253
 J Sloth-Nielsen (2004) ‘The International Framework’ in Sloth-Nielsen, J and Gallinetti, J (Eds.) 
‘Child Justice in Africa:  A guide to good practice’ 29. 
254
 The UNCRC. 
255
 Article 37(c) and Article 40(1).   
256
 M Gose (2002) ‘The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 70. 
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Adults and criminal justice officials may fall into the trap of treating child offenders 
in accordance with their underdeveloped sense of dignity and worth.  The loopholes 
left by the drafters can be sufficiently remedied by a broader interpretation taking into 
account Articles 37(c) and 40(1) of the UNCRC.257 
  
Article 17(2) sets out the minimum standards that States Parties must ensure when 
dealing with the administration of juvenile justice.  Subsection (2)(a) reiterates article 
16(1) of the ACRWC and the first part of article 37(a) of UNCRC.  It includes ‘or 
punishment’ but omits ‘or other cruel punishment’ which effectively means it affords 
better protection for juveniles than article 16 but less than article 37(a).258  States 
Parties should ensure that children who are detained or imprisoned are kept separately 
from adults without any exceptions.259  This has adverse consequences for children 
and adults from the same family housed in the same prison.  A possible remedy for 
this adverse situation is applying article 19 in conjunction with article 17(2)(b).  
article 19 provides that children have the right to the enjoyment of parental care, 
guidance and protection.  Thus wherever possible the child should reside with his or 
her parents.  Article 37(c) of the UNCRC contains a similar provision but is far more 
flexible in its wording and allows for exceptions if it is in the child’s best interest not 
be separated from the adults.260  Article 17(2)(c) contains the procedural guarantees 
for children in conflict with the law.  Article 40(2)(b) of the UNCRC is much more 
elaborate than the ACRWC procedural guarantees but one should keep in mind that 
                                               
257
 M Gose (2002) ‘The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 71. 
258
 M Gose (2002) ‘The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 56. 
259
 Article 17(2)(b) of the ACRWC. 
260
 M Gose (2002) ‘The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 71, 72.  
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both instruments only provide States Parties with the minimum standards that they 
need to follow.261 
   
There are three instances where the ACRWC advances a huge development in the 
protection of children’s rights.  Firstly, it provides that a criminal trial must be 
arbitrated as expeditiously as possible.262  Secondly, one of it main objectives is that 
rehabilitation is achieved both during the trial stage and after the conviction of the 
child.263  Thirdly, the ACRWC ensures that every child is guaranteed the right to legal 
assistance and to be assisted with the groundwork and presentation of his or her 
defence.264  There are no qualifications attached to this guarantee and is far beyond 
comparison with any other human rights instrument.265 
 
Despite the forward looking developments detailed above the ACRWC suffers from a 
number of disadvantages.  The ACRWC dictates that States Parties must ensure that 
the press and the public are barred from the trial of a child.266  Despite this warranted 
necessity, an open trial is often welcomed because of the serious consequences a 
                                               
261
 J Sloth-Nielsen (2008) ‘Children in African prisons’ in Sarkin, J (Ed) Human Rights in African 
Prisons 120.   
262
 Article 17(2)(c)(iv) of the ACRWC. 
263
 Article 17(3) of the ACRWC; DM Chirwa ‘The merits and demerits of the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 10 The International Journal on Children’s Rights 166; J 
Sloth-Nielsen (2004) ‘The International Framework’ in Sloth-Nielsen, J and Gallinetti, J (Eds.) ‘Child 
Justice in Africa:  A guide to good practice’ 29.  This same objective is not clearly provided for in the 
UNCRC.  Article 40(1) only focuses on reintegration. 
264
 Article 17(2)(c)(iii) of the ACRWC. 
265
 DM Chirwa ‘The merits and demerits of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 
(2002) 10 The International Journal on Children’s Rights 166, 167. 
266
 Article 17(2)(d) of the ACRWC. 
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decision may have on a child and his or her respective family.267  The advantage of an 
open trial is that it provides safeguards against any human rights violation that may 
occur behind closed doors.268  Thus instead of in camera proceedings being the 
standard, it should only be applied if it promotes the ‘best interests of the child’.   
 
Other shortfalls present in the ACRWC’s justice provisions and pertinent to this 
discussion is the failure to propose any alternative methods for dealing with children 
exposed to criminal proceedings,269 the lack of corresponding provisions for article 
40(2)(a), 40(3)(b) and 40(4) of the UNCRC and finally the very weak standalone 
provision in article 17(4).  Unlike its CRC counterpart,270 article 17(4) does not 
explicitly require States Parties to promote the establishment of a MACR below 
which children are presumed not to have the capacity to infringe penal law.  The 
ACRWC makes reference to a minimum age in the latter article but provides no 
further discussion or guidelines on what the age should be or how it should be dealt 
with.  I submit that subsection 4 is poorly drafted and weak in comparison to the rest 
of the article 17 and article 40(3)(a) of the UNCRC.  The best solution at present is for 
States Parties of the ACRWC to rely on its CRC counterpart, namely, article 40(3)(a) 
and its supporting international documents, the Beijing Rules and General Comment 
No. 10 for some explanation on how to implement its minimum age provision.        
 
                                               
267
 DM Chirwa ‘The merits and demerits of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 
(2002) 10 The International Journal on Children’s Rights 167. 
268
 DM Chirwa ‘The merits and demerits of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 
(2002) 10 The International Journal on Children’s Rights 167. 
269
 For example, there is no equivalent provision for Article 37(b) of the UNCRC stating imprisonment 
should be a last resort and for the shortest possible period. 
270
 Article 40(3)(a). 
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6.  The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child 
(ACERWC) 
Articles 33 to 36 of the ACRWC provide for a monitoring body known as the 
ACERWC.  Chapter 3 of the ACRWC sets out the main functions of the ACERWC in 
terms of its mandate and procedures.271  It is given a much wider and more detailed 
mandate than that of the CROC.272  The ACERWC must promote and protect the 
rights under the ACRWC,273 examine state reports under article 43, consider 
communications in confidence,274 undertake investigations and issue general 
comments.275  States Parties reports need to be submitted periodically to the 
ACERWC for examination and ACERWC has to report to the AU Assembly of 
                                               
271
 Chapter 3 of Part II of the ACRWC includes Articles 42 – 45. 
272
 Article 42 of the ACRWC details the Committee’s mandate.  A Lloyd ‘Evolution of the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the African Committee of Experts:  Raising the 
gauntlet’ (2002) 10 The International Journal on Children’s Rights 185, 186; A Lloyd ‘A theoretical 
analysis of the reality of children’s rights in Africa:  An introduction to the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 23. 
273
 In terms of the ACRWC, Article 42(a) commissions the Committee to collect and document 
information, to authorize interdisciplinary assessments of situations on African problems in the 
children’s rights sphere, to organize meeting, to encourage national and local institutions concerned 
with the rights and welfare of the child, and to give its views and make recommendations to 
governments where necessary. The Committee is further mandated to formulate and lay down 
principles and rules aimed at protecting children’s rights in Africa.  Subsection (b) and (c) charges the 
Committee with a monitoring function and that of interpretation of its provisions at the request of any 
States Party, an Institute of the AU or any person or Institution recognised by the AU.  See 
http://www.crin.org/RM/acrwc.asp [accessed 25 June 2008]. 
274
 Article 44 of the ACRWC.  
275
 Article 45 of the ACRWC; DM Chirwa ‘The merits and demerits of the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 10 The International Journal on Children’s Rights 169, 170; A 
Lloyd ‘Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the African 
Committee of Experts:  Raising the gauntlet’ (2002) 10 The International Journal on Children’s Rights 
185, 186; BD Mezmur ‘The African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child:  An 
update’ (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law Journal 550, 551.  BD Mezmur ‘Still and infant or a 
toddler? The work of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and its 
8th Ordinary Session’ (2007) Vol 7(1) African Human Rights Law Journal.  
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Heads of State and Government twice a year.276  Dejo Olowu comments that ‘perhaps 
the most remarkable landmark in the Charter is in the framework of its 
implementation mechanism’.277  This comment has been affirmed by Amanda Lloyd 
who commends the Charter for providing a progressive and action-orientated 
enforcement mechanism.278 
 
The ACERWC is made up of 11 members who are nominated by the States Parties 
and elected by the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government.279  The 
ACERWC and the CROC280 share similar requirements with regard to having 
competence in matters in the domain of rights and welfare of the child and that they 
serve in their personal capacities.281  The members of the ACERWC ‘serve as 
independent, uninstructed experts rather than government functionaries’.282  The 
inauguration of the ACERWC took place at the first meeting held at the AU 
Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in May 2002.283  The date the ACERWC has 
                                               
276
 Articles 43(1)(a), (b) & 45 (2) of the ACRWC; F Viljoen (2000) ‘The African Charter on the Rights 
and Welfare of the Child’ in Davel, CJ (Ed) Introduction to Child Law in South Africa 225-226. 
277
 D Olowu ‘Protecting children’s rights in Africa:  A critique of the African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 10 The International Journal on Children’s Rights 131. 
278
 A Lloyd ‘A theoretical analysis of the reality of children’s rights in Africa:  An introduction to the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 2 African Human Rights Law Journal 
24; A Lloyd (2008) ‘The African Regional System for the Protection of Children’s Rights’ in Sloth-
Nielsen, J (Ed) Children’s Rights in Africa:  A legal perspective 33.   
279
 Articles 33(1) and 34 of the ACRWC; BD Mezmur ‘Still and infant or a toddler? The work of the 
African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and its 8th Ordinary Session’ 
(2007) Vol 7(1) African Human Rights Law Journal. 
280
 Article 43(2) of the UNCRC. 
281
 Article 33 of the ACRWC. 
282
 F Viljoen (2000) ‘The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ in Davel, CJ (Ed) 
Introduction to Child Law in South Africa 225. 
283
 A Lloyd ‘The first meeting of the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child’ (2002) 2(2) African Human Rights Law Journal 320; BD Mezmur ‘The African Committee of 
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received only a handful of reports and has thus far only considered Egypt and 
Nigeria’s report at their 12th meeting in November 2008.284  Therefore, there are no 
concluding observations to indicate the normative principles.  
           
7. Evaluating the status of ACRWC  
As a regional treaty and the first of its kind, it has been described as ‘the most 
progressive of the treaties and rights of the child’.285  The provisions of the ACRWC 
were drafted around those in the UNCRC while bearing in mind prevailing African 
realities.  Acting as the foundation for the ACRWC to build upon, the UNCRC has 
been remarkably beneficial on improving the standards of promoting, protecting and 
monitoring children’s rights at regional level.  If one compares to ACRWC and the 
UNCRC in its entirety, it is clear that the Charter is less ambiguous and, generally, 
with the exception of juvenile justice and a few other provisions, has higher normative 
standards than the Convention.286  Yet, despite all its sensitivity for African children 
and unambiguous wording, it is far behind the UNCRC in attaining universal 
                                                                                                                                      
Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child:  An update’ (2006) 6 African Human Rights Law 
Journal 551; BD Mezmur ‘Still and infant or a toddler? The work of the African Committee of Experts 
on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and its 8th Ordinary Session’ (2007) Vol 7(1) African Human 
Rights Law Journal. 
284
 Article 43 of the ACRWC provides that States Parties should submit their initial reports two years 
after ratifying the Charter.  Parties to the Charter have far exceeded this time frame.  The Committee 
began its work in 2001 and as from December 2006 only Egypt, Mauritius, Rwanda and Nigeria have 
submitted their initial reports. See BD Mezmur ‘Still and infant or a toddler? The work of the African 
Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and its 8th Ordinary Session’ (2007) Vol 
7(1) African Human Rights Law Journal. 
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 G Van Bueren (1995) The International Law of the Rights of the Child 402. 
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 BD Mezmur (2007) ‘The African Children’s Charter Vs the UN Convention on the Rights of the 
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ratification in respect of the AU members.287  The unwillingness on the part of AU 
member states to ratify the Charter is based on its elevated normative standards which 
may be too onerous on ratifying parties.288  It is unfortunate that the ACRWC has not 
received as much attention at regional level as there are only a few academic texts 
detailing the ACRWC compared to that of the UNCRC.     
 
8. Conclusion 
The international instruments discussed in this chapter have had significant a impact 
in the field of children rights and juvenile justice.  The UNCRC, being the most 
authoritative, views children as bearers of rights globally, while the ACRWC 
recognises children as bearers of rights on a regional scale.  It represents the African 
concept of human rights while confirming and strengthening the global standards 
contained in the UNCRC.289  The success of the international standards provided for 
in these instruments into national legal systems lie in the hands of the chosen 
Committees, namely the CROC and the ACERWC, that monitor the implementation 
of the provisions by States Parties.   
   
                                               
287
 The ACRWC still needs 12 more ratifications after being formally adopted 16 years ago and in 
force for 7 years.  See A Lloyd (2008) ‘The African Regional System for the Protection of Children’s 
Rights’ in Sloth-Nielsen, J (Ed) Children’s Rights in Africa:  A legal perspective 35.   
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 A Lloyd ‘Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and the African 
Committee of Experts:  Raising the gauntlet’ (2002) 10 The International Journal on Children’s Rights 
182. 
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 These standards are the general principles enshrined in articles 2, 3, 6, 12 and the juvenile justice 
provisions contained in articles 37 and 40 of the UNCRC.  It is submitted that without the basic 
minimum rights and protections enshrined in both UNCRC and ACRWC, the juvenile justice 
provisions would have very meaning.     
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The question of minimum age arises in article 40(3)(a) of the UNCRC and article 
17(4) of the ACRWC.  The availability of the rights and protections afforded by the 
juvenile justice provisions to children in conflict with the law, and the effective 
implementation of them are dependent on a clearly defined minimum age.  The lack 
of effective birth registrations, scattered data collection, the subjective and arbitrary 
manner in which criminal responsibility has been assessed and the wide disparities 
amongst countries with regard to the minimum age hampers a uniformed approach in 
fixing a minimum age in Africa.   
 
Neither instrument provides a definition for their provision outlining a MACR.  The 
Beijing Rules provide some guidance on how to interpret or define article 40(3)(a) of 
which the ACRWC has no equivalent.  The Beijing Rules prove to be somewhat 
limited in their guidance.  Firstly, the language used is suggestive rather than 
mandatory and secondly, children mature differently depending on the environment in 
which they live in.  This problematic guideline has been alleviated in light of the 
recent position adopted by the CROC in General Comment No. 10 that a MACR 
should not be set below the age of 12 years.  Countries that practice a ‘split age’ or 
have lower minimums than 12 in place are urged by the CROC to raise their 
minimum age in accordance with international standards.    
 
The following chapter outlines the method of incorporating these international 
provisions (discussed in this chapter) into States Parties national legal systems.  It 
discusses the process of law reform that each country undertook in implementing a 
MACR.  The African legal systems under study in the next chapter have been set out 
in chapter 1.  Finally these countries MACR’s are assessed and compared to each 
other. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
ASSESSING AND COMPARING MINIMUM AGE PROVISIONS IN THE 
COUTRIES UNDER STUDY 
 
1. Introduction 
The last decade has ushered in a remarkable wealth of children’s rights and law 
reform.  It was submitted in the previous chapter that the international and regional 
instruments have taken the field of children’s rights by storm, placing minimum 
obligations upon ratifying States Parties to protect and promote the rights of children 
while at the same time making them accountable to the international community.  
Under the umbrella of a right-based approach1 for children and in the context of 
advancing the field of juvenile justice, the first step in the process is for States parties 
to review their existing legislation and to enact laws that reflect the key principles 
underlying the UNCRC and the ACRWC and implement them into their domestic 
legal systems.2   
                                               
1Van Bueren (2006) ‘Article 40:  Child Criminal Justice’, in Alen, A et al A Commentary on the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child  4; L Muntingh (2007) ‘Monitoring children in conflict 
with the law’ in Dawes, A et al ‘Monitoring Child Well-Being:  A South African rights-based 
approach’.  
2
 See Chapter 2 2.3 and 5.2 which outlines the four key principles of the UNCRC (articles 2, 3, 6 and 
12) and the anchoring principles in the ACRWC (articles 3, 4 and 5); CROC (2003) General Comment 
No. 5 ‘General Measures of Implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child’ 
CRC/GC/2003/5 para1 CROC identifies a whole range of measures for effective implementation.  Two 
tiers 1) An international norm enforcement mechanism where States Parties are required by Article 44 
of the UNCRC to submit reports detailing their progress in incorporating international law into their 
domestic legal systems and 2) obligations at domestic level which are prescribed in article 4 of the 
UNCRC requiring States Parties to take all appropriate legislative, administrative and any other 
measures ensuring the implementation of this Convention.  Legislative measures include a review of all 
their national laws while administrative measures include any programmes or policies that guide the 
legislative process such as setting up National Plan for Action on Children, a child’s ombudsperson, 
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  Article 40(3) of UNCRC specifically calls for separate legislation, procedures, 
authorities and institutions in juvenile justice systems.  Many countries do not have a 
separate piece of legislation for juvenile justice as they have incorporated it in their 
child protection laws – such as a Children’s Act – while others have produced a 
separate piece of legislation dealing exclusively with juvenile justice matters.   
   
The MACR falls within the scope of juvenile justice.  It has been identified as one of 
the elements making up a child rights-centered juvenile justice system.3  Article 
40(3)(a) of the UNCRC and article 17(4) of the ACRWC are the essential articles 
calling upon ratifying States to set out a minimum age below which children in 
conflict with the law will not be criminally responsible.  The purpose of establishing a 
minimum age is to prevent children from entering into the criminal justice system as it 
would undoubtedly have an adverse effect on young immature children.4  The 
problem ultimately arises when this minimum age needs to be established and States 
Parties differ as to what the MACR should be.  A study done by the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has described the MACR as the lowest age at which a 
State or international community is willing to hold someone liable for alleged 
                                                                                                                                      
training and capacity building for role players involved in promoting and protecting children’s rights 
etc.  See The African Child Policy Forum (2007) ‘Harmonisation of the laws on children:  Some 
practical guidance’.  Available at 
http://www.africanchild.info/documents/Harmonisation%20Guidelines.pdf [accessed 29 October 
2008]; J Sloth-Nielsen (2008) ‘Domestication of Children’s Rights in National Legal Systems in 
African Context:  Progress and Prospects’ in Sloth-Nielsen, J (Ed) Children’s Rights in Africa:  A legal 
perspective 54.     
3
 GO Odongo (2005) ‘The domestication of international law standards on the rights of the child with 
specific reference to juvenile justice in the African context’ (Unpublished LLD Thesis) 130. 
4
 J Sloth-Nielsen (2001) ‘The role of international law in juvenile justice reform in South Africa’ 
(Unpublished LLD thesis) 124. 
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criminal acts.5  In other words, it is the age at which a country is willing to prosecute 
children in a court of law.   In determining what this age should be, regard should be 
had for the Beijing Rules (discussed in chapter 2), General Comment No.10 
(discussed in chapter 2), the recommendations of the CROC, as well as best practice 
models.6    
 
This chapter aims to assess and compare the MACR in the twelve African legal 
systems under study, namely, Uganda, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Namibia, 
Lesotho, Gambia, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Zambia.7 It seeks 
to determine the status of international law in the countries under study. Secondly, it 
briefly proposes to outline the child law reform processes of the States Parties post 
ratification of the international instruments and finally to draw comparisons as to how 
minimum age provisions have been interpreted and implemented at domestic level 
and the problems encountered in implementation.   
 
2. The status of international law:  dualist and monist approaches  
Upon defining the nature and status of international law, Dugard argues that States 
comply with international law for reasons unrelated to fear of possible sanctions.  He 
                                               
5
 DJ Cipriani (2005) ‘South Asia and the minimum age of criminal responsibility:  Raising the standard 
for children’s rights’.  Available at http://www.unicef .org/rosa/Criminal 
_Responsibility_08July_05(final_copy).pdf [ accessed 23 September 2008]; Discussed in detail in 
Chapters 1 and 2.   
6
 The African Child Policy Forum (2007) ‘Realising rights for children: Harmonisation of laws on 
children: Eastern and Southern Africa’ 19.  Available at 
http://www.africanchild.info/documents.asp?page=3 [accessed 05 October 2008].  South Africa acted 
as a best practice model for Gambia, Namibia and Lesotho.  See L Ehlers ‘Child Justice:  Comparing 
the South African child justice reform process and experiences of juvenile justice reform in the United 
States of America’ Occasional Paper 1 July 2006 31. 
7
 The rationale behind selecting these 12 countries are provided for in Chapter 1.  
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cleverly asserts that this means that ‘international law is not binding because it is 
enforced, but that it is enforced because it is already binding’.8  International law 
plays a significant role in shaping legal reform initiatives as it provides the basic 
framework for such reform to take place.9   
 
The method of national implementation is dependent on the status of the international 
instruments (UNCRC and ACRWC) in each respective country’s legal system.10   
Every country whether it has a civil,11 common12 or hybrid13 legal system follows a 
dualist or monist approach by which they receive international instruments into their 
national laws.  Countries who subscribe to the dualist approach do not automatically 
                                               
8
 J Dugard (2005) ‘International Law:  A South African Perspective’ 10. 
9
 J Sloth-Nielsen (2001) ‘The role of international law in juvenile justice reform in South Africa’ 
(Unpublished LLD thesis) 8-10. 
10
 P Veerman and B Gross ‘Implementation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child in Israel, West Bank and Gaza’ (1995) 3 The International Journal of Children’s Rights 297; GO 
Odongo (2005) ‘The domestication of international law standards on the rights of the child with 
specific reference to juvenile justice in the African context’ (Unpublished LLD Thesis) 73; CROC 
(2003) General Comment No. 5 ‘General Measures of Implementation of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child’ CRC/GC/2003/5 para 19, 20;  The African Child Policy Forum (2007) ‘Realising rights 
for children: Harmonisation of laws on children: Eastern and Southern Africa’ 17, 18.  Available at 
http://www.africanchild.info/documents.asp?page=3 [accessed 05 October 2008]. 
11
 Civil law legal systems depend heavily on codified principles, legislation and rules of interpretation, 
rather than case precedent.  See http://www.answers.com/topic/legal-systems-of-the-world [accessed 
20 October 2008].   
12
 D Kleyn & F Viljoen (2002) ‘Beginners Guide for Law Students’ 82-87; Common law systems 
originated in England and are usually referred to as a body of judge made laws.  It is based on the 
doctrines of court decisions, custom and practices arising out of general usage rather than written 
codes.  Where the prevailing common law no longer meet the standards of existing and evolving case 
law it is superseded by legislation.  
13
 A hybrid legal system is a mixture of civil and common law combined with aspects of customary and 
religious law.   
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receive international law as binding in their national system.14  International law only 
becomes binding in these countries once they have incorporated it into their national 
laws through legislative transformation.15  Countries that follow the monist 
approach16 are automatically bound by international law once they ratify it and that 
ratification is made public.  Another way of incorporating international law into 
national legal systems is through judicial adoption.17  This way of incorporation 
allows judges to rely on their discretion to use international law principles in their 
rulings where a country has ratified international law but not incorporated it through 
legislative transformation.18  The judge’s rationale for incorporating international law 
is that it should apply in cases where there is no national law on the issue, or a 
national law conflicts with international law.19   
               
                                               
14
 The dualist approach, being the most common approach in common law countries, has been adopted 
in Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Namibia, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland, 
Uganda, Zambia.  See The African Child Policy Forum (2007) ‘Realising rights for children: 
Harmonisation of laws on children: Eastern and Southern Africa’.  Available at 
http://www.africanchild.info/documents.asp?page=3 [accessed 05 October 2008]. 
15
 Legislative transformation means that international law is either given constitutional status or 
incorporated through an enacting domestic legislation that give rise to the rights contained in 
international instruments.   
16
 Ethiopia is the only country subscribing to a partly monist approach as it is the only country under 
study that has not been colonized and international law will only become binding once ratification is 
published.  
17
 This method of domestication has been adopted in South Africa with regard to women’s rights under 
the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).   
18
 The African Child Policy Forum (2007) ‘Realising rights for children: Harmonisation of laws on 
children: Eastern and Southern Africa’ 17.  Available at 
http://www.africanchild.info/documents.asp?page=3 [accessed 05 October 2008]. 
19
 The African Child Policy Forum (2007) ‘Realising rights for children: Harmonisation of laws on 
children: Eastern and Southern Africa’ 18.  Available at 
http://www.africanchild.info/documents.asp?page=3 [accessed 05 October 2008]. 
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The UNCRC provides the platform for African countries to re-examine their child 
laws.20  On examination of the six countries under study by Odongo the following 
child law reform initiatives were followed from 1990 to 2005.  The first country to 
initiate the development of child reform in Africa was Uganda21 resulting in the 
Children’s Statute.22  This was one Act covering social welfare and juvenile justice 
for children.23  After Uganda, Ghana followed with the promulgation of the 
Children’s Act24 in 1998 and a separate Juvenile Justice Act25 in 2003.  Kenya 
followed the Ugandan approach and passed their Children’s Act26 in March 2002 
which incorporated both social welfare and juvenile justice.  South Africa’s child law 
reform process started much later with ratification of the UNCRC only taking place in 
1995.  It resulted in a separate Child Justice Bill27 (August 2002) covering juvenile 
justice issues and a new Children’s Act (August 2003) dealing with child protection 
and social welfare.  The latter has since become the Children’s Act No. 38 of 2005.28  
                                               
20
 J Sloth-Nielsen & B Van Heerden ‘New child care and protection legislation in Africa:  Some 
lessons learnt for South Africa’ (1997) 3 Stellenbosch  Law Review 266.  
21
 J Sloth-Nielsen (2004) ‘Law Reform Initiatives in Africa:  Turning Principles and Policy into Law’ 
in Sloth-Nielsen, J and Gallinetti, J (Eds.) ‘Child Justice in Africa:  A guide to good practice’ 52. 
22
 The Children’s Statute of Uganda Act No. 6 of 1996; J Sloth-Nielsen (2004) ‘Law Reform Initiatives 
in Africa:  Turning Principles and Policy into Law’ in Sloth-Nielsen, J and Gallinetti, J (Eds.) ‘Child 
Justice in Africa:  A guide to good practice’ 52. 
23
 J Sloth-Nielsen (2004) ‘Law Reform Initiatives in Africa:  Turning Principles and Policy into Law’ 
in Sloth-Nielsen, J and Gallinetti, J (Eds.) ‘Child Justice in Africa:  A guide to good practice’ 52. 
24
 Act No. 560 of 1998. 
25
 Act No. 650 of 2003. 
26
 The Children’s Act of 2001. 
27
 Bill No. 49 of 2002.  The Bill was first tabled before parliament in 2003 and an amended version of 
it was tabled in 2007.  It has since been approved by the National Assembly and currently making its 
way through the National Council of Provinces. 
28
 The Child Care Act 74 of 1983 is still in force; however, certain sections of the Children’s Act came 
into operation on 01 July 2007.  Section 17 provides for lowering of the age of majority from the age of 
21 to the age of 18.  The lowering in the age of majority to 18 is on par with most international 
jurisdictions but it has not been gladly received by the South African public.  
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Namibia’s reform process led to the Child Care and Protection Bill of 1996 and a 
revised Child Justice Bill (2002).29  Finally, Lesotho follows the same practice as 
Uganda and Kenya in incorporating child protection laws, social welfare and juvenile 
justice into one Bill.30         
 
The countries I have undertaken to research took the following child law reform 
initiatives with regard to the MACR from 1997 to the law as it stands on 30 
September 2008.  I did not follow the same process as Odongo in determining which 
countries reform initiatives followed on from each other.  The reason for this is due to 
my selection process in choosing countries based on the availability of information at 
the time I started my research in 2007.  Odongo’s study is very much based on the 
UNCRC and the recommendations of the CROC.  My experience has been much the 
same, by reason of the lack of State reports being submitted to the ACERWC.   
 
Child law reform in the Gambia resulted in the enactment of the Children’s Act of 
2005.  The Act covers both social welfare and juvenile justice for children and gives 
force of law to the UNCRC and ACRWC.  Ethiopia’s legal reform did not result in 
the enactment of a Children’s Act; instead it adopted a new Criminal Code in 2005 to 
deal with increasing delinquency rates in the juvenile sector.  Malawi and 
Mozambique’s child law reform has led to the adoption of the Child (Justice, Care 
and Protection) Bill in the former and two Draft Bills in the latter on Protection issues 
and Jurisdictional Organisation of Minors.  At present all three Bills are still pending 
                                               
29
 GO Odongo (2008) ‘The Impact of International law on Children’s Rights on Juvenile Justice Law 
Reform in the African Context’ in Sloth-Nielsen, J (Ed) Children’s Rights in Africa:  A legal 
perspective  149.   
30
 The Children’s Protection and Welfare Bill (2004). 
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enactment by Parliament.  Sierra Leone’s child law reform has been the most 
successful in carrying out its international obligations.  In 2007, it enacted the Child 
Rights Act which incorporates all areas concerning children.  Zambia, unfortunately 
has not undertaken any serious child law reform and relied on its Penal Code when it 
considered the MACR.          
             
3. Child Law Reform and Current Developments on the MACR to date 
3.1 Uganda  
Shortly before, Uganda ratified the UNCRC in 1990, an independent Child Law 
Review Committee (CLRC) was appointed by the Minister of Children’s Welfare.31  
A group of six consultants from Africa and Europe joined the CLRC helping them 
with law reform in a broader context.32  The CLRC began its work in drafting 
children’s legislation that would benefit disadvantaged children and children in 
conflict with the law.  It divided its work into three distinct areas, ‘young offenders’, 
‘child care’ and ‘domestic relations’.33  The reform process included research, 
consulting,34 task group discussions, workshops, internal debates and meetings, public 
                                               
31
 GO Odongo ‘Child Justice law reform in Africa and international standards on the rights of the child’ 
(2004) 6(2) Article 40 9. 
32
 GO Odongo (2005) ‘The domestication of international law standards on the rights of the child with 
specific reference to juvenile justice in the African context’ (Unpublished LLD Thesis) 84. 
33
 Mbazira, C (2006) ‘Harmonisation of national and international laws to protect children’s rights:  
The Uganda case study’ (Unpublished Report); The first area of ‘young offenders’ would include all 
juvenile justice related issues while ‘child care’ and ‘domestic relations’ would deal with all child care 
protection issues and social welfare for children.   
34
 Ministers, parliamentarians, international agencies, civil servants, member of the public, teachers, 
NGO’s etc. 
 
 
 
 
 85 
debates, legislative drafts, field work and media coverage popularising child law 
reform through articles, commentaries and correspondence.35       
 
The CLRC agreed on the principles that should underpin and guide its work.  The first 
principle was that the UNCRC, the ACRWC and other relevant non-binding UN 
Rules be the guide when legislating for children.  Most of these principles were 
reflective of the UNCRC provisions such as the ‘best interests’ of the child 
principle,36 child participation37 and detention as a last resort and for the shortest 
possible period.38  It was after this agreement amongst the CLRC members that they 
submitted a memorandum to the Constitutional Commission.  At the time of 
submitting the memorandum the Constitutional Commission was writing up the 
Ugandan Constitution.39  There is no doubt that the submission of the memorandum 
had an impact on the section devoted to children in the Constitution which is inclusive 
of a few UNCRC provisions relating to juvenile justice.40 
                                               
35
 GO Odongo (2005) ‘The domestication of international law standards on the rights of the child with 
specific reference to juvenile justice in the African context’ (Unpublished LLD Thesis) 85-90. 
36
 Article 3 of the UNCRC. 
37
 Article 12 of the UNCRC. 
38
 Article 37(b) of the UNCRC. 
39
 GO Odongo (2005) ‘The domestication of international law standards on the rights of the child with 
specific reference to juvenile justice in the African context’ (Unpublished LLD Thesis) 88. 
40
 Section 34 of the Ugandan Constitution is the section devoted to children.  The section provides:   
‘34 (1) Subject to laws enacted in their best interests, children shall have the right to know and be cared 
for by their parents or those entitled by law to bring them up. 
(2) A child is entitled to basic education which shall be the responsibility of the State and the parents of 
the child. 
(3) No child shall be deprived by any person of medical treatment, education or any other social or 
economic benefit by reason of religious or other beliefs. 
(4)Children are entitled to be protected from social or economic exploitation and shall not be employed 
in or required to perform work that is likely to be hazardous or  to interfere with their education or to be 
harmful to their health or physical, mental spiritual, moral or social development. 
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In 1992 the CLRC handed over the final report detailing child law reform to the 
relevant ministry.  A few years later they produced the draft Bill and sent it to 
Parliament’s National Assembly for the Bill to be debated.  In 1996, the Bill became a 
Statute when Parliament enacted it as the Ugandan Children’s Statute No.6 of 1996.41 
 
In its concluding observations, the CROC welcomed the advent of the new 
Constitution adopted in 1995 as well as the Children’s Act (previously the Children’s 
Statute).42  It noted the efforts made by the State Party since its last report in the field 
of juvenile justice but express concern that the progress achieved was limited.  It 
recommended that the State Party continue to ensure juvenile justice be administered 
in accordance with articles 37(b), 39 and 40 of the UNCRC.43  Both concluding 
observations are silent with regard to the minimum age of criminal responsibility as 
the age is already in accordance with international principles.44  Prior to the 
                                                                                                                                      
(5) For the purposes of clause (4) of this article, children shall be persons under the age of sixteen 
years. 
(6) A child offender who kept in lawful custody or detention shall be kept separately from adult 
offenders. 
(7) The law shall accord special protection to orphans and other vulnerable children.’ 
41
 J Sloth-Nielsen & B Van Heerden ‘New child care and protection legislation for South Africa:  
Lessons from Africa’ (1997) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 261 [Electronic] 3; GO Odongo (2008) ‘The 
Impact of International law on Children’s Rights on Juvenile Justice Law Reform in the African 
Context’ in Sloth-Nielsen, J (Ed) Children’s Rights in Africa:  A legal perspective 148.    
42
 CRC/C/15/Add.80, 21 October 1997, para 4 (Adopted at 16th session); CRC/C/UGA/CO/2, 23 
November 2005, para 4 (Adopted at 40th session). 
43
 CRC/C/UGA/CO/2, 23 November 2005 (Adopted at 40th session). 
44
 CRC/C/15/Add.80, 21 October 1997 (Adopted at 16th session); CRC/C/UGA/CO/2, 23 November 
2005, para 4 (Adopted at 40th session). 
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promulgation of the Children’s Act the MACR was raised from 7 years old to 12.45  It 
is not clear why the age of 12 and not 14 as recommended by the CLRC was chosen.  
The increase in the MACR from 7 to 12 is a positive step for Uganda in complying 
with the provisions of the UNCRC and the ACRWC.       
  
To date Uganda has submitted its second periodic report to the CROC and its first 
report the ACERWC under article 43 of the ACRWC.46  Uganda is the only country 
under study that has submitted a report to the ACERWC however it has not yet been 
considered.  As a common law legal system recognising customary law as well, it 
follows a dualist approach.  Thus it does not incorporate international law 
automatically but through domestication. 
 
3.2 Ghana  
Ghana was the first African country to ratify the UNCRC within the first year of its 
adoption.47  In 1992, Ghana promulgated a new Constitution containing s28 which 
was aimed at protecting children’s rights.48  Following the promulgation of the 
                                               
45
 Mbazira, C (2006) ‘Harmonisation of national and international laws to protect children’s rights:  
The Uganda case study’ (Unpublished Report). 
46CRC/C/UGA/CO/2, 23 November 2005 (Adopted at 40th session); The African Child Policy Forum 
(2007) ‘Realising rights for children: Harmonisation of laws on children: Eastern and Southern 
Africa’ 10.  Available at http://www.africanchild.info/documents.asp?page=3 [accessed 05 October 
2008].   
47
 Signed on 29 January 1990 and ratified it 05 February 1990. 
48
 Section 28 provides: ‘(1) Parliament shall enact such laws as are necessary to ensure that  
(a) every child has the right to the same measure of special care, assistance and maintenance as is 
necessary for its development from its natural parents, except where those parents have 
effectively surrendered their rights and responsibilities in respect of the child in accordance 
with law; 
(b) every child, whether or not born in wedlock, shall be entitled to reasonable provision out of 
the estate of its parents; 
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Constitution, a Child Law Reform Advisory Committee was elected by the National 
Commission on Children to review Ghana’s existing child laws and recommend law 
reform to the government.49  The recommendations put forward by the Committee for 
law reform had to ensure that Ghana’s national laws were fully compliant with the 
principles and provisions of the UNCRC.50   
 
In its concluding observations of the CROC to Ghana’s initial report, the CROC 
expressed its concern as to the urgency of adopting a Children’s Act and the need to 
reform the administration of juvenile justice.  CROC was particularly concerned, 
amongst other things, with the low minimum age of criminal responsibility set at 7 
years old.51  It recommended that the general principles52 of the UNCRC must always 
be taken into account and used as guidance in policy discussions, decision-making 
                                                                                                                                      
(c) parents undertake their natural right and obligation of care, maintenance and upbringing of 
their children in co-operation with such institutions as Parliament may, by law, prescribe in 
such manner that in all cases the interests of the children are paramount; 
(d) children and young persons receive special protection against exposure to physical and moral 
hazards; and  
(e) the protection and advancement of the family as the unit of society are safeguarded in 
promotion of the interests of children. 
(2) Every child has the right to be protected from engaging in work that constitutes a threat to his 
health, education or development. 
(3) A child shall not be subject to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
(4) No child shall be deprived by any other person of medical treatment, education or any other social 
or economic benefit by reason only of religious or other beliefs. 
(5) For the purposes of this article, ‘child’ means a person below the age of eighteen years.’  
49
 J Sloth-Nielsen & B Van Heerden ‘New child care and protection legislation in Africa:  Some 
lessons learnt for South Africa’ (1997) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 261 [Electronic] 9; GO Odongo 
‘Child Justice law reform in Africa and international standards on the rights of the child’ (2004) 6(2) 
Article 40 9. 
50
 CRC/C/15/Add.73, 18 June 1997, para 4 (Adopted at 15th session).  
51
 CRC/C/15/Add.73, 18 June 1997, para 27 (Adopted at 15th session). 
52
 The general principles being Articles 2, 3, 6 and 12 of UNCRC. 
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and implementation.  Juvenile justice law reform must be in accordance with articles 
37, 39 and 40 of the UNCRC and any other relevant UN standards.53  The State Party 
should pay special attention to raising the MACR so that it is reflective of 
international standards. 
    
The law reform process by the multi-sectoral Advisory Committee led to the 
enactment of the Children’s Act in 1998 dealing with issues of child care, social 
welfare, guardianship, adoption etc.54  A separate Act was enacted in 2003 to deal 
solely with juvenile justice issues such as protecting the rights of children and 
providing rights for young offenders.55  Upon submission of its second periodic report 
under article 44 of the UNCRC, CROC noted Ghana’s progress since its initial State 
report.  It had ratified the ACRWC in 2005 and adopted new legislation which was in 
conformity with the UNCRC, including the Amendment to the Criminal Code (Act 
554) in 1998 and the increase in the MACR from 7 to 14 years old.56  Thus, Ghana 
has met its minimum international treaty obligations with regard to MACR.    
 
3.3 Kenya  
Kenya ratified the UNCRC in July 199057 and is one of the countries that have 
submitted its second report to the CROC under article 44.58  Following its ratification, 
                                               
53
 CRC/C/15/Add.73, 18 June 1997, para 48 (Adopted at 15th session). 
54
 GO Odongo ‘Child Justice law reform in Africa and international standards on the rights of the child’ 
(2004) 6(2) Article 40 9; J Sloth-Nielsen (2004) ‘Law Reform Initiatives in Africa:  Turning Principles 
and Policy into Law’ in Sloth-Nielsen, J and Gallinetti, J (Eds.) ‘Child Justice in Africa:  A guide to 
good practice’ 50. 
55
 Juvenile Justice Act 650 of 2003. 
56
 CRC/C/GHA/CO/2, 17 March 2006, para 4, 5 and 73 (Adopted at 41st session). 
57
 GO Odongo (2005) ‘The domestication of international law standards on the rights of the child with 
specific reference to juvenile justice in the African context’ (Unpublished LLD Thesis) 94; See 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/11.htm [Accessed on 08 August 2008]. 
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many NGO groups got together to improve rights for children in light of Kenya’s new 
treaty obligations.  Firstly, its conservative colonial legislation urgently needed to be 
revisited and reworked.  Secondly, there was a great demand to conceptualise 
children’s rights in the applicable laws and thirdly, the need to fill the absence of a 
dedicated section for children in the Constitution.59  Thus, a much pressurised 
Attorney-General put a task force in place to review its child laws.60 
 
The task force set up by the Kenyan Law Reform Commission had to undertake a 
process of legislative review and make recommendations advancing the rights and 
welfare of children.61  This was a three year process which started in 1991 aimed at 
establishing one comprehensive piece of legislation detailing all issues affecting 
children.62  It was a highly consultative venture between government officials, the 
general public, NGO’s, outside experts, practitioners and children themselves.63   
                                                                                                                                      
58
 CRC/C/KEN/CO/2, 19 June 2007 (Adopted at 44th session). 
59
 J Sloth-Nielsen & B Van Heerden ‘New child care and protection legislation in Africa:  Some 
lessons learnt for South Africa’ (1997) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 261 [Electronic] 4; GO Odongo 
(2005) ‘The domestication of international law standards on the rights of the child with specific 
reference to juvenile justice in the African context’ (Unpublished LLD Thesis) 94. 
60
 J Sloth-Nielsen & B Van Heerden ‘New child care and protection legislation in Africa:  Some 
lessons learnt for South Africa’ (1997) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 261 [Electronic] 9. 
61
 GO Odongo ‘The domestication of international standards on the rights of the child:  A critical and 
comparative evaluation of the Kenyan example’ (2004) Vol 12(4) The International Journal on 
Children’s Rights 419, 420.   
62
 GO Odongo ‘The domestication of international standards on the rights of the child:  A critical and 
comparative evaluation of the Kenyan example’ (2004) Vol 12(4) The International Journal on 
Children’s Rights 419, 420; Odongo, G.O (2005) ‘The domestication of international law standards on 
the rights of the child with specific reference to juvenile justice in the African context’ (Unpublished 
LLD Thesis) 95. 
63
 J Sloth-Nielsen & B Van Heerden ‘New child care and protection legislation in Africa:  Some 
lessons learnt for South Africa’ (1997) 3 Stellenbosch Law Review 261 [Electronic] 10;  GO Odongo 
(2005) ‘The domestication of international law standards on the rights of the child with specific 
reference to juvenile justice in the African context’ (Unpublished LLD Thesis) 96, 97. 
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At the end of the review process the task force submitted a comprehensive report 
outlining the scope of child law issues but failed to adequately address issues of 
juvenile justice such as the MACR and diversion.64  One of the main 
recommendations put forward in the report was the enactment of a Children’s Bill.  
The Bill, however, was opposed twice by NGO lobbyists and those advocating 
children rights.65  Finally in 2001, after much redrafting, Parliament enacted the Bill 
as the Children’s Act.66     
   
In its recent concluding observation to Kenya’s second periodic report the CROC 
welcomed the new Children’s Act, the National Council for Children Services and the 
ratification of the ACRWC in July 2000.67  The Children’s Act repeals the Children 
and Young Persons Act, the Adoption Act and the Guardian and Infants Act and 
consolidates them into one piece of legislation.68  It has been acknowledged as a 
                                               
64
 GO Odongo (2005) ‘The domestication of international law standards on the rights of the child with 
specific reference to juvenile justice in the African context’ (Unpublished LLD Thesis) 97. 
65
 GO Odongo ‘Child Justice law reform in Africa and international standards on the rights of the child’ 
(2004) 6(2) Article 40 9. 
66
 GO Odongo ‘Child Justice law reform in Africa and international standards on the rights of the child’ 
(2004) 6(2) Article 40 9; GO Odongo ‘The domestication of international standards on the rights of the 
child:  A critical and comparative evaluation of the Kenyan example’ (2004) Vol 12(4) The 
International Journal on Children’s Rights 420; The African Child Policy Forum (2007) ‘Realising 
rights for children: Harmonisation of laws on children: Eastern and Southern Africa’ 8.  Available at 
http://www.africanchild.info/documents.asp?page=3 [accessed 05 October 2008]; GO Odongo (2008) 
‘The Impact of International law on Children’s Rights on Juvenile Justice Law Reform in the African 
Context’ in Sloth-Nielsen, J (Ed) Children’s Rights in Africa:  A legal perspective 149.   
67
 CRC/C/KEN/CO/2, 19 June 2007, para 3 & 4 (Adopted at 44th session). 
68
 J Sloth-Nielsen (2004) ‘Law Reform Initiatives in Africa:  Turning Principles and Policy into Law’ 
in Sloth-Nielsen, J and Gallinetti, J (Eds.) ‘Child Justice in Africa:  A guide to good practice’ 52;  GO 
Odongo ‘The domestication of international standards on the rights of the child:  A critical and 
comparative evaluation of the Kenyan example’ (2004) Vol 12(4) The International Journal on 
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‘landmark’ for Kenya because it is the first piece of legislation that gives effect to the 
international human rights treaties that Kenya is a party to.69  Part II of the Children’s 
Act identifies the four key principles underlying the UNCRC while Part XIII (s184-
s194) sets out the administration of juvenile justice.70  With regard to the latter, 
CROC expressed its concern in its concluding observation to Kenya’s initial state 
report that the MACR, set at 8 years old, is too low.71  One downside to the Act is that 
it does not raise the MACR.  Thus, Kenya has allowed the 1930 common law position 
of the doli incapax rule as set out in Kenya’s Penal Code to hold firm.72             
       
CROC urges Kenya to continue to harmonise its national legislation in accordance 
with international treaties and to address and implement recommendations in its initial 
State Party reports that have not yet been implemented.73  The CROC reiterated its 
earlier position with regard to the MACR being too low in its second periodic 
report.74  It recommended that the State party ensure that its juvenile justice system is 
                                                                                                                                      
Children’s Rights 420; GO Odongo (2005) ‘The domestication of international law standards on the 
rights of the child with specific reference to juvenile justice in the African context’ (Unpublished LLD 
Thesis) 100. 
69
 GO Odongo (2006) ‘Harmonisation of national and international laws to protect children’s rights:  
The Kenya Case Study’ (Unpublished Report). 
70
 GO Odongo ‘The domestication of international standards on the rights of the child:  A critical and 
comparative evaluation of the Kenyan example’ (2004) Vol 12(4) The International Journal on 
Children’s Rights 422, 425. 
71
 CRC/C/15/Add.160, 07 November 2001, para 22 (Adopted at 28th session). 
72
 Chapter 63 Laws of Kenya, s14.  The only difference with the rule is that it represents a one year 
increase from the normal common law rule which is set at 7 years old;  GO Odongo (2006) 
‘Harmonisation of national and international laws to protect children’s rights:  The Kenya Case Study’ 
(Unpublished Report).   
73
 CRC/C/KEN/CO/2, 19 June 2007, para 7 & 9 (Adopted at 44th session). 
74
 CRC/C/15/Add.160, 07 November 2001, para 22 (Adopted at 28th session); CRC/C/KEN/CO/2, 19 
June 2007, para 67(Adopted at 44th session). 
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carried out in accordance with the UNCRC’s articles outlining juvenile justice,75 other 
relevant UN guidelines76 as well as the Committee’s General Comment No. 10.77  In 
particular, in paragraph 68(a) it recommends the State party raise its minimum age to 
12 years and consider increasing it,78 the age of 12 being the minimum requirement 
set out in the recent General Comment No.10.79  The Children’s Act has failed to raise 
the MACR despite CROC’s pleas in its recommendations to the Party’s reports.  It is 
submitted that Kenya’s minimum age is in violation of article 40(3)(a) of the UNCRC 
and article 17(4) of the ACRWC. 
                      
3.4 South Africa 
South Africa ratified the UNCRC and the ACRWC after a long an arduous apartheid 
struggle which excluded South Africa from the international arena.80  The 1993 
Interim Constitution81 laid the foundations for South Africa’s new democracy in 1994 
which was embraced with open arms.  The final Constitution82 was adopted in 1996 
which included a laudable Bill of Rights and an elaborate s28 detailing children’s 
                                               
75
 Articles 37, 39 and 40 of the UNCRC. 
76
 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The Beijing 
Rules) 1985;  United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (The Riyadh 
Guidelines) 1990; United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty 1990 
and Guidelines for Action on Children in the Criminal Justice System (The Vienna Guidelines).   
77
 CRC/C/GC/10, 02 February 2007. 
78
 CRC/C/KEN/CO/2, 19 June 2007 (Adopted at 44th session). 
79
 CRC/C/GC/10, 02 February 2007, para 30 and 31. 
80
 Ratified the UNCRC on 16 June 1995 and the ACRWC on 07 January 2000.  See 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/11.htm [accessed 08 August 2008] and 
http://www.africa-
union.org/roots/au/Documents/Treaties/List/African%20Charter%20on%20the%20Rights%20and%20
Welfare%20of %20the%20Child.pdf [accessed 06 August 2008]; O Sewpaul ‘SA Presentation to UN 
CRC – setting the agenda for tansformation’ (2000) 2(2) Article 40 1. 
81
 Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. 
82
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
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rights and juvenile justice provisions.83  Many of the provisions incorporated in s28 
are straight from the UNCRC.84   
 
South Africa has a hybrid legal system and follows a dualist approach with regard to 
international law.  The Constitution provides for this approach in chapter 14 which 
deals with international law.  Section 231(4) states that international agreements only 
become law in South Africa when they are given domestic status through national 
enactment.85  Due consideration, however, must be given where international law has 
                                               
83
 J Sloth- Nielsen (2006) ‘Harmonisation of national and international laws to protect children’s rights:  
The South African case study’ (Unpublished Report).  Section 28 of the South African Constitution 
provides:  ‘(1) Every child has the right – 
(a) to a name and a nationality from birth; 
(b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the 
family environment; 
(c) to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services;  
(d) to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation; 
(e) to be protected from exploitative labour practices; 
(f) not to be required or permitted to perform work or provide services that: 
(i) are inappropriate for a person of that child’s age; or 
(ii) place at risk the child’s well-being, education, physical or mental health or 
spiritual, moral or social development; 
(g) not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case, in addition to the rights 
a child enjoys under sections 12 and 35, the child may be detained only for the shortest 
appropriate period of time, and has the rights to be:- 
       (i)         kept separately from detained persons over the age of 18 years; and 
       (ii)         treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that takes account of the child’s  
        age; 
(h) to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense, in civil  
proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result; and  
(i) not be used directly in armed conflict, and to be protected in times of armed conflict. 
(2) A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child. 
(3) In this section ‘child’ means a person under the age of 18 years.’           
84
 GO Odongo (2005) ‘The domestication of international law standards on the rights of the child with 
specific reference to juvenile justice in the African context’ (Unpublished LLD Thesis) 105;  
85
 J Dugard (2005) ‘International Law:  A South African Perspective’ 58-62. 
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not been directly incorporated into domestic legislation but has acquired legal 
recognition through constitutional provisions.  Our children’s rights section includes 
many UNCRC concepts and since our children’s rights are justiciable in our courts, so 
too has the UNCRC acquired legal status in our law.86  In addition to this, s39(1) 
states that a court or tribunal ‘must’ at the very least consider international law when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, while s233 states a court must prefer an interpretation 
consistent with international law when interpreting legislation.87 
 
After submitting its initial State report, the CROC welcomed the 1996 Constitution 
with s28 directly incorporating rights and freedoms provided for in the UNCRC.88  It 
noted the stumbling blocks such as the apartheid legacy, high levels of unemployment 
and poverty, lack of adequate statistical data in juvenile systems (to mention a few) 
that hinder the State party in implementing the provisions of the UNCRC.89  It further 
encouraged the State to continue in its efforts in reforming legislation to make it 
UNCRC compliant and in so doing introduce additional reforms.   
 
                                               
86
 J Sloth-Nielsen (2001) ‘The role of international law in juvenile justice reform in South Africa’ 
(Unpublished LLD thesis); J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Children’s rights in the South African Courts:  An 
overview since ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2002) Vol 10(2) The 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 139; J Sloth- Nielsen (2006) ‘Harmonisation of national and 
international laws to protect children’s rights:  The South African case study’ (Unpublished Report). 
87
 J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Children’s rights in the South African Courts:  An overview since ratification of the 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (2002) Vol 10(2) The International Journal of Children’s 
Rights 139; M Saine (2005) ‘Protecting the Rights of the Children in Trouble with the Law:  A Case 
Study of South Africa and the Gambia’ (Unpublished LLM Thesis) 16; J Dugard (2005) ‘International 
Law:  A South African Perspective’ 56, 65-67; Sloth- Nielsen, J (2006) ‘Harmonisation of national and 
international laws to protect children’s rights:  The South African case study’ (Unpublished Report). 
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South Africa’s child law reform followed a split process with child protection and 
social welfare being dealt with on the one hand and juvenile justice on the other.  The 
existing child legislation was the Child Care Act 74 of 1983 which was in dire need of 
review and reform.90  Over the years this Act had been amended several times.  A 
substantial improvement in child care was made with the enactment of the Child Care 
Amendment Act 96 of 1996.91  In the same year, the Minister of Justice in charge of 
the then South African Law Commission (now known as South African Law Reform 
Commission (SALRC)) appointed a project committee on juvenile justice.92  This 
committee was tasked with investigating new reform proposals for a separate juvenile 
justice system.  It was highly consultative involving all the relevant stakeholders, role-
players and children themselves.93  The Child Justice Bill 49 of 2002 was the product 
of this law-making process.94  It was tabled before parliament in 2002 and debated in 
2003 but lay dormant until mid 2008 when a revised Bill was reintroduced.  The Child 
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in Sloth-Nielsen, J and Gallinetti, J (Eds.) ‘Child Justice in Africa:  A guide to good practice’ 50; GO 
Odongo (2005) ‘The domestication of international law standards on the rights of the child with 
specific reference to juvenile justice in the African context’ (Unpublished LLD Thesis) 111. 
94
 J Sloth-Nielsen (2004) ‘Law Reform Initiatives in Africa:  Turning Principles and Policy into Law’ 
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Justice Bill has since been approved by the National Assembly and making its way 
through the National Council of Provinces.  Parliament also enacted parts of the 
Children’s Act 38 of 2005 earlier this year which deals with child protection and 
social welfare.   
 
The Child Justice Bill provides for a new and separate juvenile justice system for 
South Africa.  It details the procedures from the moment of the child’s arrest up until 
the case is disposed of.95  The CROC raised concerns about the provisions relating to 
the MACR which were arguably contrary to international principles.  The Bill raised 
the MACR from the very low age of 7 to 10 years old and retained the common law 
doli incapax presumption for children between the ages of 10 and 14.96  The CROC 
expressed its disapproval that the age of 10 is still too low and that the State should 
reassess its draft legislation with the view of increasing the proposed MACR.97   
Furthermore, CROC noted in General Comment No. 10 that a split age often leads to 
discriminatory practices.98                    
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis details a thorough discussion outlining the SALRC proposals 
surrounding the Child Justice Bill and its decisions with regard to the MACR. 
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3.5 Namibia  
Namibia became an independent state in 1990 and inherited the devastating effects of 
apartheid because of its shared borders with South Africa.99  It has a hybrid legal 
system consisting of common law and Roman-Dutch law and supports a dualist 
approach to international law.100  Children were amongst those mostly affected by the 
apartheid regime.  The government has since dedicated its time to addressing the 
inadequate situation that children find themselves in.  It is against this backdrop that 
Namibia became a party to the UNCRC101 and the ACRWC.102  The adoption of these 
human rights treaties provided the State an opportunity to review its national laws 
ensuring its compliance with international principles and provisions.  This review is 
done through comprehensive law reform and the harmonisation of international and 
national laws.    
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Prior to child law reform in 1992, the South Africa’s Children’s Act 33 of 1960 
governed protection and rights for children.103  The Act included a wide variety of 
issues around children in need of care, protection, prevention from neglect, ill-
treatment, exploitation etc.104  The introduction of the 1990 Constitution and adoption 
of human rights treaties called for comprehensive law reform as the 1960 South 
African Act was no longer the suitable vehicle for governing children’s rights.105   
 
The Namibian Constitution provides for the underlying key principles of the UNCRC 
in articles 10 and 15.106  Article 15 was specifically drafted for the rights and 
protections of children.107  In addition to this article, Namibia’s reform process 
                                               
103
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resulted in three separate draft Bills, namely, the Child Care and Protection Bill, the 
draft Regulations to the Bill and the Children’s Status Bill.108  The Child Care and 
Protection Bill was enacted in 2003109 while the Children’s Status Bill, after much 
redrafting, was enacted in 2006110 but is not yet in force. 
 
Law reform is a top priority on the juvenile justice agenda in Namibia.111  The CROC 
recommended that the States Party take articles 37 and 40 of the UNCRC and the 
other relevant UN standards into account when administering juvenile justice.112  
Namibia has since then redrafted a Child Justice Bill (2002) modelled on South 
Africa’s Child Justice Bill.113  Despite much redrafting the Bill has not yet been 
introduced into Parliament.  Section 6 of the Child Justice Bill maintains the age of 7 
years old as the MACR and retains the doli incapax rule for children between age 7 
                                                                                                                                      
such employee, shall for the purposes of Art 9 hereof be deemed to constitute an arrangement or 
scheme to compel the performance of forced labour. 
(5) No law authorising preventative detention shall permit children under the age of sixteen years to be 
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110
 The African Child Policy Forum (2007) ‘Realising rights for children: Harmonisation of laws on 
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and 14.114  The age of 7 is too low considering international standards which require 
the age of 12 as the lowest minimum age.  The CROC has expressed its disapproval 
of countries setting their MACR below 12 and of those who practice a ‘split age’.115  
Thus Namibia fails to comply with its international obligations relating to the MACR.     
     
3.6 Lesotho  
On 10 March 1992,116 Lesotho ratified the UNCRC and submitted its initial report to 
the CROC in 1998.  Following its submission it acceded to the ACRWC in 1999.117  
In 2001, the CROC responded to Lesotho’s initial report in its concluding observation 
adopted at its 26th session.118     
 
The CROC praised Lesotho’s progress since ratifying the UNCRC.  It made special 
mention of the UNCRC being translated into Sesotho, the effort involved in raising 
awareness of children’s rights and the UNCRC through media broadcasts and the 
significant improvement in establishing a juvenile justice system.119  It highlighted the 
problems hampering effective implementation and raised a few issues of concern.  
The first was the need to review existing legislation in a legal system embodying a 
mixture of civil, common and customary law and where domestic legislation always 
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prevails in conflict situations.120  Secondly, the lack of clarity regarding the definition 
of a child and the low MACR set at 7, further undermined by the ever increasing low 
rate of birth registrations.121  The CROC recommended that the State continue to 
adopt and amend domestic legislation that adequately reflects the principles and 
provisions of the UNCRC.  Of particular importance was the need to consider the 
enactment of a comprehensive children’s rights statute and to catalyse the approval of 
draft legislation.122              
  
Child law reform in Lesotho under the aegis of the Law Reform Commission has been 
hailed as forward looking and serves as a best practice model for other countries.123  It 
was a highly extensive consultative process with Dr. Itumeleng Kimane holding the 
reigns and directing.124  The Commission appointed multi-sectoral task teams to 
undertake legislative review.  Other key role players included in the process that 
provided their expertise and views were academics, government officials, NGO’s, 
parliamentarians, researchers, Lesotho citizens and children.125  The reform process 
led to one piece of legislation underpinning the key principles of the UNCRC and the 
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ACRWC as well as providing for child protection, social welfare and juvenile 
justice.126  The Children’s Protection and Welfare Bill was the result of this law 
reform process and has been tabled before parliament but is still pending 
enactment.127  
 
The Bill defines a ‘child’ as a person who is under the age of 18 as opposed to two 
separate pieces of legislation containing two conflicting ages.128  The definition of a 
‘child’ goes further to define a child in respect of criminal proceeding as a person who 
attained the age of criminal responsibility as referenced in s83.  The CROC noted that 
one of the weaknesses of the Lesotho’s juvenile justice system is the low age of 
criminal responsibility which the Bill tries to remedy in s83.129  Section 83 of the Bill 
deals with the MACR and the doli incapax rule.  It raises the minimum age of 7 to 10 
years old and provides for the retention of doli incapax rule for children between the 
ages of 10 and 14, which still falls short of international standards.130   
          
3.7 The Gambia 
The Gambia is party to both the UNCRC and the ACRWC.131  This means that the 
Gambia has undertaken to be accountable before the international community in 
promoting and protecting children’s rights.  The Constitution is the supreme law of 
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the Gambia.132  In addition to the Constitution, other subsidiary laws are provided for 
in s7 because of its legal system based on English common law, customary law and 
Shari’a.133  The Gambia subscribes to a dualist approach meaning that international 
law is not automatically received into national laws unless approved by Parliament 
and domesticated.134  
 
The Constitution obliges the State to take cognizance of the international instruments 
signed by the Gambia when making protective polices for the fundamental rights in 
the Bill of Rights.135  Secondly it empowers the courts to consider these protective 
policies when interpreting laws based on them.136  There is also the possibility of the 
courts relying directly on the international instruments as an interpretive tool when 
interpreting the fundamental rights protected in the Bill of Rights and any other 
legislation.  The rationale behind this reliance is based on the logic that because the 
protective policies made by the State must be in accordance with the international 
instruments there is no reason why the court should not be able to rely on the 
international instrument themselves.137  On the basis of these Constitutional 
provisions, the provisions of the UNCRC and ACRWC have been indirectly 
domesticated into the laws of Gambia and therefore can be invoked by the courts.      
 
                                               
132
 Section 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of Gambia (1997).  
133
 Constitution of the Republic of Gambia (1997). 
134
 Domestication happens through a country’s constitutional provisions or enacting new legislation 
which gives international law domestic status. 
135
 Section 216(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Gambia (1997). 
136
 Section 211(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of Gambia (1997). 
137
 M Saine (2005) ‘Protecting the Rights of the Children in Trouble with the Law:  A Case Study of 
South Africa and the Gambia’ (Unpublished LLM Thesis) 17. 
 
 
 
 
 105 
In response to the Gambia’s initial report under article 44, the CROC in its concluding 
observations noted with appreciation the Constitution’s inclusion of s29138 dedicated 
to the rights of children.139  CROC goes on to highlight the difficulties accompanying 
implementation of the UNCRC’s provisions citing Gambia’s legal system as one of 
the contributing factors.140  As noted earlier Gambia’s legal system consists of 
English common law, customary law and Shari’a and CROC is concerned that latter 
two are not reflective of the provisions in the UNCRC.141  The Committee has urged 
the States Party to review its existing fragmented children’s legislation and speed up 
the law reform process by enacting a comprehensive children’s code.142  A further 
concern raised by the Committee is the absence of a legal definition of a child and the 
many differing legal ages, in particular the MACR being too low.143  CROC 
recommended that the States Party raises the age of criminal responsibility, taking 
into account all appropriate measures to ensure a juvenile justice system that is 
reflective of articles 37, 39 and 40 of the UNCRC and other UN guidelines.144                            
       
                                               
138
 Section 29 provides the following rights for children:  ‘(1) Children shall have the right from birth to 
a name, the right to acquire a nationality and subject to legislation enacted in the best interests of 
children, to know and be cared for by their parents. 
(2) Children under the age of sixteen years shall be entitled to be protected from economic exploitation 
and shall not be employed in or required to perform work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere 
with their education or be harmful to their health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social 
development’. 
(3) A juvenile offender who is kept in lawful custody shall be kept separately from adult offenders. 
139
 CRC/C/15/Add.165, 06 November 2001, para 3 (Adopted at 28th session). 
140
 CRC/C/15/Add.165, 06 November 2001, para 10 (Adopted at 28th session). 
141
 CRC/C/15/Add.165, 06 November 2001, para 11 (Adopted at 28th session). 
142
 CRC/C/15/Add.165, 06 November 2001, para 12 (Adopted at 28th session). 
143
 CRC/C/15/Add.165, 06 November 2001, para 23 (Adopted at 28th session). 
144
 CRC/C/15/Add.165, 06 November 2001, para 67 and 68(b) (Adopted at 28th session). 
 
 
 
 
 106 
Law reform in the Gambia resulted in the enactment of Children’s Act on the 23 June 
2005 dealing with both social welfare and juvenile justice.  The enactment of the 
Children’s Act gave the UNCRC and the ACRWC full force of law in the Gambia.  
Section 2(1) of the Act defines a child as a person under the age of 18.  The 
Constitution does not expressly state who is a child but it can be inferred from 
s39(1)145 and s26146 that the full age is 18 and that a child is someone below the full 
age.  Part XVII of the Children’s Act details the administration of juvenile justice.  
Under its Criminal Code, Cap 10 Laws of the Gambia and qualified by other parts of 
the Code, the Gambia was an adherent of the doli incapax rule.147  This meant that 
criminal responsibility began at the tender age of 7 if a child had knowledge and 
understanding of his or her wrongful actions.  There existed a rebuttable presumption 
that a child between the ages of 7 and 12, lacked criminal responsibility at the time of 
the commission of the alleged offence, if he or she did not posses the required 
knowledge and understanding of his or her wrongful actions determined by a court.  
The onus was on the prosecution to rebut the presumption that the child lacked 
criminal responsibility.  Section 209 of the Children’s Act increased the MACR from 
7 to 12 and abolished the doli incapax rule.148  In raising its MACR from 7 to 12 the 
Gambia is acting in accordance with international principles and its State 
obligations.149              
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3.8 Ethiopia 
Ethiopia is the only African country under study that has not been colonized and that 
follows a partly monist approach to international law.150  This means that international 
treaties automatically become binding law in the State upon ratification.  Such 
binding law can only be directly invoked and applied once ratification is published.151   
Ethiopia is a party to both the UNCRC and ACRWC and has submitted its third 
periodic report to the CROC under article 44 of the UNCRC.152   
 
The 1995 Constitution recognises all international agreements ratified by Ethiopia as 
law of the land153 and any national laws and constitutional human rights shall be 
interpreted in accordance with these international agreements.154  Article 36 of the 
Constitution is dedicated to children and their rights.  The principles and the provision 
of the UNCRC influenced the drafting of this section as it was already ratified by 
Ethiopia at the time the Constitution was being drafted.155  
 
In its concluding observations, CROC notes with satisfaction the progress that 
Ethiopia has made since its initial report.  The adoption of the 1995 Constitution was 
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Ethiopia’s first move in the right direction.156  Following the Constitution was the 
establishment of the inter-ministerial committee to review its legislation and monitor 
the implementation of the UNCRC at all levels of government.157  Thirdly, the States 
Party in collaboration with NGO’s translated the UNCRC into 11 local languages and 
took every effort in publicizing the UNCRC so as to ensure its effective 
implementation.158   The CROC welcomed the adoption of the new Criminal Code in 
2005 and the States ratification of the ACRWC in 2002.159  It is submitted that all this 
reform coupled with the fact that Ethiopia is the only African country thus far to 
submit its third report to the CROC is very progressive.160   
 
Two weaknesses reflected from the periodic reports is the failure of the State to 
publish the UNCRC in the official Gazette and the need for much development in the 
administration of juvenile justice.161  On 09 May 2005, Ethiopia adopted a new 
Criminal Code in keeping with its treaty obligations of adopting legislation as a way 
of realising children’s rights.162  One of the main reasons in adopting the Code was to 
deal with the alarming increase in delinquency rates within the juvenile sector.163  The 
Code stipulates three distinct ages, namely, ‘infants’, ‘young persons’ and ‘adults’.  
Infans are children below the age of 9 years old who cannot be held criminally 
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responsible for their criminal acts as they lack accountability.164  Young Persons are 
children aged 9 to 15 while children aged 15 to 18 are treated in the same manner as 
adults.165  The Criminal Code thus sets the MACR at 9 years old and the upper age 
limit at 15 years old despite CROC’s numerous recommendations for the State to 
raise the minimum age to an internationally acceptable level.166    
 
3.9 Malawi  
Malawi became a party to the UNCRC on 02 January1991 and the ACRWC on 16 
September 1999.167  These human rights instruments obligate State Parties to realise 
children’s rights through adopting legislation and formulating and implementing any 
other measures in favour of such realisation.  Malawi ratified the UNCRC at a time 
when the State was ruled by a dictatorship.168  Thus, implementation of its provisions 
was pretty much at a standstill until the end of the Banda Regime. 
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The end of the Banda regime brought with it a new multiparty government and a new 
Constitution containing a justiciable Bill of Rights in 1994.169  The advent of the 
Constitution meant that the State had to review its enactments and policies over the 
last 30 years of dictatorship and colonialism.  The State appointed a special ministry 
for women and children and tasked the Malawi Law Commission to deal with 
comprehensive law reform.  However, in 2001 a Special Law Commission was 
appointed to deal with reform relating to children.170  This resulted in one 
comprehensive piece of legislation called the Child (Justice, Care and Protection) Bill. 
At present the Bill is still pending enactment.171          
 
Malawi has a common law legal system which recognises customary law as well.  It 
subscribes to a dualist approach to international law.  Section 211(2) of the 
Constitution provides that international treaties that were binding on the Republic 
before the commencement of the Constitution will remain binding unless an Act of 
Parliament provides otherwise.  Thus the UNCRC forms part of Malawian law and 
can be invoked in their courts while the ACRWC cannot unless it is domesticated 
through an Act of Parliament.             
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The Constitution defines a child as a person below the age of 16 which is inconsistent 
with the ACRWC’s definition of below 18.172  The CROC raised concern about the 
definition in its concluding observations and recommended that the State establish a 
definition that is in accordance with article 1 of the UNCRC and other related 
provisions.173  The proposed Child (Justice, Care and Protection) pending enactment 
had sought to adopt a comprehensive definition of the child that complies with the 
UNCRC and the ACRWC.    
 
Another concern raised by the CROC was Malawi’s MACR that is set at 7 years 
old.174  The Malawi Penal Code provides that children below the age of 7 lack 
criminal capacity.175  Children between the ages of 7 and 12 are presumed to lack 
criminal capacity until proven otherwise.176  The CROC has expressed that the 
MACR set at 7 is far too low and contrary to international standards.177  It 
recommended that the State take legislative measures in accordance with the ‘best 
interests’ of the child principle as well as the juvenile justice provisions in the 
UNCRC and the other relevant UN guidelines in the raising the MACR.178   
 
                                               
172
 Section 23 of the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi. 
173
 CRC/C/15/Add.174, 02 April 2002, para 19(a) (Adopted at 29th session). 
174
 A Stapleton ‘African focus:  The role of juvenile justice in Malawi’ (2000) 1(1) Article 40 8. 
175
 CRC/C/8/Add.43, 26 June 2001, para 343. 
176
 DM Chirwa & T Kaime ‘Where are the missing pieces? Constructing a mosaic of the CRC and the 
African Children’s Charter in Malawi’s law and policy’ (2008) Vol 2(1), Malawi Law Journal 87. 
177
 CRC/C/15/Add.174, 02 April 2002, para 18 and 67 (Adopted at 29th session). 
178
 CRC/C/15/Add.174, 02 April 2002, para 19(b), 68 and 69(a) (Adopted at 29th session); DW Chirwa 
(2006) ‘Harmonisation of national and international laws to protect children’s rights:  The Malawi case 
study’ (Unpublished Report); Malawi’s second periodic report is to be discussed at the 09 January 2009 
CROC meeting. 
 
 
 
 
 112 
According to State practice and public opinion the MACR should be set at 12.179  Yet 
the Malawi Law Commission has recommended that the MACR be raised from 7 to 
10 contrary to State practice as submitted in Malawi’s initial report.180  The rebuttable 
presumption would then apply for children between the ages of 10 and 14.181  In light 
of these concerns and State practice, it is my submission that Malawi should review 
its legislation pertaining to the MACR, in an attempt to comply with its international 
obligations. 
 
3.10 Mozambique 
Mozambique has a civil law legal system and subscribes to a dualist approach to 
international law.  It has ratified both the human rights treaties, the UNCRC in 1994 
and the ACRWC in 1998.  Prior to its ratification of the UNCRC, Mozambique 
adopted its own 12 point Declaration on the Rights of the Mozambican Child. 
 
Subsequent to Mozambique’s initial report, the CROC commended the State on its 
efforts thus far in reviewing its legal codes to ensure compatibility with international 
standards and the incorporation of article 3 into its Constitution, the establishment of 
the Ministry for the Co-ordination of Social Action (MICAS) and a children’s 
parliament.182  CROC however raised the following concerns; firstly, there remained 
inconsistencies between domestic legislation and international standards of the 
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UNCRC.183  When conflict arises between the two, domestic legislation takes 
precedence which may lead to a violation of the UNCRC provisions.  Secondly, there 
was no specialised body in place to oversee the MICAS and take the lead for 
developing children’s rights policy, planning and programming.184  Thirdly, on the 
issue of juvenile justice, the CROC was concerned that 16 and 17 year olds were 
excluded from the benefits of the juvenile system.185   
 
It was these concerns that led to the process of child law reform in Mozambique 
initiated by MICAS, the Ministry of Justice and UNICEF.  In carrying out its law 
reform processes, the State had to ensure that its national laws reflected the four key 
principles enshrined in articles 2, 3, 6 and 12 of the UNCRC.186   
 
In keeping with international law187 and UN standards,188 Mozambique’s Penal Code 
sets the MACR at 16 years old.189  The high age of 16 was inherited from 
Mozambique’s colonial laws and remained intact post the civil war.190  A consultative 
process was followed in determining whether 16 was a suitable age for criminal 
capacity and the results showed an almost even split.191  Cantwell, an expert in the 
field of children’s rights, noted that the real issue was not so much at what age the 
State sets the minimum, but what the State does with the children below that age who 
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find themselves in conflict with the law.192  States with high minimum ages are 
allowed to resort to non-penal measures such as referring children to educational 
institutions (the so-called ‘sleep over institutions’) which amounts to a deprivation of 
the child’s liberty without a trial.193  This could result in welfare processes being more 
harmful to the child than the normal criminal process, thus presenting a very real need 
for alternative measures for children under the age of 16.194  
 
Article 40(3) of the UNCRC requires States to have separate legislation, institutions 
and authorities specifically for children in conflict with the law.  Article 1 of the 
UNCRC defines the child as a person below the age of 18 unless majority is attained 
earlier.  A problematic area concerning Mozambique’s high MACR, is the age of 
majority is also set quite high.  The MACR is set at 16 and the age of majority at 21 
yet young persons between these age categories are denied the protective benefits of 
the juvenile justice system.195  I submit that the State needs to reassess this provision 
bringing it into accordance with the CROC’s initial response of a child in conflict 
with the law who is a person below the age of 18.  Thus there is no reason why a child 
over the age of 16 but below 18 should not benefit from protective benefits of the 
juvenile justice system. 
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A consultative law reform process resulted in two pieces of Draft legislation for 
children.  One of the Draft Bills deal with Child Protection issues while the other Bill 
on the Jurisdictional Organisation of Minors details issues of juvenile justice.196  At 
present, neither of the Bills has been enacted by Parliament.                    
 
3.11 Sierra Leone  
Sierra Leone is a party to both the UNCRC and ACRWC. 197  It has a common law 
legal system but also subscribes to customary law.  The Constitution is the supreme 
law of the land.  Second to the Constitution are international treaties and conventions 
followed by common law and judicial precedent.  Customary law is at the bottom of 
Sierra Leone’s legal hierarchy yet it regulates most of the law relating to criminal 
behaviour.198  This has proved problematic in the area of criminal and family law as 
traditional rules and cultural values often clash with the Constitution and international 
human rights treaties at the expense of women and children.199   
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In 1991 a civil war broke out in Sierra Leone and came to an end in 2002.200  The 
period between ratification of the two treaties saw the most heinous human rights 
atrocities especially against women and children.  Children found themselves in the 
position of being both the perpetrator and the victim.201  The country was riddled with 
the effects of war and slowly started implementing disaster relief methods.  As a 
States Party to both the UNCRC and the ACRWC, Sierra Leone is under an 
obligation to review its current child laws and policies and reform them in a manner 
that will best serve the interest of the child.  This means that Sierra Leone needs to 
initiate legal reform in accordance with the international provisions advocated in the 
above treaties to promote and protect children’s rights in their jurisdiction.   
 
Sierra Leone submitted its initial report in April 1996 which was considered by the 
CROC in January 2000.  In its concluding observations, the CROC addressed its 
concerns pertaining to the definition of a child and the low MACR set at 10 years 
old.202  The CROC recommended that the States Party review its country’s domestic 
legislation in formulating a consistent definition of a child and in raising its very low 
MACR.  It advised the States Party to adopt the age of 18 in defining a child.  This 
age is also consistent with provisions of the UNCRC and the ACRWC which defines 
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a child as under the age of 18.203  Furthermore, in light of articles 37, 39, 40 and other 
the other relevant UN standards, it recommended that Sierra Leone harmonise its 
domestic legislation in accordance with these international provisions.204     
 
In carrying out the recommendations of the CROC, Sierra Leone’s Parliament enacted 
a long awaited and most elaborate Child Rights Act on 13 July 2007.205  It is a 
laudable reform initiative on the part of Sierra Leone which is very closely linked 
with the provisions of the UNCRC and ACRWC for the purposes of 
implementation.206  It is divided into eight sections covering areas such as child rights, 
parental and state responsibilities, custody and maintenance, juvenile justice, social 
welfare, employment and miscellaneous matters.  In the definition section of the Act a 
child is defined as any person under the age of 18 and the best interests of the child 
shall be paramount in the administration of justice and the protection of children’s 
rights.207  Article 70 of the Act outlines the MACR provision as follows, ‘In any 
judicial proceedings in Sierra Leone, a child shall not be held to be criminally 
responsible for his actions if he is below the age of fourteen years’. 
 
In its concluding observations to Sierra Leone’s second periodic report, the CROC 
commended the States Party on its Child Rights Act that was drafted in response to its 
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initial recommendations.208  It praised Sierra Leone’s efforts in reviewing and 
upgrading its laws in accordance with international standards.  It noted the increase of 
MACR from 10 to 14 with satisfaction and advised that the States Party must ensure 
its full implementation in light of article 37, 39, 40, the other relevant UN standards 
and the invaluable General Comment No.10.209  In raising its MACR from 10 to 14, 
Sierra Leone has met its international treaty obligations.210  I submit that Sierra Leone 
is the only country under study that has correctly adhered to CROC’s views 
concerning the MACR in General Comment No. 10.  It is noteworthy that General 
Comment No. 10 has gained an entry way into the concluding observations to Sierra 
Leone.211  It is my submission that since gaining entry into the concluding 
observations of the CROC it should be afforded more weight than a reference 
document with persuasive force as described in chapter 1.212    
    
3.12 Zambia 
Zambia ratified the UNCRC on 06 December 1991 and signed the ACRWC on 28 
February 1992 but has not yet ratified it.213  Its legal system is based on the common 
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law but it recognises and incorporates customary law as part of its system.214  Zambia 
follows a dualist approach to international law, thus, until Zambia domesticates the 
principles and provisions of the UNCRC or the ACRWC it is not legally binding on 
its citizens.215  
 
In 2003, CROC in its concluding observation welcomed the appointment of the Law 
Development Commission and noted Zambia’s attempts in harmonising their 
domestic legislation with international law.  However, the CROC was concerned that 
their domestic and customary legislation was not fully reflecting the principles and 
provisions enshrined in the UNCRC.  The CROC raised its concerns about the various 
minimum ages under the different statutes.  For example, the Constitution defines a 
child as person under the age of 15, customary law bases the end of childhood on 
puberty, and the MACR is set at 8 years old.216   
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The CROC has urged the State to make every effort in determining a clear and precise 
definition for the child that is in compliance with article 1 and other relevant 
principles of UNCRC.217  It further recommended that the State increase the existing 
low MACR in accordance with article 40 and the relevant UN standards.218  Finally, 
on the issue of age, I submit that the State should review its statutory legislation and 
customary law that have set minimum ages which are contradictory to various fields 
and international standards as well.219             
 
Section 14(1), of the Zambian Penal Code, Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia sets out 
the MACR.  The section stipulates that children under the age of 8 years old cannot be 
held criminally liable for any act or omission on their part.  Subsection (2) provides 
for the doli incapax presumption for children between the ages of 8 and 12 years old.  
I submit that even though the minimum of 8 is raised by one year in comparison to the 
common law age of 7, it is still too low.  Zambia has not increased its MACR despite 
the CROC’s urgent recommendations.  To make matters worse the provisions of the 
Penal Code only hold true in theory but not in practice.  There is a tendency in 
Zambia to disregard the rights of children set out in the Penal Code and reiterated in 
the human rights instruments that Zambia is a party to.220  
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4. The CROC’s jurisprudence on the MACR  
Since the adoption of the UNCRC, the CROC has continually developed the way it 
views the MACR.  These developments are said to be threefold; the first view taken 
by CROC with regard to the MACR is the failure to have a MACR in place.221  Those 
States Parties that have failed to establish a MACR are in clear violation of the 
UNCRC.  The second view is a very low MACR set by States Parties.  The CROC 
has expressed its disapproval (through the system of State reporting) of States Parties 
setting their age minimums at 10 and below.  At a later stage, but still when there was 
no definitive recommended age, the CROC began criticizing countries that set their 
age minimums at 12 and below.222  The third and final view deals with the doli 
incapax rule.  Initially, the CROC held that the abolition of this rule would be a 
violation of the UNCRC.223  However, since the arrival of General Comment No.10, 
the CROC has rejected a ‘split age’ as it leads to discriminatory practices.224  This 
‘split age’ ultimately arises through the retention of the doli incapax rule which means 
that States Parities practicing a ‘split age’ is in violation of its treaty obligations.  
Some commentators may argue that the CROC’s jurisprudence is inconsistent and 
thus confusing for States Parties.  I submit that it shows development over the last 18 
years and that the CROC has been consistent in that it always advocates for an 
increase of the MACR. 
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5. Assessing and comparing child law reform initiatives on the MACR of the 
countries under study 
Uganda, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya and Sierra Leone have all successfully enacted child 
legislation within their Parliaments.  All 5 of them with the exception of Ghana have 
their reforms in one comprehensive Act.  Ghana has two separate Acts, one for child 
care and one for juvenile justice.  South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Malawi and 
Mozambique all have their child-centered bills still pending in Parliament or partially 
in operation.225  South Africa, Namibia and Mozambique each have a separate Bill for 
juvenile justice while Lesotho has all its child law reforms in one Bill.  Namibia, 
Lesotho and Malawi have relied on South Africa’s juvenile justice legislative reform 
as a good practice model and have modelled their bills in a similar fashion.226  South 
Africa’s Child Justice Bill is in its second phase of approval (at the National Council 
of Provinces) and is soon to be enacted.  Ethiopia and Zambia have both relied on 
their Penal Codes for establishing a MACR.     
 
Uganda, Ghana and the Gambia have all increased their age minimums from 7 to 12 
(14 for Ghana) and abolished the doli incapax rule.  Kenya and Zambia have opted to 
keep their minimum age set at 8 and retain the doli incapax rule for children between 
the ages of 8 and 12.  Namibia kept its MACR at 7 and retained the doli incapax rule 
for children between 7 and 14.  South Africa, Lesotho and Malawi have increased 
their minimum age from 7 to 10 and retained the doli incapax rule for children 
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between the ages of 10 and 14.  Ethiopia has three different age categories with the 
MACR set at 9.  Mozambique has its minimum age set at 16 and Sierra Leone at 14. 
 
The doli incapax rule forms part of the legal systems of Kenya, South Africa, 
Namibia, Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia.  It serves as a ‘protective mantle’ for young 
children who find themselves in the criminal justice system.227  It used to form part of 
the legal systems of Uganda, Ghana and the Gambia before they abolished it as part of 
their child law reform process.  This means that initially 9 of the 12 countries under 
study subscribed to the doli incapax rule.  However, since each country has 
undergone a process of legal reform only 6 of the 9 still subscribe to the rule.  
Ethiopia does not subscribe to the doli incapax rule but falls short its international 
treaty obligations with its MACR set at 9.  More than half of the countries under study 
are in violation of the UNCRC according to the CROC’s second and third views on 
the MACR.  Even though Uganda and Gambia meet the UNCRC and ACRWC 
standards, the CROC has indicated that 12 is the absolute minimum age 
requirement.228  This means that Uganda and Gambia should keep reviewing their 
child laws in view of raising their minimum age of 12 progressively.  Ghana, Sierra 
Leone and Mozambique have met their international treaty obligations regarding the 
MACR with the commendable high minimums of 14 and 16 respectively.   
 
Some of the problems affecting the MACR such as the increasing low rate of birth 
registrations and poor statistical data were highlighted in all the States Parties reports 
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under study.  The CROC recommended that these countries should implement mobile 
registration units for easier access and awareness campaigns educating government 
officials, community and religious leaders, midwives and parents on the importance 
of registration.229  Another helpful mechanism that could strengthen efforts to make 
birth registrations a less costly exercise is by issuing certificates free of charge.  Such 
efforts by States Parties will ensure compliance with articles 7 and 8 of the UNCRC.  
On the problem relating to poor statistical data, the CROC recommends that States 
Parties should develop indicators to monitor and evaluate their progress in collecting 
systematic and disaggregated data.230  They should also seek technical assistance from 
organisations such UNICEF.       
 
All the countries under study have submitted their initial periodic reports to the 
CROC.  Some of the countries have submitted more than one and Ethiopia has 
already submitted its third periodic report.  However, only one country under study 
has submitted its initial report to the ACERWC.231  
 
6. Conclusion 
Upon ratification all countries under study needed to review their laws pertaining to 
children and bring them in accordance with international law principles.  The MACR 
                                               
229
 CRC/C/15/Add.122, 23 February 2000, para 20 (Adopted at 23rd session); CRC/C/15/Add.144, 21 
February 2001, para 35 (Adopted at 26th session); CRC/C/15/Add.172, 03 April 2001, para 35 
(Adopted at 29th session); CRC/C/ETH/CO/3, 01 November 2006, para 32 (Adopted at 43rd session). 
230
 CRC/C/15/Add.165, 06 November 2001, para 15 (Adopted at 28th session); CRC/C/Add.160, 07 
November 2001, para 15; CRC/C/Add.174, 02 April 2002  para11 (Adopted at 29th seession).  
231
 Uganda is the only country under study who has submitted its initial report to the ACERWC but it 
has not yet been considered.  See The African Child Policy Forum (2007) ‘Realising rights for 
children: Harmonisation of laws on children: Eastern and Southern Africa’ 10.  Available at 
http://www.africanchild.info/documents.asp?page=3 [accessed 05 October 2008].   
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has not been given much attention in the past but it has definitely moved up on the 
juvenile justice agenda.  It is also a substantive provision that must be incorporated 
into any piece of legislation affecting children in conflict with the law.   
 
This chapter looked at how each country undertook child law reform initiatives to 
bring their laws in accordance with the principles of the UNCRC and the ACRWC.  
Despite lengthy and consultative reform processes, more than half the countries under 
study failed to meet the MACR standards prescribed by the international instruments.  
Kenya, South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho and Malawi have inherited the doli incapax 
rule into their legal systems serving as a ‘protective mantle’ for young children in 
conflict with the law.  The CROC has argued that the retention of this rule is a 
violation of their treaty obligations as it leads to discriminatory practices.  Ethiopia 
and Zambia’s reliance on their Penal Code has also led to their failure to meet their 
treaty obligations.  Uganda, Ghana and the Gambia, Mozambique and Sierra Leone 
are the countries that have met their international treaty obligations through their legal 
reform processes. 
   
The next chapter critically analyses the two opposing views held by the SALRC and 
the CROC with regard to the MACR.  It provides an overview of the drafting history 
of South Africa’s Child Justice Bill and an in depth discussion on the development of 
the relevant MACR provisions since 2002.  Cogent arguments by the SALRC in 
favour of raising the MACR from 7 to 10 which falls below international standards set 
by the CROC in General Comment No. 10 will be documented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 4  
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SALCR CHILD JUSTICE BILL AND THE 
RECENT POSTION ADOPTED BY THE CROC IN GENERAL COMMENT 
NO. 10 ON THE MACR 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter is a critical appraisal of the arguments for and against raising the MACR 
in the South African legal system in light of the position in international law (set out 
in chapter 2).  A brief overview of the concept of criminal capacity in South Africa is 
provided and an explanation of how it works in practice.  It further examines the work 
of many academics involved in advocating juvenile justice reform; NGO’s views and 
the many other role players that have discussed and given comment on the issues 
around the MACR are also given.  Finally, this chapter it takes a more detailed look at 
the legislative process of the SALRC in formulating the Child Justice Bill and how it 
differs to or accords with that of the international perspective of the CROC.   
  
2. The concept of criminal capacity in South Africa 
Criminal capacity (in the context of children) refers to (1) a child’s mental ability to 
distinguish between right and wrong and to understand or appreciate the 
consequences involved (cognitive mental function) and (2) to act in accordance with 
such understanding or appreciation (conative mental function).1  The concept was 
                                               
1
 Rumpff Report (1967) ‘Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the responsibility of mentally 
deranged persons and related matters’ 72; Criminal Procedure Act 51 0f 1977 s78(1)(a) and (b); E 
Burchell & P Hunt (1997) ‘South Africa Criminal Law and Procedure.  Vol 1 General Principles of 
Criminal Law’ 153; C Snyman (2002) ‘Criminal Law’ 177, 178; J Burchell & J Milton (2005) 
‘Principles of Criminal Law’ 358. 
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derived from a mixture of civil law, Roman law and Germanic law.2 For a child to be 
held criminally liable for his or her unlawful act or omission both elements (1) and (2) 
need to be present.3  Thus, if one of the elements is lacking the child cannot be held 
criminally liable.  
 
In South Africa the concept of criminal capacity has been used synonymously with 
criminal accountability, criminal responsibility and imputability.4  This however, is 
not accurate as criminal capacity determines criminally responsibility.  It is the sine 
quo non for the proof of criminal responsibility.5  Before a child can be held 
responsible for his or her unlawful actions an inquiry into whether or not he or she 
had the requisite criminal capacity must first take place.  If the child is found to have 
criminal capacity then only can the child be held responsible (provided the other 
conditions for criminal liability are met).6  Similarly, if the child lacks the requisite 
criminal capacity then the child cannot be held criminally responsible.   
 
The cognitive and conative elements of criminal capacity are often misunderstood and 
as a result not adequately dealt with in practice.  The courts have accepted or are too 
easily satisfied with the prosecution simply providing evidence that indicates that the 
child knows the difference between right and wrong.7  The consequences of dealing 
                                               
2
 J Burchell & J Milton (2005) ‘Principles of Criminal Law’ 359. 
3
 C Snyman (2002) ‘Criminal Law’ 158; J Burchell & J Milton (2005) ‘Principles of Criminal Law’ 
358. 
4
 C Badenhorst (2006) ‘Criminal capacity of children’ (Unpublished LLD thesis) 38. 
5
 J Sloth-Nielsen (2001) ‘The role of international law in juvenile justice reform in South Africa’ 
(Unpublished LLD thesis) 131 fn 53. 
6
 Such as conduct, unlawfulness and mens rea.   
7
 C Badenhorst (2006) ‘Criminal capacity of children’ (Unpublished LLD thesis) 44. 
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with the elements in such an incomplete manner are three-fold.  The first problem that 
arises is that criminal capacity and awareness of unlawfulness are treated as one and 
the same.8  Yet these are two separate requirements for criminal liability.  Secondly, it 
only focuses on the child’s knowledge of wrongfulness of the conduct and not on the 
understanding of the nature and consequences of the conduct which is equally 
important.9  Finally, no mention is made of the conative function which is the child’s 
ability to act in accordance with the appreciation of the distinction between right and 
wrong.                 
 
3. Criminal capacity and the doli incapax presumption   
The youthfulness of a child often excludes criminal capacity.  It was laid down in the 
Corpus Iuris Civilis that children under 7 (infans) were exempted from criminal 
responsibility while children who had reached puberty (puberes) were not 
exempted.10  Puberty was assessed by the child’s physical development.  Currently in 
our law there is an irrebuttable presumption of doli incapax for children under the age 
of 7.11  This means that they lack criminal capacity and thus may never be prosecuted 
for any criminal conduct. For children between the ages of 7 and 14 there exists a 
rebuttable presumption of doli incapax.12  This means that children falling within the 
                                               
8
 C Snyman (2002) ‘Criminal Law’ 177, 178. 
9
 C Snyman (2002) ‘Criminal Law’ 177, 178. 
10
 J Burchell & J Milton (2005) ‘Principles of Criminal Law’ 364. 
11
 N Van Dokkum ‘Unwelcome assistance:  Parents testifying against their children’ (1994) 7(2) South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice 213; E Burchell & P Hunt (1997) ‘South Africa Criminal Law and 
Procedure.  Vol 1 General Principles of Criminal Law’ 159; J Burchell & J Milton (2005) ‘Principles 
of Criminal Law’ 364; A Skelton (2005) ‘The influence of the theory and practice of restorative justice 
in South Africa with special reference to child justice’ (Unpublished LLD Thesis) 322. 
12
 N Van Dokkum ‘Unwelcome assistance:  Parents testifying against their children’ (1994) 7(2) South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice 213; E Burchell & P Hunt (1997) ‘South Africa Criminal Law and 
Procedure.  Vol 1 General Principles of Criminal Law’ 159; J Burchell & J Milton (2005) ‘Principles 
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age group of 7 and 14 stand to be prosecuted if they possessed the requisite criminal 
capacity at the time of committing the alleged offence.  Children over the age of 14 
are presumed doli capax and are treated in the same manner as adults.13  Our common 
law presumptions found its origins in Roman law which forms the basis of South 
Africa’s legal system and several others in Southern Africa.14  The age of 7 represents 
one of the lowest MACR in the world.15  Many experts in the field of juvenile justice 
find this age unacceptably low and have varying opinions with regard to children 
between the ages of 7 and 14 being rebuttably presumed to lack criminal capacity.  
The 1924 case of Attorney-General, Transvaal v Additional Magistrate of 
Johannesburg16 confirms these presumptions obiter.17   
 
The prosecution is responsible for collecting and adducing sufficient evidence to rebut 
the presumption of doli incapax.  The burden of proof that is placed upon the 
                                                                                                                                      
of Criminal Law’ 364; A Skelton (2005) ‘The influence of the theory and practice of restorative justice 
in South Africa with special reference to child justice’ (Unpublished LLD Thesis) 322. 
13
 J Sloth-Nielsen (2001) ‘The role of international law in juvenile justice reform in South Africa’ 
(Unpublished LLD Thesis) 134.    
14
 J Sloth-Nielsen (2001) ‘The role of international law in juvenile justice reform in South Africa’ 
(Unpublished LLD Thesis) 130;  A Skelton (2005) ‘The influence of the theory and practice of 
restorative justice in South Africa with special reference to child justice’ (Unpublished LLD Thesis) 
321; GO Odongo (2008) ‘The Impact of International law on Children’s Rights on Juvenile Justice 
Law Reform in the African Context’ in Sloth-Nielsen, J (Ed) Children’s Rights in Africa:  A legal 
perspective 150 fn 6.   
15
 A Skelton (1996) ‘Developing a juvenile justice system for South Africa:  International instruments 
and restorative Justice’ Acta Juridica 180.  
16
 1924 A.D. 421. 
17
 At p 434 of the judgment the appeal court held that the law in South Africa has always been that a 
child under the age of 7 is conclusively doli incapax and the child between the ages 7 and 14 are 
presumed to be doli incapax, but this presumption ‘is rebuttable on proof of a malicious mind on the 
part of the child’.  This obiter remark is quoted in almost every case where the court has to establish or 
fails to establish criminal capacity of children between the ages of 7 and 14.  
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prosecution in rebutting the presumption is beyond a reasonable doubt.18  Establishing 
the presence of the cognitive mental function on its own is not sufficient to disprove 
the presumption.  Both functions must be present and all the circumstances of the case 
must be taken into account for the prosecution to rebut the presumption.  The closer 
the child is to 7 the harder it is for the prosecution to rebut the presumption.  The 
presumption however weakens the closer the child is to 14.19   
 
In rebutting the presumption our courts have been urged to avoid placing ‘an old head 
on young shoulders’ and should consider the child’s age, knowledge and the specific 
circumstances facing the child at the time of the commission of the offence.20  
Children very often act irrationally, impulsively, or succumb to peer-pressure 
forgetting what they have been taught and impervious of any consequences.  Section 
73(3) and 74 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that the prosecution may call 
upon the parent or guardian to accompany the child to court and to testify.21  The 
prosecution will ask the parent or guardian to confirm the child’s age and whether or 
not the child has been taught the difference between right and wrong and was able to 
distinguish between the two at the time the alleged offence occurred.  Parents and 
guardians are often misled by this unfair practice of the prosecution calling them to 
                                               
18
 M Johnson & F Chambers (1999) ‘The criminal capacity of children’.  Available at  
http://www.legalaid.nsw.gov.au/data/portal/00000005/public/05324001132028174843.doc [accessed 
30 October 2008]. 
19
 J Sloth-Nielsen (2001) ‘The role of international law in juvenile justice reform in South Africa’ 
(Unpublished LLD Thesis) 133.    
M Johnson & F Chambers (1999) ‘The criminal capacity of children’.  Available at 
http://www.legalaid.nsw.gov.au/data/portal/00000005/public/05324001132028174843.doc [accessed 
30 October 2008].   
20
 E Burchell & P Hunt (1997) ‘South African Criminal Law and Procedure.  Vol 1 General Principles 
of Criminal Law’ 153, 160. 
21
 Act 51 of 1977. 
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testify.22  They believe that they are providing mitigating evidence in favour of their 
children.  Instead the prosecution uses such evidence as confirmation that the child in 
question did in fact possess criminal capacity at the time the offence was committed.  
It is my submission that the prosecution should avoid the practice of calling parents or 
guardians and should rather call upon teachers, probation officers or psychologists to 
assist in proving criminal capacity.23    
 
4. Case law illustrations of the doli incapax presumption in practice     
In R v K24 a 13 year old boy was charged with the murder of his mother.  The child’s 
mother was mentally unstable and often had violent outbursts.  On the day in 
question, the mother had a violent episode and chased the accused with a plank.  The 
sister of the accused testified that there was a struggle.  Her mother fell down and her 
brother ran away.  Consequently the mother died of a knife wound.  The father 
testified that his son owned a pocket knife, knew the difference between right and 
wrong, and thought that his son could appreciate that a knife is a dangerous weapon.  
The court a quo held that the Crown had to show that the accused knew what the 
reasonable and possible consequences of his act would be.25  The court a quo found 
that the Crown had discharged its onus and the child was convicted.  On review the 
conviction was set aside on the basis that it had not been proven beyond a reasonable 
                                               
22
 N Van Dokkum ‘Unwelcome assistance:  Parents testifying against their children’ (1994) 7(2) South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice 214; M Johnson & F Chambers (1999) ‘The criminal capacity of 
children’.  Available at 
http://www.legalaid.nsw.gov.au/data/portal/00000005/public/05324001132028174843.doc [accessed 
30 October 2008].  Johnson and Chambers refer to this procedure of the prosecutor calling upon 
parents as an ambush tactic. 
23
 N Van Dokkum ‘Unwelcome assistance:  Parents testifying against their children’ (1994) 7(2) South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice 219. 
24
 1956 (3) SA 353 (A). 
25
 R v K 1956 (3) SA 353 (A) at 357 para G – H. 
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doubt that the accused was doli capax and that his actions exceeded the grounds of 
self-defence.26  The court reasoned that the Crown did not prove that the child was 
aware that his use of his pocket knife was a wrongful act, rather it was to defend 
himself against his mother’s violent outburst.  The act of running away and not 
returning could be explained by the fact that he feared his mother may have been 
waiting for him to finish off what she had started. 
       
In R v Tsutsu27 a 10 year old was convicted of culpable homicide based on the 
testimony of one eye witness who was the wife of the victim.  The victim had a fight 
with the accused’s father.  Shortly after the fight the accused was charged with 
culpable homicide.  The magistrate was faced with the question of motive.  He could 
not determine with certainty whether the accused killed the victim out of revenge or 
because he thought it was his duty to protect his father’s honour.  He averred that the 
accused must have had the knowledge that a knife is a dangerous object and that using 
it to stab someone would cause great harm to that person.  The magistrate interpreted 
the accused’s act of running away as a sign that the accused knew what he had done 
was wrong.  The matter went on review and the review court held that running away 
from the scene does not necessarily constitute an admission of guilt.  It could be 
explained as the boy being frightened.28  The doctor who examined the accused after 
the incident provided evidence that the boy showed no signs that he fully appreciated 
the seriousness of the allegations against him.  Upon closer consideration of the facts 
the court was of the opinion that the Crown had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
                                               
26
 R v K 1956 (3) SA 353 (A) at 359 para E – F. 
27
 1962 (2) SA 666 (SR). 
28
 R v Tsutso (2) 1962 SA 666 (SR) at 668 para C – D. 
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that the child was mature enough to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct.29  
Thus his conviction and sentence were set aside.            
 
In S v Van Dyk and Others30 an 11 year old and two adults were found guilty of 
housebreaking with the intent to commit another offence unknown to the State.  The 
11 year old was sentenced to three strokes with a cane.  The case went on automatic 
review because of the sentence imposed upon the first accused.  The magistrate who 
adjudicated the matter was asked to provide reasons for the conviction and sentence 
imposed upon the child.  The review court was swayed by the age of the child as there 
was a presumption that he was doli incapax and thus he may not fully understand the 
wrongfulness of his actions.31   A further mitigating factor in favour of the child was 
that the other two perpetrators were adults who may have had a hand in influencing 
and possibly even coercing the child to partake in their criminal acts.32  The court 
belaboured the point that where a matter involves a child between the ages of 7 and 
14, the prosecution has a duty to rebut the presumption before convicting such a child.  
Even in circumstances where the child pleaded guilty to the offence the prosecution is 
still under a duty to rebut the presumption before conviction.        
 
The case of S v S33 involved a 13 year old boy accused of committing the crime of 
sodomy.  He was convicted of attempt to commit sodomy because at the time he 
committed the crime he was 13 years, 4 months and 16 days old.  The court laid down 
the rule of law that children under the age of 7 are irrebuttably presumed doli incapax 
                                               
29
 R v Tsutso (2) 1962 SA 666 (SR) at 668 para H. 
30
 1969 (1) SA 601 (CPD). 
31
 S v Van Dyk and Others 1969 (1) SA 601 (CPD) at 602 para F – G. 
32
 S v Van Dyk and Others 1969 (1) SA 601 (CPD) at 603 para D – G.  
33
 1977 (3) SA 305 (OPA). 
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and children between 7 and 14 are presumed to be doli incapax.34  It was argued that a 
boy under the age of 14 could not be convicted of rape and thus by analogy neither 
could he be convicted of sodomy.35  The accused pleaded guilty and admitted to 
having intercourse with the victim.  He testified that he waited for the other children 
to go home before having intercourse with the victim because he feared that they may 
tell the adults.  He told the court that he knew what he was doing was wrong and that 
he would get a hiding if the adults found out.  The review court was satisfied that the 
State had successfully rebutted the presumption as it was clear from his testimony that 
he planned the offence and knew what he was doing was wrong because he feared the 
punishment.           
 
The decision of S v M and Others36 dealt with three accused charged with stock theft.  
The first accused was the mother of the second and third accused who were 8 and 7 
years old.  All three accused were found guilty of stock theft.  Accused two and three 
were convicted and sentenced to a juvenile whipping.  The nature of such punishment 
was not one that ordinarily went on automatic review.  The review court held that 
accused two and three were improperly convicted and sentenced and the courts are 
obliged to intervene when the conviction and sentence are not in accordance with the 
aims of justice.37  Section 25 of the Transkeian Penal Code codifies the common law 
doli incapax presumption.  It states that children under the age of 7 cannot be 
convicted of any offence.  Neither can children over 7 but under 14, unless it can be 
proven that at the time of the offence, he or she had sufficient intelligence to know 
                                               
34
 S v S 1977 (3) SA 305 (OPA) at 306 para F – G which cites the obiter remark in Attorney-General, 
Transvaal v Additional Magistrate for Johannesburg, 1924 A.D. 421 at 434.  
35
 S v S 1977 (3) SA 305 (OPA) at 307 para E – H.  
36
 1978 (3) SA 557 (TKSC). 
37
 S v M and Others 1978 (3) SA 557 (TKSC) at 558 para A – B. 
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what the nature and consequences would be or to appreciate the wrongfulness of the 
conduct.38  The matter was correctly heard in camera which was in accordance with 
the Criminal Procedure Act.39  However, upon consideration of their sentence the 
prosecutor alerted the court from the charge sheet that the accused were both juveniles 
aged 8 and 7 respectively.  The court referred to R v K40 and R v Tsutso41 as precedent 
that the onus is on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that accused two and 
three had a sufficiently mature mind at the time of the offence to understand what 
they were doing was wrong.  No further evidence relating to the age of the two 
accused was conducted by the State.  The State did not ask the magistrate to make any 
estimation as to their age nor did they question the mother of the two accused in 
relation to their age when she elected to testify on their behalf.  The States case was 
defective and they were not successful in discharging their onus.  The mother (first 
accused) testified that she instructed the boys to slaughter any sheep.  The children 
testified to the same evidence in their statements.  The review court held that where 
children below or over the age of 14 acted upon the instructions of an older person, 
especially a parent, such children cannot be said to have understood or appreciated the 
wrongfulness of their conduct.  In such circumstances children should be excused 
from criminal liability.42  Both the conviction and sentence of accused two and three 
was set aside. 
 
                                               
38
 Transkeian Penal Code Act 24 of 1955. 
39
 Section 156(5), Act 56 of 1955. 
40
 1956 (3) SA 353 (A) at 356 para E – H.  
41
 1962 (2) SA 666 (SR) at 668 para F and H. 
42
 S v M and Others 1978 (3) SA 557 at 559 para G –H.  
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In S v Pietersen and Others,43 three accused were charged with housebreaking with 
the intent to steal and theft.  The first accused was 18 and accused two and three were 
both 9 years old.  All three pleaded guilty to the charge and were questioned in 
accordance with s112(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act.44  The magistrate 
questioned each accused to ascertain whether each of them knew that what they were 
doing was wrong when they broke into the house and stole property that did not 
belong to them.  Each accused answered that they were aware that what they were 
doing was wrong.  The prosecutor called upon the second and third accused’s parents 
to testify that they had taught their children the difference between right and wrong 
and that they were punished when they did something wrong or naughty.  The parents 
affirmed that their children knew that breaking into someone’s house and stealing 
their possessions was wrong.  The father of the second accused further testified that 
his child was 8 years old at the time of the offence.  On the basis of the magistrate’s 
questioning and the testimony provided by the parents the court found that both 
accused two and three were doli capax.  Thus all three accused were found guilty as 
charged.  Before sentencing the matter went on review.   
 
The review court found that the magistrate erred in finding the second and third 
accused doli capax.  The circumstances under which a child between the ages of 7 and 
14 commits an offence with an adult or an appreciably older youth must be 
investigated before a magistrate can find the child to be doli capax.45  Furthermore, 
the prosecuting authorities need to take congnisance of the fact that when charging 
children under the age of 14 together with adults or older youth, they are responsible 
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 1983 (4) 904 (ECD). 
44
 Act 51 of 1977. 
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 S v Pietersen and Others 1983 (4) 904 (ECD) at 910 F – G. 
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for discharging the onus that the child knew what he or she was doing was wrongful 
and that he or she acted out of his/her own free will and was not coerced or influenced 
by the older co-accused.  Despite the plea of guilty in terms of s112(1)(b) and the 
testimony of the parents of the accused, the questioning magistrate and the prosecutor 
did not inquire into the presence of the first accused who was 18 at the time the 
offence was committed.46  The review court was of the opinion that the first accused’s 
actions and presence during the commission of the offence strongly suggested that he 
may have coerced, influenced or persuaded them into joining him.47  Neither the 
questioning magistrate nor the prosecutor investigated whether the first accused had 
played a role in influencing the second and third accused.  The matter was sent back 
to the magistrates’ court with the instruction that the magistrate enter a plea of not 
guilty in terms of s113 of the Criminal Procedure Act for the second and third 
accused.48  
 
In the matter of S v Mbanda and Others,49 three boys were charged and convicted of 
burglary and theft of cakes and sweets.  Two of the boys were aged 11 and 12 and 
welfare reports submitted into evidence indicated that the boys lived on the streets.  
Upon review, the court found that neither the 11 nor 12 year old was doli capax.  The 
State had not been successful in rebutting the presumption on the grounds that the 11 
year old was asked only whether he knew it was wrong to break into a place and to 
take property that did not belong to him.  A previous postponed sentence against the 
11 year old was also submitted into evidence in an attempt to strengthen the State’s 
                                               
46
 S v Pietersen and Others 1983 (4) 904 (ECD) at 909 B – C. 
47
 S v Pietersen and Others 1983 (4) 904 (ECD) at 910 G – H. 
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case.  The State further submitted that the one year age gap between the two accused 
assisted in proving that 12 year old was also doli capax.  The review court rejected the 
evidence put forward by the State as insufficient to rebut the presumption and lacking 
in establishing whether the third accused (an older boy) coerced or influenced them 
into participating in the offence.   
 
In S v Ngobese and Others50 the court had to deal with three children charged and 
convicted of housebreaking, attempt to steal and theft.  One of the children was aged 
13 and the other two were 14 at the time of the commission of the offence.  The 
matter went on special review because the court was of the opinion that the 13 year 
old (the second accused) should have been presumed doli incapax and that his 
sentence was too severe.  The State never raised the issue of capacity other than 
submitting that when all three accused were confronted by the complainant they ran 
away.  The State conceded that their behaviour was indicative of children who knew 
that their conduct was wrongful and contended that that was sufficient in rebutting the 
presumption.51  The court reiterated the common law position and held that if the 
State wanted to be successful in discharging its onus it had to prove that: (1) ‘The 
particular accused has been shown to have appreciated the distinction between right 
and wrong and (2) that he or she knew the act which had been committed by him or 
her was wrong within the context of the facts of the particular case’.52  The precise 
age and the nature of the crime itself are factors which may weaken the presumption 
the closer the child is to 14 and the severity of the act.53  In looking at the facts of this 
                                               
50
 2002 (1) SACR 562. 
51
 S v Ngobese and Others 2002 (1) SACR 562 at 563 para d. 
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 S v Ngobese and Others 2002 (1) SACR 562 at 564 para h – j.  
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particular case there was nothing in the evidence that suggested that the State had 
tried to prove that the 13 year old was doli capax.  The evidence only related to his 
actions at the time of the offence and not his state of mind or his capacity to act in the 
manner that he did.54  The State completely ignored the conative element of the 
child’s capacity to resist temptation.  Finally, the State did not investigate the fact that 
13 year old was accompanied by two older boys who may have influenced him to 
partake in the commission of the offence.  The State failed in discharging its onus of 
rebutting the presumption beyond a reasonable doubt and thus the child’s sentence 
and conviction was set aside.    
 
5. Assessing the doli incapax presumption  
The presumption was set out in an obiter remark in Attorney-General, Transvaal v 
Additional Magistrate of Johannesburg55 and it offered persuasive force in the cases 
that followed.  In S v Van Dyk and Others56 and S v Pietersen and Others57 the courts 
extended the de facto reach of the doli incapax presumption when adults were 
involved in the commission of the offence.  The court held that where children were 
acting under the coercion or influence of an adult person such children could not be 
doli capax even if it appears that they appreciated the wrongfulness of their conduct.58  
This reasoning was taken further in S v M and Others59 when the learned judge Rose-
Innes averred that whether the child is below or over the age of 14, if such a child was 
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55
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56
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given an instruction by an adult or a parent and the child acted in obedience with that 
instruction then in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, such child cannot be 
doli capax.60  It is doubtful whether the child can fully understand or can appreciate 
the wrongfulness of his or her conduct as he or she is simply carrying out an 
instruction by someone who they believe would never instruct them to do something 
wicked or wrong. 61   
 
Van Oosten and Louw submit that in S v Mbanda62 the court deviated from the 
original test of criminal capacity by adding more criteria for children between the 
ages of 7 and 14.  The additional criteria set by the courts are as follows: 
(i) ‘Was the accused, at the time of the perpetration of the alleged crime, aware of the 
fact that he or she acted in contravention of the law or was he or she aware of such a 
possibility?;  (ii) could the accused, at the time of the alleged perpetration of the 
crime, control his or her conduct?; and (iii) did the accused intend the consequences 
of his or her act or did he or she foresee the consequences as a possibility but acted 
notwithstanding such foresight?’63  They argue that the added criteria nevertheless fail 
to recognise the cognitive element of whether the child is able to distinguish between 
right and wrong and to understand or appreciate the consequences involved.64  I agree 
with the argument put forward by Van Oosten and Louw that these additional criteria 
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 1978 (3) SA 557 (TKSC) at 559 para G – H. 
61
 S v M and Others 1978 (3) SA 557 (TKSC) at 559 para G – H; S v Pietersen and Others 1983 (4) 
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 1986 (2) PHH 108 (T). 
63
 F Van Oosten & A Louw (1997) ‘The Law of Children and Young Persons in South Africa:  
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children’ (Unpublished LLD thesis) 60, 61. 
64
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lack the cognitive element and submit further that it confuses and complicates the test 
of criminal capacity.  In S v Ngobese and Others65 the court lists four factors for the 
State to prove when discharging its onus.66  I submit that even though the conative 
element gets lost in the decision the four factors set out by the review judge is far 
more easy to follow than those set out in S v Mbanda.67 
 
The case law discussion illustrates that the presumption available to child offenders 
between the ages of 7 and 14 is often inadequately applied and understood by our 
courts.  Even though the concept of criminal capacity and the presumption has long 
been part of our legal system there is still no uniformity in its application.68  Firstly, 
our lower courts are easily satisfied with the State proving only one of the elements of 
criminal capacity, instead of both elements, in discharging its onus.  Parents are still 
called on behalf of the State to help prove their children’s criminal capacity.  
However, they only testify to the fact that they have taught their children the 
difference between right and wrong, proving only the first part of the test.69  This was 
clearly illustrated in the cases of R v K70 and S v Pietersen and Others.71  Secondly, 
our courts do not spend sufficient time on the inquiry that would establish a child’s 
criminal capacity.  Simply asking a child whether he or she understands the offence 
and the consequences thereof is not enough to prove criminal capacity.  Thirdly, when 
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a child pleads guilty to a particular offence, criminal capacity seems to become a ‘non 
issue’.  The inquiring magistrate often does not inquire into the child’s criminal 
capacity as it is easily assumed that the child must have had the capacity to carry out 
the offence.  This was illustrated in the case of S v Pietersen and Others.72  Finally, it 
is questionable whether it is possible for a child under the age of 14 to plead guilty to 
an offence prior to an inquiry which assesses the child’s criminal capacity. 
 
Ann Skelton is one of the experts who are of the opinion that the age of 7 is too low 
and that the presumption is too easily rebutted.  She argues in favour of adopting a 
balanced approached when considering an appropriate MACR, coupled with better 
safeguards to make the presumption a little harder to rebut.  In making the 
presumption a little more challenging to rebut, the State can lead expert testimony or 
if the child has a legal representative, the representative can make appropriate 
submissions on the child’s behalf.73  Those who favour the age of 7 as the MACR 
argue that one of the aims of juvenile justice is not to make children untouchable, but 
to hold them accountable and responsible for their actions.74  There is another 
argument favoured by Labuschagne and Badenhorst that opposes chronological age 
altogether, known as the individualised approach.75  This approach focuses on the 
specific offender’s intellectual abilities.  In theory a child of any age is capable of 
being criminally liable.  However, liability should only ensue if the child is aware of 
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the unlawfulness of the act at the time of committing the act, had the ability to control 
his or her actions and he or she intended the consequences.76  Labuschagne argues 
that age limits are arbitrary and at most should only serve as guidelines in determining 
criminal liability.77            
    
According the SALRC the rebuttable presumption was designed to protect children 
between the ages of 7 and 14.78  However instead of serving as a protection it 
sometimes serves as a legal impediment for young people by reason of the courts 
being far too hasty in permitting its rebuttal.79  For example, mothers who testify on 
behalf of their children confirming that they were taught the difference between right 
and wrong is often considered sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption.  Dealing 
with the presumption in this manner indicates that the courts are merely paying lip-
service to the test of criminal capacity.80   
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The doli incapax presumption has long been a cause for concern in light of its over-
simplification and unsatisfactory application. Additional safeguards need to be 
undertaken (such as expert testimony by a professional but only where prosecution is 
warranted to proceed to plea and trial, training of probation officers, guidelines for 
dealing with children over 10 but below 14 and setting up a database of experts to 
conduct evaluations and assessments of capacity where the need arises) if the 
presumption is to be preserved.81  Without these safeguards the protections offered by 
the presumption will be an illusion rather than a reality.  The SALRC proposed that a 
separate piece of legislation dealing specifically dedicated to child justice issues 
should set out specific steps in preparation for rebuttal.82   
     
6. The need for separate legislation governing children in conflict with the law   
South Africa and a few of the African countries under study have opted for separate 
legislation governing children in conflict with the law.83  The reasons put forward by 
the writer are specifically in the context of South Africa, but the same principles 
would apply in the other African countries under study that share the same system or 
subscribe to the doli incapax presumption.84   
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Firstly, s28 of the Constitution governs the rights for children by providing certain 
guarantees for them.85  In sub-section (2) it provides that ‘a child’s best interests are 
of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child’.  Yet often in reality 
when children find themselves in conflict with the law our current legislation does not 
allow this constitutional obligation to hold true, especially in relation to the MACR.  
Sub-section (1)(g) provides that detention should be as a measure of last resort and for 
the shortest possible time.  If children are detained, they must be kept separate from 
persons over the age of 18 and treated in a manner consistent with their age.  The 
Criminal Procedure Act is not equipped to carry out the aims of s28(1)(g) and (2).86  
Enactment of a separate piece of legislation, such as the Child Justice Bill, that caters 
only for children in conflict with the law and their needs will equip South Africa with 
the necessary legislative frameworks to make these Constitutional guarantees a 
reality. 
 
Secondly, separate legislation for such children is necessary for South Africa to meet 
its international obligations.87  South Africa has ratified both the UNCRC and the 
ACRWC.  As a States Party to these treaties it is obligated to ensure that its domestic 
                                                                                                                                      
subscribe to the doli incapax rule, although as indicated in Chapter 3 see 3.1 , Uganda has since 
abolished the rule through legal reform.  See The African Child Policy Forum (2007) ‘Realising rights 
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laws is in compliance with the relevant articles.  South Africa would also need to 
comply with other non-binding human rights treaties available for the protection of 
children in conflict with the law.  The Bill provides mechanisms for South Africa to 
meet these obligations and to deal with children in a manner consistent with their 
age.88 
 
Finally, separate legislation for such children provides for certainty, consistency and 
fairness in criminal justice practice.  We have already implemented some of the 
procedures available in the Bill.89  The Bill (at the time of writing) has only been 
passed by the National Assembly and not yet formally enacted into legislation thus we 
face the looming danger of inconsistencies, uncertainty and treating children in 
conflict with the law unfairly and inappropriately. 
 
6.1 The emergence of the Child Justice Bill  
When South Africa ratified the UNCRC in 1995 it bound itself as a State Party to 
carry out the mandate of the convention.  In terms of article 40(3), South Africa has 
undertaken to establish separate laws, procedures, authorities and institutions for 
children in conflict with the law.  It must also establish ‘a minimum age below which 
children shall be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law’ which is 
                                               
88
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central to the discussions that follow.90  South Africa must endeavour to achieve the 
directives set out in Article 40 ‘in a manner that is consistent with promoting the 
child’s sense of dignity and worth, which reinforces the child’s respect for the human 
rights and fundamental freedoms of others and which takes into account the child’s 
age and the desirability of promoting the child’s reintegration and the child’s 
assuming a constructive role in society’.91   
 
In 1996, the Minister of Justice appointed a Project Committee on Juvenile Justice to 
head the reform process.92  The Committee was tasked with investigating proposals 
for law reform.  The process officially commenced in 1997 with an Issue Paper 
proposing the drafting of a separate bill.93  The Issue Paper was highly consultative 
between government and members of civil society.  At the end of 1998 a Discussion 
Paper containing concrete proposals and a draft Child Justice Bill was published.94  
The draft Bill characterised a new justice system for children in conflict with the law 
providing for substantive law, procedures and the general administration of juvenile 
justice.  The Discussion Paper was followed by a wide consultation process which 
included workshops, seminars, briefings, questionnaires, written and oral submissions 
to mention but a few.  In July 2000, a comprehensive Report on Juvenile Justice 
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followed the Discussion Paper marking the end of the structured consultation 
process.95 
 
7. The issue of the MACR and the draft proposals  
7.1 The Issue Paper 
The Issue Paper placed the issued of criminal capacity on the agenda for review.  It 
highlighted the fact that South Africa’s MACR began at the very low age of 7 and 
that, contrary to public opinion, the practical application of the doli incapax 
presumption did not present an impediment to children because it is too easily 
rebutted.96  Secondly, it was suggested that the MACR should be raised in accordance 
with South Africa’s international treaty obligations without prejudicing the 
administration of justice.  Several options were put forward, such as retaining the doli 
incapax presumption but adding additional safeguards, increasing the MACR (with or 
without the presumption), establishing a fixed minimum age or abolishing the 
presumption altogether.97  A noteworthy inclusion to the Issue Paper was that setting a 
higher minimum age meant that children who committed offences but were below this 
                                               
95
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higher minimum age could not be held criminally liable.  Thus such children had to be 
dealt with under the welfare system.98      
  
7.2 The Discussion Paper   
The problems relating to establishing a new MACR was one of the most controversial 
issues up for debate in the Discussion Paper.  The Project Committee requested an 
explanation and a report detailing the research that supported an increase of the 
common law minimum age set at 7.  The Committee identified three possible options 
to the issue of MACR which are very much based on the options mooted in the Issue 
Paper.  The first option was to retain the common law position (but raise the lower 
age of 7 to 10) as well as providing for additional safeguards to protect children.99  
The second option was to do away with the common law presumption and set a 
minimum age of prosecution which was not directly related to the child’s criminal 
capacity.100  Finally, the third option was setting a dual minimum age of prosecution 
which meant setting a general minimum age and exceptions when that general age 
would not apply.101  The most favoured option was the first one of retaining the 
common law presumption and raising the lower age of 7 to 10 which was inserted into 
the provisions of the Child Justice Bill.102   
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A seminar conducted in May 1999 at the Centre for Child Law of the University of 
Pretoria saw the coming together of local and international participants to debate the 
MACR issue quandary facing the Project Committee.103  They discussed the present 
presumption which is afforded to children between the ages of 7 and 14.104  Many of 
the participants were of the opinion that the presumption served as a ‘protective 
mantle’ for children in theory but not in reality.  Despite the feeling that the 
presumption only works in theory, the participants were nevertheless reluctant to 
depart from the presumption because of ‘psychological and anthropological evidence 
that children mature at different rates especially in a country as culturally diverse as 
ours’.105  They discussed some practical options for the assessment of criminal 
capacity, such as the requirement of expert evidence, the practice of employing a 
probation officer to carry out the preliminary screening of children alleged of 
committing an offence and the procedure of the DPP issuing a certificate (where 
children face prosecution) to limit expensive expert evidence to only the most serious 
cases.106  The majority of the participants held in favour of raising the MACR and that 
children below the age of 10 should not be prosecuted.107      
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7.3 The Report 
The Report proposed that our present common law presumption (operating in favour 
for children between the ages of 7 and 14) be repealed and be replaced with the age 
limits of 10 and 14.  This meant that the MACR would be raised from 7 to 10 years 
old and that child below the age of 10 cannot be prosecuted.108  Children between the 
ages of 10 but not yet 14 ought to be presumed to lack criminal capacity.  The 
advantage of this approach was that the presumption operated automatically by virtue 
of the child being a certain age (10 – 14), thereby providing a ‘protective cloak’.109  It 
was further argued that the presumption recognised the need for younger children to 
be treated differently to older children, and that it allowed flexibility in focusing on 
the individual child.110     
 
The SALRC considered the effects of abolishing the presumption and held that it 
would have a negative effect in a culturally and ethically diverse country like South 
Africa.  Children’s experiences of maturity and mental development differ from one 
area to another and if the presumption were to be removed it may lead to 
indiscriminate prosecution.111  Even if the MACR was raised higher than 10 years old 
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the removal of the presumption would lead to a case of substantive inequality between 
children within the same age group because of differing maturing rates.112 
 
Establishing support for the upper age of the presumption set at 14 years old proved 
slightly more difficult.  The Report however found in favour of evidence put forward 
by Ms P Jana113 that 14 would be a suitable cut off age for the presumption to cease.  
She provided that children under the age of 14 found court proceedings intimidating 
and too technical to understand.  Children often had difficulties understanding the 
language and lost concentration. The power imbalance between lawyers and children 
further inhibited their ability to provide their lawyers with clear instructions. This was 
supported by the proposition that children under the age of 14 were in need of the 
procedural safeguards offered by the presumption.   
 
The Report considered the argument that the presumption works in theory but not in 
practice because of its incorrect application in the past, viz calling upon parents to 
testify whether they had taught their children between right and wrong.  The SALRC 
offered the safeguard of expert evidence which is currently not a requirement in 
considering the criminal capacity of child.  They also provided statistical evidence 
that few children under the age of 13 where either prosecuted or serving a term of 
imprisonment for criminal offences.114  The Discussion Paper also provided statistical 
                                               
112
 SALRC (2000) ‘Juvenile justice report’. Project 106 para 3.12.  Available at 
http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj106_juvjus_2000%20jul.pdf [accessed 06 October 2008]. 
113
 Member of Parliament responsible for the defence of children arrested for political crimes during 
the apartheid era.  SALRC (2000) ‘Juvenile justice report’. Project 106 para 3.23 and 3.24.  Available 
at http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj106_juvjus_2000%20jul.pdf [accessed 06 October 2008].   
114
 SALRC (2000) ‘Juvenile justice report’. Project 106 para 3.25.  Available at 
http://www.doj.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj106_juvjus_2000%20jul.pdf [accessed 06 October 2008].   
 
 
 
 
 153 
evidence in this regard for children under the age of 14.115  Thus the argument that the 
presumption does not provide a ‘protective cloak’ was not convincing at the level of 
prosecutorial practice.     
 
Paragraphs 3.27 and 3.28 of the Report provided for additional safeguards that needed 
to be factored into legislation to ensure that the presumption in fact served as a 
protection for children (rather than an impediment) and was applied correctly.  The 
safeguards were the same as those advocated for at the 1999 seminar at the Centre for 
Child Law with a few add-ons, such as, guidelines for dealing with children over 10 
but below 14 and setting up a database of experts to conduct evaluations and 
assessments of capacity where the need arises. 
 
Finally, children below the MACR who find themselves in conflict with the law are 
also catered for in the provisions of the legislation proposed by the SALRC.  The 
Report sets out procedures that will address their social behaviour, links with 
organised crime or the exploitation by others in the commission of offences.116  These 
children were to have access to counselling, social and reintegration services in 
accodance with the child care and protection system.    
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8. The Child Justice Bill (2002 version)  
The Child Justice Bill developed by the SALRC was tabled before Parliament in 
August 2002.  Public hearings were hosted in February 2003 and deliberations by the 
Portfolio Committee followed in March.117  Section 5 of 2002 Bill set out the 
provisions dealing with criminal capacity while s56 provided for the establishment of 
criminal capacity.118  The provisions of the Bill increased the MACR from 7 to 10 
years old while retaining the doli incapax presumption for children between the ages 
of 10 and 14 and concretizing these in legislature format as opposed to it being a 
common law rule.119 
 
Section 5(1) provides for an irrebuttable presumption in favour of children below the 
age of 10 that they lack criminal capacity and as a result can never be prosecuted.   
Section 5(2) provides for a presumption in favour of children between the ages of 10 
and 14 that they lack criminal capacity.  This latter presumption is a rebuttable one 
and the State is charged with the duty of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a 
child between the ages of 10 and 14 had criminal capacity at the time he or she 
contravened the law.120  When establishing the criminal capacity of children between 
the ages of 10 and 14, the State and the child’s legal representative can rely on s 56 
for guidance.  In terms of this section, the prosecutor or the child’s legal 
representative may request that an evaluation of the cognitive, emotional, 
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psychological and social development of the child be conducted by a suitably 
qualified person and at the expense of the state.  The evaluator must furnish the child 
justice court with a written report within 30 days of conducting the evaluation and 
may further be requested to give oral testimony in support of his or her findings.  It 
has been submitted by professionals in the field of children’s rights and criminal 
justice that the evaluation be conducted before the child has to appear before the 
court.121  I am of the opinion that conducting the evaluation first would be in the best 
interest of the child as it would keep the child from unnecessarily being exposed to 
the criminal justice system if the evaluation shows that the child lacks criminal 
capacity.  The insertion of s5(3) – (5) strengthens the presumption of incapacity and 
discourages the State from careless prosecution.122        
             
In 2003, experts in the field of children’s rights and other interested bodies made 
submissions to the Committee.123  Professor J. Sloth-Nielsen made a submission to 
the Portfolio Committee indicating her support for the increase of the MACR from 7 
to 10 years old and urged the Committee to do the same.  She submitted that since 
South Africa became a party to the UNCRC, regularly reviewing the MACR and 
raising it if it were set too low, was part of its obligations under the UNCRC.124  After 
the ASLCR examined the low minimum age and taking into account children’s 
                                               
121
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122
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growth and development patterns, the MACR was raised from 7 to 10 years old.  Yet, 
at international level, the age of 10 was still to be one of the lowest age minimums in 
the world.  It was argued that retaining the rebuttable presumption of doli incapax for 
children between the ages of 10 and 14 will serve as a protection for children falling 
in this age category.  It would also be apt for a country such as South Africa, where 
children experience childhood differently because of our diverse cultural and ethnic 
population.125   
 
The Child Justice Alliance made their submission to the Portfolio Committee on the 
26 February 2003.  The Alliance supported the raised minimum age of 10 years old 
and the retention of the rebuttable presumption for children between the ages of 10 
and 14.126  It was submitted that setting a minimum age is no easy task.  The UNCRC 
and the Beijing Rules attempt to guide States Parties on setting a minimum age but 
neither treaty provides a specified age.127  According to the Child Justice Alliance 
another guiding factor in determining a suitable minimum age is the critical attitude of 
the CROC towards countries who set their minimum ages below 10.128  
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The National Institute for Crime Prevention and Reintegration of Offenders (NICRO) 
furnished their unanimous support for the increase of the minimum age to 10 and the 
retention of the rebuttable presumption in their submission to the Committee.129  The 
organisation was of the view that the age of 10 was in accordance with their 
experience as practitioners in child development and the practicalities associated with 
the commission of the offences at national level.  NICRO highlighted that the age of 
10 would be the lowest minimum age accepted by international bodies such as CROC.  
Some of their provincial offices, however, indicated a preference for a higher 
minimum age in light of recent criticisms by the CROC of countries setting their 
minimum ages as low as 10.   
 
NICRO further submitted that the rebuttable presumption was an excellent 
mechanism for proving criminal capacity or the lack thereof.  However, the 
organisation wished to address the availability of other existing options.  The option 
of diversion was available for children under the age of 14.  These programmes were 
much more economical than prosecution and are aimed at those children who commit 
petty offences.130  Finally, NICRO noted that the Bill was silent on any procedure that 
should be followed when children below the minimum age of 10 commit offences.  
This omission must be addressed by Parliament to incorporate some non-punitive 
measures for these children, they argued.131  
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The Open Society Foundation acknowledged that South Africa was amongst one of 
the few countries that still adhered to a minimum age of 7.  Section 5(1) of the Bill 
was welcomed by the Foundation for two reasons.  Firstly, it was forward looking for 
the prosecution services in reducing the burden placed upon them in rebutting the 
presumption and secondly, it would strengthen the family preservation approach 
through intervention with young children.132  The Foundation did, however, express 
its concern that the Bill was silent on any procedures that could be followed when 
children below the proposed new minimum age committed offences.  It submitted that 
a section devoted to outlining the role of the Children’s Court in such circumstances 
should be included.133        
                             
9. The international perspective on South Africa’s draft legislation 
In response to South Africa’s initial report, the CROC commented on the Child 
Justice Bill No.49 of 2002 in its concluding observations.134  It noted with 
appreciation the draft legislation which increased the legal MACR to 10.  However, it 
recommended that South Africa as a States Party reassess their proposed new 
minimum age with a view to increasing it.135  The CROC did not provide any further 
guidance as to what an appropriate proposed minimum age would be.  In 2003, the 
Portfolio Committee deliberations on the Bill were sporadic and by 2005, the Minister 
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of Justice and Constitutional Development indicated that the Bill was still pending 
before the Committee.136   
 
Since the Bill was deliberated in Parliament in 2003 significant developments on the 
domestic and international fronts have taken place.  Chapter 3 details the 
developments across Africa with specific focus on the countries under study and child 
justice law reform.  One of the most noteworthy developments in international law 
was the CROC’s General Comment No. 10 release in February 2007 (discussed in 
chapter 2).  The CROC elaborated on children’s rights in juvenile justice but most 
notably took a firm stance on the issue relating to the MACR.  In light of varying 
MACR’s, the CROC sets the minimum age at 12 but States Parties are urged to raise 
it where possible.137     
 
10. The Child Justice Bill (2007 Cabinet version)    
A revised Child Justice Bill (Cabinet Version)138 came under the spotlight earlier this 
year, in 2008, when it was tabled before Parliament.  The 2007 Cabinet version of the 
Bill bears little resemblance to the 2002 version.  Almost every clause has been 
changed under the direction of the Portfolio Committee and the Executive.  A major 
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drawback of the 2007 Cabinet version is its complex format containing too many 
schedules and cross-references.139  The 2002 version was easy to follow and 
understand, bearing in mind that lay people and not only legal scholars would be 
working with the Bill.  Unlike the 2002 version applying to all children equally, the 
2007 version allowed for bifurcation which meant that it excluded certain children 
from certain services (assessment, preliminary inquiry and possible diversion) based 
on their age and category of offence.140  This was evidence of a change in policy in 
that only certain children would be entitled to the procedures in the Bill.   
 
The clauses devoted to age and criminal capacity were much more elaborate and 
extensive than the 2002 equivalents.  Clause 6 of the Bill (2007 Cabinet version) set 
out the provisions relating to the criminal capacity of children below the age of 10 
while clause 7 and 8 dealt with the procedure to be followed in respect of these 
children.141  This was an improvement of the 2003 version which was silent on the 
matter, as observed by NICRO and the Open Society Foundation in their 2002 
submissions to the Committee.  The criminal capacity of children between the ages of 
10 and 14 and the establishment of criminal capacity is dealt with in clause 9 and 10 
of the Bill.142  Clause 10(2) and (3) provided that the determination of criminal 
capacity must be based on the assessment report of the probation officer and that an 
evaluation may be ordered by a suitably qualified person.  However, it does not make 
any mention of it being a state expense as was done in s56(2) of the 2002 Bill.  This is 
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concerning because probation officers are not suitably trained to carry out an 
assessment of the child’s criminal capacity.  Secondly, if the evaluation is no longer a 
State expense, albeit necessary, it may never be ordered because of the cost involved.   
 
Once again submissions were made by interested parities concerning the newly tabled 
version of the Bill.   Professor J. Sloth-Nielsen submitted her comments on the Bill 
earlier this year indicating that over the last eight years our law has developed quite 
rapidly resulting in compelling research in favour of increasing the MACR.  Her 
submission was based on the recent developments in our law and thus took a very 
different approach to the one she initially supported in 2002.  She submitted that the 
Portfolio Committee should be making legislative amendments in accordance with 
international law.  The age of 10 should be raised to 12 and progressively raised from 
there and the doli incapax presumption should be abandoned.143  However, if the 
presumption is to be retained then it should apply to children over the age of 12.  In 
her oral submission she gave supporting scientific evidence in favour of criminal 
capacity and of having a fixed minimum at the age of 12.  It was generally agreed 
upon amongst child development experts that children only start developing the 
ability to make appropriate choices and to understand the consequences of those 
choices at around the age of 11.  It is this same consensus that is expressed as the 
conative mental function which completes the criminal capacity test.  Law reform 
over the last decade has shown a number of countries fixing their MACR at 12 which 
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becomes a fixed rule of law irrespective of differing maturing rates.144  She expressed 
her support for some of the new ideas such as the inclusion of referring children 
lacking criminal responsibility due to youth in terms of clause 7(3)(a).  However, she 
argued there is much to be desired in that there are too many errors and loopholes in 
the clauses outlining the procedures relating to criminal capacity and matters related 
to age.145  
 
Despite, the recent release of General Comment No.10 in which the CROC 
recommends that the minimum age be set at 12, the Child Justice Alliance supported 
their previous submission under the 2002 version of the Bill but some made additional 
comments.  With regard to clause 6(2), the Alliance brought the typographical error to 
the attention of the Committee and provided a suggestion on how the clause should be 
read.146  Clause 7 did not appear in the 2002 version which indicates reform progress 
on the part of the Portfolio Committee or the Executive, although, the clause in 
subsection (2), (3), (4), (6) and (7) need not be limited to a probation officer.  Any 
other suitably qualified person will be allowed to conduct the assessment.147  Clause 
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9(1)(a) is the same as s5(2) of the 2002 version of the Bill.148  Clause 9(1)(b) needs to 
be removed from clause 9 as it deals with the prosecutor’s decision to divert the 
matter not with criminal capacity.149  The criteria establishing criminal capacity is laid 
out in clause 10.150  Establishing criminal capacity has always been a problem area in 
our law for reasons discussed earlier.151 The Alliance urged that the Committee place 
the careful task of establishing criminal capacity in the hands of appropriate 
professionals.  The Alliance outwardly rejected clause 10(2), as a probation officer is 
not the appropriate person to assess the criminal capacity of the child during the first 
48 hours after the arrest has been made.152  Finally they argued that s56(2) – (5) of the 
2002 version should be reinserted in place of clause 10(2) – (5).153  
            
When the Bill was first tabled in 2002, NICRO had supported the increased MACR 
from 7 to 10.  They did, however, alert the Committee to the fact that the CROC had 
become very critical of countries setting their minimum ages at 10.  NICRO then 
raised its concerns that South Africa may fall short of its international obligations if it 
did not raise the minimum age higher than this.  Commenting subsequently on the 
2007 version of the Bill, NICRO suppored the recommendations they made in their 
previous submission of raising the minimum age to 12.154   
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In its submission to the Portfolio Committee on the 2007 (Cabinet version) of the Bill, 
Childline South Africa contends that the MACR of 10 in clause 6 be increased to 12.  
Childline is in favour of 12 as the MACR because it is in accordance with research 
based on the development of children and the recommendations made by the 
CROC.155  Childline has further argued for the retention of the rebuttable presumption 
for children 12 years and older but younger than 14.156  Research studies have shown 
that at the age of 12, a child is developed enough to exercise the ability to make 
choices and to understand the consequences of those choices.157  This was evidence in 
support an increased MACR from 10 to 12 with the presumption coming into 
operation for children between the ages of 12 and 14.  Childline further commended 
and supported the programmes and services envisaged by clauses 7 and 8 as the 2002 
version was silent about the procedures for children below the age of 10.158  Once the 
Bill is enacted these programmes and services will serve as crime prevention 
strategies.  The objections Childline raised to some of the clauses dealing with 
criminal capacity were very much the same as those put forward by the Child Justice 
Alliance.        
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After all the submissions were heard and debated the first clause-by-clause reading of 
the Bill took place at the end of April 2008.159  The overall feeling amongst civil 
society was to reform to the provisions of the 2002 Bill.  The following provisional 
decisions were made by the Portfolio Committee on Justice and Constitutional 
Development; Firstly, the services of assessment, the preliminary inquiry and possible 
diversion should be afforded to all children equally and not certain children depending 
on their age or the offence committed.160  The Committee was persuaded that this 
‘exclusion of certain children from these processes and procedures places them in a 
more prejudicial position not only with regard to other children but also with regard to 
certain adults who appear in criminal courts’.161  The provision that allows the 
probation officer to carry out an assessment into the child’s criminal capacity remains 
the same even though they are not adequately trained for this.  This was confirmed by 
the Department of Social Development however the Committee is of the opinion that 
the provision remains the same as there is still an option for an expert to assess the 
child if the prosecution or legal representative apply for it.162  I submit that the 
Committee should provide a provision catering for procedures (where a suitably 
qualified person can carry out the assessment) if the prosecution or legal 
representative does not apply for such an assessment contemplated in clause 10(3).       
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11. Child Justice Bill (2008 Cabinet version as approved by the National 
Assembly) 
On 25 June 2008 the National Assembly approved the Child Justice Bill.163  The new 
Bill is set to come into effect on 01 April 2010 after it has been approved by the 
National Council of Provinces.164  The initial 2007 draft Bill which was complex and 
extremely difficult to read was however amended for easier reading and made more 
user-friendly for all those involved in advocating children’s rights, including children 
themselves.165  The issue of bifurcation was laid to rest in this version of the Bill, 
ensuring that ‘all children will be assessed, appear at the preliminary inquiry and be 
considered for diversion’.166 
 
Clause 4 is worded differently to that of the clause 4 in the 2007 Cabinet version.  In 
consultation with Professor Sloth-Nielsen an error contained in clause 4(1) was 
brought to my attention.167  The clause reads, subject to subsection (2) the application 
of the Act applies to anyone who is alleged to have committed an offence and was (a) 
under the age of 10 at the time of the offence and (b) was 10 years old or older but 
under the age of 18.  She argued that the way clause 4 has been worded by including 
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children under the age of 10 is possibly indicative of the position that South Africa 
has no MACR.  I am of the opinion that if clause 4(1)(a) is read in conjunction with 
clause 5(1) then the provisions for children under the age of 10 have the same effect 
as the provisions which were better worded in 2007 Cabinet version.168   
 
Part 2 of the Bill sets out the provisions for the MACR and the procedures dealing 
with children under 10 years old and those children over 10 years old but below 14.  
Clause 7(1) determines that children under the age of 10 years old ‘cannot’ be 
prosecuted even if they committed an offence.  Professor Sloth-Nielsen is of the 
opinion that clause 7(1) should read ‘can never be prosecuted instead of cannot be 
prosecuted’.  The word ‘cannot’ in clause 7(1) has remained unchanged from clause 
6(1) in the 2007 Cabinet version.  The wording of this clause suggests that a child 
‘cannot’ be prosecuted before the age of 10 if he or she committed an offence before 
then.  However, the State can wait until the child turns 10 years old and then 
prosecute that child for the act committed prior to his or her attaining the age of 10.  
This too is possibly indicative of the position that South Africa may have no MACR.  
Clause 7(2) has the effect of raising the MACR to 10 and retaining the common law 
rebuttable presumption for children between the ages of 10 and older but below 14 
despite all the submissions in favour of a MACR of 12.169  It also directs the reader to 
the clause that sets out how the State must rebut the presumption.170   
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Clause 8 is a completely new one which was not contained in the 2007 Cabinet 
version of the Bill.  It provides for review of the MACR, ‘not later than five years 
after the commencement of this section’.  This clause must further be cross-referenced 
with clause 96(4) and (5).  The Portfolio Committee has provided that the MACR will 
be reviewed within five years after date of implementation and raised if need be.  
Clause 96 provides a detailed outline for review and what the report should contain 
that must be submitted to Cabinet for approval, and later to Parliament, to be 
considered.171   The Intersectoral Committee will be responsible for putting the report 
together in light of the following information:  Statistics of the categories of children 
that are alleged to have committed offences (between the ages of 10 and 13 years old) 
and the type of offences they allegedly committed, the sentences imposed on each age 
category of children and the type of offence, if they were convicted, the number of 
matters that did not go to trial in terms of clause 10(2)(b) and those that were dealt 
with in terms of clause 11 and whether expert evidence was led and the outcome of 
the matter with regard to MACR.172  Finally, an analysis of all the statistical 
information gathered must be undertaken and recommendations should be made as to 
whether the MACR should remain at 10 years old or be raised.173  It is my submission 
that the inclusion of clause 8 is not only a significant move for South Africa’s 
legislative child law reform process but that it is a progressive step toward dealing 
with some of the MACR concerns raised by the CROC.  This clause, in conjunction 
with clause 96, answers the concern raised by the CROC in view of South Africa’s 
MACR being too low and contrary to the country’s international treaty obligations.  It 
is clear from clause 8 that the MACR will be kept under review and raised 
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progressively if the statistical data collected foreshadows such a need.  I further 
submit that South Africa is still in the infant stages of implementing such reform 
especially in view of the fact that the Bill has only recently been passed by National 
Assembly.  The CROC should be patient while South Africa carries out implementing 
its reform in the best possible manner to eventually bring its MACR in accordance 
with the position advocated by the CROC.  
 
12. Conclusion 
The MACR has finally been awarded some importance within child justice circles.  It 
has become one of the most debated topics in the offices of Parliament when the 
Child Justice Bill was deliberated upon.  The earlier case law discussion has indicated 
that the doli incapax presumption was not always been given careful consideration by 
our courts, which resulted in the presumption being incorrectly applied time and time 
again.  The presumption is based on a fundamental principle in criminal law that no 
one should be punished unless they knew and understood what they were doing was 
wrong and chose to do it anyway.174  It also takes into account that children mature at 
different levels and that they develop gradually especially in a diverse country such as 
South Africa.  I submit that the presumption does indeed provide a ‘protective mantle’ 
for children who find themselves in the harsh criminal justice system.  Criminal trials 
are often long and complex for children to understand.  They are often traumatised by 
court procedures and not always able to provide their legal representatives with 
adequate instructions.  Thus, the presumption serves as a due process safeguard for 
children who are not capable of understanding the unlawfulness of their actions, but at 
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the same, it allows for the conviction of those children who are capable of 
understanding the unlawfulness of their actions.  Together with the additional 
safeguards proposed in the Bill, the presumption is definitely an advantage for 
children in conflict with the law.   
 
Even though I am a firm believer of the doli incapax rule I still tend to favour the age 
of 12 put forward by the Child Justice Alliance and Childline South Africa, and argue 
that the presumption should apply for children between the ages of 12 and 14.  
Together these two submissions incorporate our domestic legal principles together 
with the recommendations of the CROC.  I am pleased that the Bill will be reviewed 
within 5 years after the implementation of clause 8 and I am hopeful that over time we 
will meet our international obligation.   
 
The next and final chapter of this thesis takes a broad overview of the influence of 
international law and the extent of harmonisation.  The main arguments spanning over 
the whole document will be reiterated and recommendations will further be provided.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This thesis sought to investigate the MACR in the African legal systems of Uganda, 
Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, the Gambia, Ethiopia, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Zambia.  Its aims as outlined in the chapter 1 was to 
assess, compare and analyse the MACR in accordance with the harmonisation of 
national and international laws, as reflected against the backdrop of 1) recent 
international standards and 2) African realities.   
 
The MACR has been defined (in chapter 1) as the lowest age at which a State is 
willing to hold children liable for their alleged criminal acts in any court.  Chapter 2 
sets out the international frameworks under which this study was conducted, namely 
the UNCRC and the ACRWC.1  Both instruments instruct States Parties to establish a 
MACR below which children will not be held criminally responsible.  The Beijing 
Rules stipulate that the MACR should not be fixed too low with the General 
Comment No.10 providing a clear chronological age at which the MACR should be 
set.2  The General Comment sets this age at 12 years old as an absolute minimum.  It 
further argues that countries practicing a ‘split age’ inherent in the retention of the 
doli incapax presumption are in violation of their international treaty obligations as 
the ‘split age’ leads to discriminatory practices.3  The ACRWC is still in its infancy 
compared to that of the UNCRC but it is an important document that complements the 
UNCRC in reflecting children’s realities in an African context such as the lack of 
                                               
1
 Articles 40(3)(a) of the UNCRC and 17(4) of the ACRWC.  
2
 Rule 4.1 of the Beijing Rules; CRC/C/GC/10 para 32. 
3
 CRC/C/GC/10 para 30. 
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effective birth registrations, scattered statistical data and the arbitrary manner in 
which criminal responsibility has been assessed.  States Parties are encouraged to 
review their national legislation and policies relating to the MACR and raise it in 
accordance with international standards.   
 
The General Comment serves as a reference document, combining all the existing 
issues and standards on juvenile justice and making recommendations, such as 
developing an appropriate MACR not lower than 12.  One of the greatest challenges 
for countries domesticating the recommendations made in the General Comment into 
their legal systems is that of implementation.  Thus, at present, there is still a variety 
of MACR’s at international law.  I submitted that the CROC will have to be patient 
with States Parties as many of them have in the last decade reviewed their MACR 
provisions and raised them.  However, the raised MACR’s still fall short of 
international standards.      
 
Chapter 3 looked at how each country under study reviewed their existing legislation 
concerning the MACR and undertook child law reform initiatives in an attempt to 
bring their laws in accordance with the principles of the UNCRC and the ACRWC.  
The first six countries recapped and followed on from the work of Godfrey Odongo 
produced in 2005.  The other six countries were selected on the basis of availability of 
information and that their texts were in English.  The language barrier of the other 
countries that could have been selected presented a problem for the writer whose first 
language is English.  It was unfortunate that more than half the countries under study 
failed to meet their international obligations with regard to the MACR.  It was 
submitted that Kenya, South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho, Ethiopia, Malawi and Zambia 
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all fell short of the minimum age requirement set by the CROC in General Comment 
No.10.  Uganda, Ghana, Mozambique and Sierra Leone were the only countries 
whose reform processes measured up to their international obligations by setting a 
MACR at 12 and above.       
 
Finally chapter 4 took a closer look at South Africa’s legislative reform process as 
representative of the some of the other countries under study who share the same legal 
system and have retained the ‘discriminatory’ doli incapax presumption.  It starts with 
an explanation of the concept of the MACR and the doli incapax presumption in the 
context of South Africa and how the presumption works in practice through case law 
illustrations.  The presumption was inherited as a protection for children who find 
themselves in conflict with the law and are too immature to understand the 
unlawfulness of their actions.  Many experts in the field commented that the 
presumption works in theory but not always in practice.  The case law discussions 
provided a clear example of how the presumption is often incorrectly applied by our 
courts.  Thus the presumption does not serve as a protection for younger children in 
conflict with the law it acts as a legal impediment instead. 
 
South Africa underwent a process of legal reform that started in 1997 up until 2008 
with the National Assembly passing the Child Justice Bill.  It was a highly 
collaborative process between government and civil society.  The Issue Paper was the 
result of this process followed by a Discussion Paper accompanied by a draft Bill.  In 
July 2000, a comprehensive Report on Juvenile Justice followed the Discussion Paper 
marking the end of the structured consultation process.  The Report contained many 
sound arguments by the SALRC favouring the increase of the MACR from 7 to 10 
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years old and the retention of the presumption for children between the ages of 10 and 
14 years old.   
 
The Bill passed by National Assembly increased the MACR from 7 to 10 years old 
and retained the presumption for children between the ages of 10 and 14 years old.  
This is contrary to the recommendations of the CROC.  Although I am not in favour 
of the MACR being increased to 10 instead of 12 years old.  The Bill, however, 
included a very progressive clause 8 cross-referenced with clause 96(4) and (5).  The 
clause details the review of the MACR, ‘not later than five years after the 
commencement of this section’ and the procedures involved in carrying out this 
review.4  Within five years an analysis of all the statistical information gathered must 
be undertaken and recommendations should be made as to whether the MACR should 
remain at 10 years old or be raised.5   I submitted that South Africa is still in the infant 
stages of implementing such reform especially in view of the fact that the Bill has 
only recently been passed by National Assembly.  The CROC should be patient while 
South Africa carries out implementing its reform in the best possible manner to 
eventually bring its MACR in accordance with the position advocated by the CROC.  
 
In conclusion I recommend that all the countries under study that have not increased 
their MACR in accordance with international law should strive toward that end.  They 
should continue to review their laws through the system of State reporting and 
progressively raise their MACR’s in an attempt to bring their laws in accordance with 
their treaty obligations.  Countries such as Kenya, Namibia, Lesotho and Malawi 
should consider implementing a similar clause like that of South Africa’s clause 8.  
                                               
4
 See Appedix 3 clause 8 and Appendix 3(A) clause 96. 
5
 See Appendix 3(A) clause 96(4)(e) and (f). 
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Ethiopia and Zambia need to take legislative reform that is aimed at creating rights 
and protections for children instead of relying on their Penal codes.  Secondly, those 
countries such as Uganda, Ghana, Mozambique and Sierra Leone who have met their 
treaty obligations should continue to ensure their laws are being effectively 
implemented into their legal systems.  Finally, South Africa should ensure that they 
keep proper controls over their statistical data in view of reviewing their MACR in 
five years time.  
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APPENDIX 1: Child Justice Bill No. 49 of 2002 
Criminal capacity 
‘5. (1) A child who commits an offence while under the age of 10 years cannot be prosecuted 
for that offence. 
 
(2) A child who commits an offence while under the age of 14 years is presumed not to have 
had the capacity to appreciate the difference between right and wrong and to act in 
accordance with that appreciation, unless the criminal capacity of the child is proved in 
accordance with section 56. 
 
(3) If a Director of Public Prosecutions intends charging a child contemplated in subsection (2) 
with an offence, the Director or his or her delegate must issue a certificate confirming an 
intention to prosecute.  
 
(4) If the certificate contemplated in subsection (3) is not issued within 14 days after the 
preliminary inquiry, the Director of Public Prosecutions must be regarded as having declined 
to institute prosecution. 
 
(5) In issuing a certificate contemplated in subsection (3) the Director of Public Prosecutions    
     may have regard to any relevant information, but must have regard to 
(a) the appropriateness of diversion; 
(b) the educational level, cognitive ability, domestic and environmental circumstances, age       
    and maturity of such child; 
(c) the nature and gravity of the alleged offence; 
(d) the impact of the alleged offence upon any victim of such offence; and 
(e) a probation officer’s assessment report. 
 
(6) The common law pertaining to the criminal capacity of children is hereby amended to the 
extent set out in this section.’ 
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Establishment of criminal capacity 
‘56. (1) The criminal capacity of a child over the age of 10 years but under the age of 14 years 
must be proved by the State beyond reasonable doubt. 
 
(2) The prosecutor or the child’s legal representative may request the child justice court to 
order an evaluation of the child by a suitably qualified person to be conducted at State 
expense. 
 
(3) If an order has been made by the child justice court in terms of subsection (2), the person 
identified to conduct an evaluation of the child must furnish the child justice court with a 
written report of the evaluation within 30 days of the date of the order. 
 
(4) The evaluation must include an assessment of the cognitive, emotional, psychological and 
social development of the child. 
 
(5) The person who conducts the evaluation may be called to attend the child justice court 
proceedings and give evidence and, if called, must be remunerated by the State in 
accordance with section 91 of the Criminal Procedure Act.’ 
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APPENDIX 2: Child Justice Bill (2007 Cabinet Version) 
PART 1: APPLICATION OF ACT 
Application of Act 
4. (1) Subject to subsection (2), this Act applies to any person in the Republic who is alleged 
to have committed an offence and who, at the time of the commission of the alleged offence, 
was 10 years or older but below the age of 18 years. 
 
(2) Notwithstanding subsection (1) – 
(a) only Part 2 of this Chapter applies to any person who, at the time of the commission of the 
alleged offence, was under the age of 10 years; and 
(b) the Director of Public Prosecutions or a prosecutor designated thereto by the Director 
may, in exceptional circumstances and in accordance with directives issued by the National 
Director of Public Prosecutions, in the case of a person who is being charged with a Schedule 
1 or 2 offence and who is 18 years or older but under the age of 21 years, at the time of the 
institution of criminal proceedings against him or her in respect of the commission of an 
alleged offence, direct that the matter be dealt with in terms of section 11(b) or (c). 
 
(3) (a) The Criminal Procedure Act applies with such changes as may be required by the 
context to any person contemplated in this section, except in so far as this Act provides for 
amended, additional or different provisions or procedures in respect of such person. 
(b) For purposes of paragraph (a), Schedule 7 to this Act, which is not part of this Act and 
does not have the force of law, contains an exposition of the interface between the Criminal 
Procedure Act and this Act. 
 
PART 2: CHILDREN BELOW 10 YEARS OF AGE 
Criminal capacity of child below 10 years of age 
6. (1) A child who commits an offence while below the age of 10 years does not have criminal 
capacity and cannot be prosecuted for that offence, but must be dealt with in terms of section 
8. 
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(2) The common law pertaining to the criminal capacity of children below 10 years is hereby 
amended to the extent set out in this section and section. 
 
Manner of dealing with child below 10 years of age 
7. (1) Where a police official has reason to believe that a child suspected of having committed 
an offence is below the age of 10 years, he or she may not arrest the child, and must 
immediately but not later than 48 hours take such child to the child’s home and if the child 
does not have a home, to a placement facility and must inform a probation officer, as 
prescribed. 
 
(2) A probation officer who receives a notification from a police official in terms of subsection 
(1), must assess the child in terms of Chapter 5 as soon as possible but not later than seven 
days after receipt of the notification. 
 
(3) (a) After assessment of a child in terms of subsection (2), the probation officer concerned 
may - 
(i) in the prescribed manner, refer the child to the children’s court on any of the 
grounds set out in section 51; 
(ii) in the prescribed manner, refer the child for counselling or therapy; 
(iii) in the prescribed manner, refer the child to an accredited programme designed 
specifically to suit the needs of children below the age of 10 years; 
(iv) arrange for support services to the child; 
(v) in the prescribed manner, arrange a meeting, which must be attended by the 
child, his or her parent or an appropriate adult, and which may be attended by 
any other person likely to provide information for the purposes of the meeting 
contemplated in subsection (4); or 
(vi) decide to take no action. 
(b) Any action taken under paragraph (a) may not, in any way, require a child to be held 
responsible for the incident that led to the assessment. 
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(4) The purposes of the meeting convened by a probation officer in terms of subsection 
(3)(a)(v) are to - 
(a) assist such probation officer to establish more fully the circumstances surrounding the 
allegations against a child who is alleged to have committed an act with serious 
consequences; and 
(b) formulate a written plan appropriate to the child and relevant to the circumstances. 
 
(5) The written plan referred to in subsection (4)(b) must, at least - 
(a) specify the objectives to be achieved for the child and the period within which 
they should be achieved; 
(b) contain details of the services and assistance to be provided for the child as 
prescribed; 
(c) specify the persons or organisations to provide such services and assistance 
as prescribed; and 
(d) state the responsibilities of the child and of the parent or appropriate adult. 
 
(6) The probation officer must record, with reasons, the outcome of the assessment and the 
decision made in terms of subsection (3) in the prescribed manner. 
 
(7) The decision made by the probation officer in terms of subsection (3), including the written 
plan, if any, must, in the prescribed manner, be submitted to a magistrate in chambers for 
consideration and for purposes of having the decision, including the plan, if any, made an 
order of court. 
 
Assessment of child below 10 years of age 
8. The provisions of Chapter 5 relating to the assessment of children apply in respect of 
children contemplated in this Part, except- 
(a) section 35(b), (c) and (d), dealing with assessment before a preliminary inquiry; 
(b) section 40(1)(d) and 41(4), dealing with the acknowledgment of responsibility; 
(c) section 41(1), dealing with the recommendations by a probation officer, in 
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which case the provisions of section 7(3) apply; and 
(d) section 41(5), dealing with the submission of the assessment report to the 
prosecutor. 
 
Criminal capacity of child aged 10 years or older but below 14 years 
9. (1) (a) A child who is 10 years of age or older but under the age of 14 years and who 
commits an offence is presumed to lack criminal capacity, unless he or she is proved to have 
such criminal capacity in accordance with section 10. 
(b) A prosecutor who is required to make a decision in respect of a child referred to in 
paragraph (a), whether to divert such child as contemplated in section 11(b) or (c) or not, or 
whether to prosecute such child as contemplated in section 11(e) or not, must take the 
following factors into consideration: 
(i) The educational level, cognitive ability, domestic and environmental 
circumstances, age and maturity of such child; 
(ii) the nature and gravity of the alleged offence; 
(iii) the impact of the alleged offence upon any victim of such offence and the implications 
thereof; 
(iv) the interests of the community; 
(v) a probation officer's assessment report in terms of Chapter 5; 
(vi) the prospects of establishing criminal capacity in terms of section 10 if the matter were to 
be referred to a preliminary inquiry in terms of Chapter 7 or to trial in terms of Chapter 8; and 
(vii) any other relevant factor. 
(c) If a prosecutor decides in respect of a child referred to in paragraph (a) – 
(i) that criminal capacity is likely to be proven in terms of section 10, he or she 
must, in the event of – 
(aa) diversion being a possibility, proceed as contemplated in section 11(b) or (c); 
(bb) prosecution being a possibility, proceed as contemplated in section 11(e); or 
(ii) that criminal capacity is not likely to be proved in terms of section 10 and the matter 
cannot be diverted or prosecuted on this ground alone, he or she may cause the child to be 
taken to a probation officer for any further action in terms of Part 2 of this Chapter. 
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(2) The common law pertaining to the criminal capacity of children aged 7 years or older but 
below the age of 14 years is hereby amended to the extent set out in this section and section 
10. 
 
Establishment of criminal capacity 
10. (1) The capacity of a child who is 10 years or older but under the age of 14 years to 
appreciate the difference between right and wrong and to act in accordance with that 
appreciation at the time of the commission of an alleged offence must be proved by the State 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
(2) In making a determination regarding the criminal capacity of the child in question, the 
inquiry magistrate or child justice court must consider the assessment report of the probation 
officer contemplated in section 41 and all evidence placed before it prior to diversion or 
conviction, as the case may be, which evidence may include a report of an evaluation referred 
to in subsection (3). 
 
(3) An inquiry magistrate or child justice court may, on its own accord, or upon the request of 
the prosecutor or the child’s legal representative, order an evaluation of the criminal capacity 
of the child referred to in subsection (1), in the prescribed manner, by a suitably qualified 
person, which must include an assessment of the cognitive, emotional, psychological and 
social development of the child. 
 
(4) If an order has been made by the inquiry magistrate or child justice court in terms of 
subsection (3), the person identified to conduct an evaluation of the child must furnish the 
inquiry magistrate or child justice court with a written report of the evaluation within 30 days of 
the date of the order. 
 
(5) Where an inquiry magistrate or child justice court has found that a child’s criminal capacity 
has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, such inquiry magistrate or child justice court 
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may, if it is in the interests of the child, cause the child to be taken to a probation officer for 
any further action in terms of Part 2 of Chapter 2. 
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APPENDIX 3: Child Justice Bill (2008 Cabinet Version as approved by the 
National Assembly) 
PART 1: APPLICATION OF ACT 
Application of Act 
4. (1) Subject to subsection (2), this Act applies to any person in the Republic who is alleged 
to have committed an offence and— 
(a) was under the age of 10 years at the time of the commission of the alleged 
      offence; or 
(b) was 10 years or older but under the age of 18 years when he or she was— 
(i) handed a written notice in terms of section 18 or 22; 
(ii) served with a summons in terms of section 19; or 
(iii) arrested in terms of section 20, for that offence. 
 
(2) The Director of Public Prosecutions having jurisdiction may, in accordance with directives 
issued by the National Director of Public Prosecutions in terms of section 97(4)(a)(i)(aa), in 
the case of a person who— 
(a) is alleged to have committed an offence when he or she was under the age of 
     18 years; and 
(b) is 18 years or older but under the age of 21 years, at the time referred to in 
subsection (1)(b), direct that the matter be dealt with in terms of section 5(2) to (4). 
 
(3) (a) The Criminal Procedure Act applies with the necessary changes as may be required by 
the context to any person referred to in this section, except in so far as this Act provides for 
amended, additional or different provisions or procedures in respect of that person. 
 (b) For purposes of paragraph (a), Schedule 5 to this Act, which is not part of this Act and 
does not have the force of law, contains an exposition of the interface between the Criminal 
Procedure Act and this Act. 
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Manner of dealing with children who are alleged to have committed offences 
5. (1) Every child who is alleged to have committed an offence and is under the age of 10 
years, must be referred to a probation officer to be dealt with in terms of section 9. 
 
(2) Every child who is 10 years or older, who is alleged to have committed an offence and 
who is required to appear at a preliminary inquiry in respect of that offence must, before his or 
her first appearance at the preliminary inquiry, be assessed by a probation officer, unless 
assessment is dispensed with in terms of section 41(3) or 47(5). 
 
(3) A preliminary inquiry must be held in respect of every child referred to in 
subsection (2) after he or she has been assessed, except where the matter— 
(a) has been diverted in accordance with Chapter 6; 
(b) involves a child who is 10 years or older but under the age of 14 years where criminal 
capacity is not likely to be proved, as provided for in section 10(2)(b);    or 
(c) has been withdrawn. 
 
(4) (a) A matter in respect of a child referred to in subsection (2) may be considered for 
diversion— 
(i) by a prosecutor in accordance with Chapter 6; or 
(ii) at a preliminary inquiry in accordance with Chapter 7. 
(b) A matter which is for any reason not diverted in terms of paragraph (a) must, unless the 
matter has been withdrawn or referred to a children’s court, be referred to a child justice court 
for plea and trial in terms of Chapter 9. 
(c) A matter in respect of a child referred to in paragraph (b) may, before the conclusion of the 
case for the prosecution, be considered for diversion by a child justice court in terms of 
Chapter 9. 
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Seriousness of offences 
6. (1) In order to determine the seriousness of offences for purposes of this Act, the 
categories of offences are listed in the following order, beginning with the category of least 
serious offences: 
(a) Offences contained in Schedule 1; 
(b) offences contained in Schedule 2; and 
(c) offences contained in Schedule 3. 
 
(2) In the case of a child being charged with more than one offence which are dealt with in the 
same criminal proceedings, the most serious offence must guide the manner in which the 
child must be dealt with in terms of this Act. 
 
(3) In the case of a child being charged with more than one offence which are dealt with in 
separate criminal proceedings, subsection (2) does not apply. 
 
PART 2: CRIMINAL CAPACITY OF CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 14 
YEARS 
Minimum age of criminal capacity 
7. (1) A child who commits an offence while under the age of 10 years does not have criminal 
capacity and cannot be prosecuted for that offence, but must be dealt with in terms of section 
9. 
(2) A child who is 10 years or older but under the age of 14 years and who commits an 
offence is presumed to lack criminal capacity, unless the State proves that he or she has 
criminal capacity in accordance with section 11. 
(3) The common law pertaining to the criminal capacity of children under the age of 14 years 
is hereby amended to the extent set out in this section. 
 
Review of minimum age of criminal capacity 
8. In order to determine whether or not the minimum age of criminal capacity as set out in 
section 7(1) should be raised, the Cabinet member responsible for the administration of 
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justice must, not later than five years after the commencement of this section, submit a report 
to Parliament, as provided for in section 96(4) and (5). 
 
Manner of dealing with child under the age of 10 years 
9. (1) Where a police official has reason to believe that a child suspected of having committed 
an offence is under the age of 10 years, he or she may not arrest the child, and must, in the 
prescribed manner, immediately hand the child over— 
(a) to his or her parents or an appropriate adult; or 
(b) if no parent or appropriate adult is available or if it is not in the best interests of the child to 
be handed over to the parent or appropriate adult, to a suitable child and youth care centre, 
and must notify a probation officer. 
 
(2) A probation officer who receives notification from a police official in terms of subsection 
(1), must assess the child in terms of the provisions of Chapter 5 which are applicable to 
children under the age of 10 years as soon as possible but not later than seven days after 
being notified. 
 
(3) (a) After assessing a child in terms of subsection (2), the probation officer may, in the 
prescribed manner— 
(i)   refer the child to the children’s court on any of the grounds set out in       
      section 50; 
(ii)  refer the child for counselling or therapy; 
(iii) refer the child to an accredited programme designed specifically to      
       suit the needs of children under the age of 10 years; 
(iv) arrange support services for the child; 
(v) arrange a meeting, which must be attended by the child, his or her   
     parent or an appropriate adult, and which may be attended by any 
     other person likely to provide information for the purposes of the        
     meeting referred to in subsection (4); or 
(vi) decide to take no action.  
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(b) Any action taken under paragraph (a) does not imply that the child is criminally liable for 
the incident that led to the assessment. 
 
(4) The purpose of the meeting convened by a probation officer in terms of subsection 
(3)(a)(v) is to— 
(a) assist the probation officer to establish more fully the circumstances 
     surrounding the allegations against a child; and 
(b) formulate a written plan appropriate to the child and relevant to the 
      circumstances. 
 
(5) The written plan referred to in subsection (4)(b) must, at least— 
(a) specify the objectives to be achieved for the child and the period within which 
      they should be achieved; 
(b) contain details of the services and assistance to be provided for the child, as 
      prescribed; 
(c) specify the persons or organisations to provide the services and assistance,      
      as prescribed; and 
(d) state the responsibilities of the child and of the parent or appropriate adult. 
 
(6) The probation officer must record, with reasons, the outcome of the assessment and the 
decision made in terms of subsection (3) in the prescribed manner. 
 
(7) In the event of a child failing to comply with any obligation imposed in terms of 
this section, including compliance with the written plan referred to in subsection (4)(b), the 
probation officer must refer the matter to a children’s court to be dealt with in terms of Chapter 
9 of the Children’s Act. 
 
Decision to prosecute child who is 10 years or older but under the age of 14 years 
10. (1) A prosecutor who is required to make a decision whether or not to prosecute a child 
referred to in section 7(2) must take the following into consideration: 
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(a) The educational level, cognitive ability, domestic and environmental    
      circumstances, age and maturity of the child; 
(b) the nature and seriousness of the alleged offence; 
(c) the impact of the alleged offence on any victim; 
(d) the interests of the community; 
(e) a probation officer’s assessment report in terms of Chapter 5; 
(f) the prospects of establishing criminal capacity in terms of section 11 if the 
     matter were to be referred to a preliminary inquiry in terms of Chapter 7; 
(g) the appropriateness of diversion; and 
(h) any other relevant factor. 
 
(2) If a prosecutor decides in respect of a child referred to in subsection (1) that 
criminal capacity is— 
(a) likely to be proved in terms of section 11, he or she may— 
(i) divert the matter in terms of Chapter 6 if the child is alleged to have 
               committed an offence referred to in Schedule 1; or 
(ii) refer the matter to a preliminary inquiry as provided for in Chapter 7; or 
(b) not likely to be proved in terms of section 11, he or she may cause the child  
      to be taken to a probation officer to be dealt with in terms of section 9. 
 
Proof of criminal capacity 
11. (1) The State must prove beyond reasonable doubt the capacity of a child who is 10 years 
or older but under the age of 14 years to appreciate the difference between right and wrong at 
the time of the commission of an alleged offence and to act in accordance with that 
appreciation. 
 
(2) In making a decision regarding the criminal capacity of the child in question— 
(a) the inquiry magistrate, for purposes of diversion; or 
(b) if the matter has not been diverted, the child justice court, for purposes of   
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plea and trial, must consider the assessment report of the probation officer    referred to 
in section 40 and all evidence placed before the inquiry magistrate or child justice court 
prior to diversion or conviction, as the case may be, which evidence may include a report 
of an evaluation referred to in subsection (3). 
 
(3) An inquiry magistrate or child justice court may, on own accord, or on the request of the 
prosecutor or the child’s legal representative, order an evaluation of the criminal capacity of 
the child referred to in subsection (1), in the prescribed manner, by a suitably qualified 
person, which must include an assessment of the cognitive, moral, emotional, psychological 
and social development of the child. 
 
(4) If an order has been made by the inquiry magistrate or child justice court in terms of 
subsection (3), the person identified to conduct an evaluation of the child must furnish the 
inquiry magistrate or child justice court with a written report of the evaluation within 30 days of 
the date of the order. 
 
(5) Where an inquiry magistrate or child justice court has found that a child’s criminal capacity 
has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the inquiry magistrate or child justice court 
may, if it is in the interests of the child, cause the child to be taken to a probation officer for 
any further action in terms of section 9. 
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APPENDIX 3(A):  Chapter 14 General Provisions s96(4) and (5) 
Responsibilities, functions and duties of Intersectoral Committee 
96. (4) In order for Parliament to review the minimum age of criminal capacity, as provided for 
in section 8, the Intersectoral Committee must, not later than five years after the 
commencement of this Act, submit a report to the Cabinet member responsible for the 
administration of justice, setting out the following: 
(a) The statistics of the following categories of children who are alleged to have committed an 
offence and the offences they are alleged to have committed: 
(i) Children who are 10 years at the time of the commission of the alleged offence; 
(ii) children who are 11 years at the time of the commission of the alleged offence; 
(iii) children who are 12 years at the time of the commission of the alleged offence; 
(iv) children who are 13 years at the time of the commission of the alleged offence; 
(b) sentences imposed on the children in the categories referred to in paragraph (a), if they 
were convicted; 
(c) the number of children referred to in paragraph (a) whose matters did not go to trial, as 
provided for in section 10(2)(b) on the grounds that the prosecutor was of the view that 
criminal capacity would not be proved and reasons for that decision in each case; 
(d) the number of children referred to in paragraph (a) whose matters were dealt with in 
accordance with section 11, whether expert evidence was led, and the outcome of each 
matter regarding the establishment of criminal capacity; 
(e) an analysis of the statistics referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d); and 
(f) a recommendation based on the analysis as to whether the minimum age of criminal 
capacity should remain at 10 years as provided for in section 7(1) or whether the minimum 
age of criminal capacity should be raised. 
 
(5) The Cabinet member responsible for the administration of justice must, on receipt of the 
report referred to in subsection (4), submit the report to Cabinet for approval, and thereafter to 
Parliament for consideration. 
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